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This thesis attempts to discuss the position of the
Somalis in the East Africa Protectorate and Kenya Colony
from the beginning of British administration in 1895 to
the time when Kenya attained its independence in 1963.
The seven chapters are mainly intended as a historical
survey of British administrative policy towards both the
local Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) Somalis and the
%
so-called 'Alien' Somalis in the urban centres of Kenya.
The main theme is the political and administrative problems
associated with the Somalis in Kenya, but a social and
economic approach of some of the problems involved is also
included.
The first chapter deals with the Jubaland Somalis
and their response to the British administration.. The second
discusses attempts by the British administration to pacify
the Somalis in Jubaland and in the newly established N.F.D.
The third deals with international aspects of the
administration of a frontier people, and the impact of the
Italo-Abyssinian conflict of 1935 and the Second World War.
The fourth discusses the position of the 'Alien' or urban
Somalis and their response to colonial rule. The fifth
deals with the post-war social and economic position of the
Somalis in Kenya. The last two chapters deal with the
growth of national feeling among the Kenya Somalis and
their response to the concept of Greater Somalia.
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INTRODUCTION
The Somalia inhabit a vast region in the Horn of
Africa bounded to the East by the Indian Ocean down to
the mouth of the Tana River in Kenya; to the west by
Ethiopia to Longitude ij.2° and Latitude 12°; to the north
up to Latitude 12°; and to the south by the Tana River
up to 38° Longitude. This is in all an area of about
1,000,500 sq. miles. Throughout the period under
consideration in this thesis, the Somalia were divided
politically among the Powers to form British Somaliland,
Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland and some were
t
divided between Ethiopia and Kenya. By I960, the first
two were united to form the Somali Republic, while the
rest, including the area particularly considered in this
thesis, were still struggling to secede and join the
Republic.
This thesis attempts to examine the position of the
Kenya Somalia from the start of the British administration
in 1895 up to 1963 when Kenya attained its independence.
The survey, which mainly deals with the area generally
known as the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.), has also
included the other group of Somalia in the urban centres
known to the British administrative officials as 'Alien*
Somalia. The latter group, although they had a different
history of immigration into the Protectorate and the
Colony, had problems which were complementary to the local
or N.F.D. Somalia and hence^their inclusion in the survey >r
is hoped to give a clearer picture of the Somali question
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in Kenya as a whole.
But before discussing the main issues of the
administration of the Somalia in Kenya between 1895 and
1963, it is worthwhile to give an outline of the main
problems involved in governing the Somalia. These
problems were inherent in the apparently obscure origin
of the people; the question of the history of their
migration into the Protectorate and the Colony; the
geography of their country which was itself an obstacle to
their position; and finally their attitude to the previous
attempts o-f foreign rule.
The Origin of the Somalia
Although it is not the intention of this thesis to
formalize* a hypothesis about the origin of the people -
indeed already much research has been done in this aspect
by authorities on the Somalia"'' - it is important to discuss
the question here in view of the fact that it was one of
the main obstacles which faced the British administrators
in Kenya. In Kenya, where the administration was marked
by the classification of the different races into different
units, the question as to whether the Somali was an
African "native" or a "non-native" was always raised.
In fact at a certain stage the N.P.D. Somalia were
distinguished from the other Bantu tribes in the country
1. See I.M. Lewis, Peoples of the Horn of Africa; Somali.
Afar and Saho, (London, 1955) J A Pastoral Democracy"!"
(London, l^fl)• The Modern History of Somaliland,
(London, 1965); "The Somali Conquest of the Horn of
Africa", J.A.H., Vol. I, No. 2, I960, pp. 213-29.
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and were called "tribesmen" instead of "natives". The
other section, the urban or Ishaq Somalia were often
referred to as "Aliens" or "non-native". It is important
thus, not only from the point of view of the Kenya Somalia,
but also for the political position of the Somalis in the
general African scene, that the question of their origin
and position should be clarified.
According to Somali tradition, the Somali people are
divided into three main classes. Firstly, the Asha
Somalis classed by Genealogists as "Semites""*" owing to
their traditional descent from the union of two Arab
Proselytizera Sheikh Ishaq bin Ahmad and Darod bin -Ismail
with "Hamitic" women. Secondly, the Irir or Hawiye
Somalis, classed as "pure Hamites" and regarded as the
descendants of "Hamitic" people who were resident near the
Red Sea Coast and the Gulf of Aden when the Arabs arrived,
into whose families those Arab immigrants married. Thirdly,
the low class Somali tribes known as Sup or Sab including
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the smiths and the hunters - Tomal, Midgan and Bon.
Somali tradition was also frequently supplemented by
writings from prominent people in the different parts of
the Horn of Africa. All Ahmad Udum, the President of the
Liberation Front of the French Somali Coast maintained
1. It Is still not clear on what grounds the words "Semitic"
and "Hamitic" are used in this context; whether they
denote a difference in skin colour, physical features
or linguistic variations.
2. J.W.K. Pease, "The Tomal or Smith Class in Gurreh District",
1927. K.N.A., Natives Tribes and their Customs. Vol. IV,
part 2.
that both the Danakil and Somalia were "Hamites" mixed
with immigrants from Arabia and that this immigration
together with the degree of integration among the immigrants
had resulted in a predominantly Arabicized Somali nation."1"
However, subsequent research into the origin of Somalia
j , . ,
_ i V' "3 '''I
is increasingly sceptical of the "Semitic" and even the
"Hamitic" hypotheses. Writing in 1938, Sir Vincent Glenday,
a prominent Somali administrator, quoted the Italian
anthropologist Sergi, to illustrate his views on the
subject. Sergi, after comparing the physical type of the
Somali with that of other branches of the "Hamitic race",
concluded that, "the Semitic ancestory of the Asha tribes
has by the present time left no visible trace on the type
and that the Somalia of the present day must be regarded
p
from an anthropological point of view as pure Hamites .."
J. Bart on^ had even suggested that the Somali is not
a "pure Hamite" and that the physical characteristics of
the race show signs of interbreeding With Galla, Afar,
Arabs, Abyssinians, Bantu and negroes.
I.M. Lewis who ha£ amply dealt with Somali oral
tradition stated in "The Somali conquest of The Horn of
Africa":-
1. Ali Ahmad Udum, Al-Danakil Tarikhiya wa Bashariva,
pp. U.2, I4.9, 109. The author is a Dankali bom in
French Somaliland in 1913*
2. V.G. Glenday, "The Origin of Somalia with Special
Relation to their Political Development in Kenya",
1938* ~ Native Tribes and their Customs. Vol. IV, part 2.
3. J. Barton, "An account of the origins of the Galla and
Somali Tribes", Ibid.
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"Although it is thus possible to uncover the
main trends of Somali movements and their
general chronological sequence, Somali origins
remain obscure it is impossible to
determine yet whether the Somali are to be
regarded as independent Hamitic stock, or
whether rather they are to be considered as
a heavily Arabicized segment of that other
great branch of the Eastern Hamites, the Galla,
with whom they.are also closely connected
historically."
Later still I.M. Lewis was increasingly sceptical of
the Semitic hypothesis and was of the opinion that
"ethnically and culturally the Somalia belong to the
Hamitic ethnic group. Their olosest kinsmen are the
surrounding Hamitic (or as they are often called ,cushitic')
peoples of the Ethiopian Lowlands, and Eritrea - the
traditionally bellicose Afar (or Danakil), the Galla, Saho
and Beja."^ But he did not altogether dismiss the fact
that the traditional Arab ancestry claimed by the Somalia
is part and parcel of the traditional and profound Somali
attachment to Islam.^ These traditions, according to
Lewis, "Commemorate the many centuries of contact between
1. I.M..Lewis, "The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa",
J.A.H. , Vol. I, No. 2, I960, pp. 2I3-II4..
2. I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, p. I4..
3. Historians are not quite sure as to the exact date of
Islamic penetration in Somalia but it was generally
assumed that Islam has first arrived about the middle
of the first century A.H. by muslira traders from Arabia.
Also it was certain that both the north and southern
Somali coasts have unquestionably bean in extensive
contact with the Muslim world for almost a thousand
years. All the Somalis are Sunnis of the Shafi rite,
and the two main tariquas, the Qadirlya and the Ahmadiya,
are similarly represented in both north and south.
(See, Jami Uraar Isa, Tarikh al-Somal fil-Usur al-Wusta
Wal-Haditha. (Cairo, I385-I965) pp. 13-16; I.M. Lewis,
"Conformity and Contrast in Somali Islam", Islam in
Tropical Africa. (1966). p. 255) •
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the Somali and Arabian Coasts which have brought Islam
and many other elements of Muslim Arab culture to
Somaliland."
Modern historical and linguistic research is, how¬
ever, not only critical of the Semitic hypothesis of
Somali origin, but has also questioned the validity1'of the
word "Hamite". H.S. Lewis dismissed Somali tradition
relating to Arabian descent as "both higjhly suspect and
frequently irrelevant to the problem of origins.""*"
Disuussing the validity of these traditions H.S. Lewis
further stated, "There can be no doubt that these tales
contain little reliable historical material; but, even
if we accept I.M. Lewis's contention that they mirror
actual settlement of Arabs among the Somali, this would
leave unanswered the question of where the indigenous
Somali had come from". Analysing tradition collected and
studied by Cerulli,^ on the various Hawiye and Rahanwein
groups, H.S. Lewis maintained that they affirmed the belief
that Tunni, Hawiye, Ajuran and Jiddu Somali have been in
the south for many centuries, as the written evidence
indicated. In conclusion, he was of the opinion that the
preponderant trend of Eastern Cushitic migration and
expansion has been from the south and West to the north
and east rather than the reverse and that the original
1. Herbert S. Lewis, "The Origins of the Galla and Somali",
J.A.H. . Vol. VII, No. 1, 1966, pp. 27-1*6, pp. 35-36.
2. See E. Cerulli, Somalia: Soritti Vari Editi Ed Iniditi.
(Rome, 1957), Vol. I, pp. 57-69.
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homeland of the Somali may be placed in the south-eastern
highlands of Ethiopia. Moreover, he established that the
Galla, Somali, Afar and Saho once belonged to a single
speech community located in southern Ethiopia and presumably
shared more common cultural elements than they do now,
many centuries after their separation."'"
K.S. Lewis's hypothesis which questioned the "Semitic"
origin of the Somalis was further supplemented by recent
linguistic research into Somali and kindred languages.
This has seriously questioned the use of the word "Hamite"
even at a linguistic level. Greenberg ba£
emphatically stated:-
"As a matter of fact, even the linguistic use' of
the term Hamite should be abandoned. The Semitic
languages do not occupy any special place in the
total Hamito-Semitic complex... In other words,
the non-Semitic languages of the Hamito-Semitic
family do not form a linguistic unity as against
Semitic. Therefore, the term Hamitio, which has
been reserved for this use, does not refer to any
valid linguistic entity.... The only remaining
use of the term Hamitic is the complex terra Hamito-
Semitic and even here it can only lead to mis¬
conceptions regarding a special place for Semitic
within the entire family....I suggest the name
Afroasiatio for this family as the only one found
both in Africa and in Asia. In this way Hamitic
could be entirelYoeliminated from use even as a
linguistio term.
1. H.S. Lewis, p. I4.2.
2. Joseph H. Greenberg, Languages of Africa. (Bloomington,
1966), Ch. Ill, "Afroaaiatlc", pp. 42-65» P» 50. His
point of view was also adhered to by Robert G. Armstrong,
The Study of West African Languages,(Ibadan. 1966), an
expanded version of an Inaugural leoture delivered at
the University of Ibadan on 20th February I96I4., in which
he criticized C. Meinhof, in his Die Sprachen dar Hamiten,
(Hamburg, 1912). The latter was a study of Fula,
Hausa, Schilh, Bedauye, Somali, Masai, and Nama and
which attempts to show that they are all "Hamitic"
languages. Their views were also shared by
Dr. Andrzejewski (Department of Language, S.O.A.S.
London).
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It is thus clear that modern research has consistently
tended to repudiate the use of "Semitic" and "Hamitic" and
to place the homeland of the Somalia in the Afrioan soil,
in the highlands of Ethiopia, and the Somali oral tradition
which overstresses Arabian descent were regarded as suspect
because of the great time , depth involved. But owing to the
fact that the British administration was established well
before these studies into Somali origins were conducted
and also due to the tremendous pressure by Kenya Somalis
that they should be classed differently from the African
tribes in the Colony and Protectorate, the question of
Somali origin proved a major factor in the inconsistency
of British Somali policy in Kenya. The question as to
whether the Somali was to be regarded as a "native" or a
"non-native" in the laws of the country proved a difficult
problem throughout the British colonial period.
Somali immigration into the N.F.D.
Another problem Involved in the administration of the
Kenya Somalia at that time was due to the fact that the
British administration was always inclined to regard the
Somalis as recent comers to the N.P.D. and they were
deprived of certain rights to whioh other groups in the
country were entitled. Among these, the question of land
tenure^ was outstanding whereby the Somalis both in Jubaland
and the N.P.D. were considered occupants of crown land and
had no right of ownership. The question of when the
Somalis had actually crossed the Juba into Kenya was the
9
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subject of another controversy which hadAits marks on
the administration of the Somalia during the colonial period.
As far aa the N.P.D. is concerned, the Somalia seemed
to have come to the Province from two different directions:
Abyssinia and Jubaland. The methods of infiltration were
not the same; those from Abyssinia established themselves
in the district by adopting the 'Shegat1^ system while
those coming from the Juba appeared in a more warlike
disposition. The immigration from the north seemsto have
been either caused or encouraged by the invasion of Ethiopia
in the 16th Century by the Muslim leader Ahmad Gurre (or
Gran) of the Muslim state of Adal who had Somalia among
his forces. His army had over a period of time devastated
Ethiopia almost to the point of collapse until the Ethiopians
with Portuguese support defeated him in I5I4.2. This victory
closed the gateway to any Somali expansion to the west and
diverted Somali and Galla pressure increasingly towards
p
the south.
On the other hand, I.M. Lewis has further established
that by the seventeenth century the old Somali Ajuran
sultanate on the lower Shebelle River, linked with the port
of Mogadishu, was overthrown and Mogadishu itself was
invaded and split into two rival quarters. The Ajuran
1. Shegat is a system, or custom among the Somalia and
their kindred nomads whereby the tribe or section of
a tribe may be allowed to attach itself to a stronger
or more powerful tribe and live with it. The weaker
section is called 'Shegat*.
2. Report of the Northern Frontier District Commission.
Cmnd. 1900, (London, 19&2), Vol. X, p. 6.
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and their allies, the Madanle, were driven southwards into
what was known as the N.F.D. where they appear to have
been the first inhabitants of the area. The Ajuran
Madanle were then followed by another Somali clan, the
Dabarre. In alliance with the Galla Boran who appeared
on the scene, the Ajuran occupied the area between Buna
in the N.F.D. and Liban in Ethiopia at the expense of the
Dabarre who replaced the Madanle near Wajir. They in
their turn, were soon displaced by an influx of Galla Wardy
from the Juba River. By about 1850 these new Galla
immigrants dominated the whole of the Tana River region.
But the ascendancy of the Galla seemed short lived as they
were eventually challenged by new Darod Somali immigrants
from the north. The latter crossed the Juba to find a
ready welcome from the Wardy Galla who needed their
support against the Akamba and the Masai raiders from the
west and south. The Darod Wardy allianoe lasted until
about 1865 when, as a result of an outbreak of a smallpox
epidemic among the Wardy, the Somalia found their opportunity
and thrust forward further south.^ In 1870 the Ajuran
and the Boran Galla jointly drove out the Wardy from Wajir
and by 1909 parties of the Darod had reached the Tana River
2
and the Ajuran abandoned Wajir to the Ogaden Darod.
1. In a recent work on the Somalia, "The Pastoral Tribes of
Northern Kenya 1800-1916", unpublished Ph.D. Thesis
(London, 1970), E.R. Turton established that the Darod
attacked the Wardy in 1867 and was of the opinion that
the epidemic among the Boran of 1865 and 1867 never
reached the mouth of the Juba or the coast. (See Turton,
p. 77 footnote 2.)
2. See I.M. Lewis, "The Problem of the Northern Frontier
District of Kenya", Race, Vol. V, No. 1, July 1963,
pp. i+8—60.
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After defeating the Wardy Galla the Somalia
continued their movement towards the Lorian Swamp led
by Abdi Ibrahim."'" With him waa a party of the Abd Wak,
Aulihan, Muhammad Zubeir, Herti and a few Marehan. Having
originally started from Afmadu, the party arrived at a
place visible from Garba Tulla named by the Somalia
"BureBalaya" (the hill of sorrow and loss). As the name
implies, the Somalia seemed to have lost considerably on
the fighting which took plaoe between them and the Meru,
but it did not discourage them from proceeding onwards.
Leaving "BureBalaya" behind, the Somalia reached the
Uaso Nyiro near Serchio. There they fell in with a party
of Rendille and were obliged to fight. Being defeated
they returned to Afraadu and the Deshek Wama. Sometime
later, Abdi Ibrahim took his young men westward again,
for his eyes had feasted on the water and the grazing of
the Uaso Nyiro. He then established villages which
became the resting place for Ogaden parties. In 1892 he
started on his way to Garba Tulla, from where he tried to
pass once more by "BureBalaya" where he was previously
defeated and for this reason many of his men deserted him.
The remainder were wiped out by a group of Meru and Rendille
and Abdi Ibrahim himself was killed. However his move
was significant in that it marked the biggest infiltration
1. The father of the prominent Abd Wak chief Stambul Abdi.
The Battle between the Somalia and the Meru is described
in K.N.A./DO/GRSSA 3/I4. Garissa District Political
Records Vol. II.
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by Somali groups into the interior of the area to be
known as the N.F.D. and from then onwards large Somali
groups followed.
These later Somali movements into the N.F.D., as
I.M. Lewis had observed, should not divert attention from
the fact that Somali immigration into the N.F.D. started
much earlier. He remarked, "The striking character of
these later Somali movements has tended to divert attention
from the earlier Somali penetration of northern Kenya and
it is to some extent responsible for the impression given
by many acoounts (including some of my own) that the Somali
occupation of the N.F.D. is altogether of comparatively
recent date."''' Recent research had also tended to prove
that Somali tribes inhabited an area generally associated
with the Wardy Galla from at least the beginning of the
19th century, also these tribes had long been in the area
and they were allies or 'shegats* of the Galla.2 So the
contention that the Somalia settlements in the N.F.D. had
just coincided with the establishment of the British
administration of the area could not be supported.
The most important sections of the Somalia in the
N.F.D. were the Darod and the Hawiya branches. The Darod
are principally of the Ogaden clan and are represented by
seven sub-divisionsMuhammad Zubeir, Aulihan, Abd Wak,
1. See I.M. Lewis, "The problem of the N.F.D." p. 55>
Also for Somali invasion of the N.F.D. see R.G. Turnbull,
"The Darod Invasion"; "The Wardeh"; "Some notes on the
History of the Degodia".
2. Turton, p. 6I4..
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Abdallah, Maghabul, Rer Muhammad and Habr Sulieman. Other
Darod sections in the area are the Marehan who occupy the
north eastern corner of Jubaland between Dolo and Serenli.
Most important among their sub-divisions are the Rer Hasan,
Rer Ahmad Weid, and Rer Eili Dera. The third section of
the Darod present in Jubaland and the N.F.D. is the Herti
subdivided into Mijertein, Warsengeleh and Dolbahanta.
The Herti occupied the coast area around Kismayu, extending
inland as far as the Deshek Warna."^ The Hawiya are less
numerous in the N.F.D. than the Darod and are represented
by the Ajuran, Degodia, Murille and Gurreh.
The Geography of the Somali country:-g
The two main Somali inhabited provinces in Kenya, in
the period under consideration, were Jubaland and the
N.F.D., Jubaland to the east and the N.F.D. to the west.-^
The boundary between them ran from Uhsi on the Daua to the
Lorian Swamp, passing to the oast of Eil Wak, and through
the District of Wajir. From the Lorian Swamp it ran in
a straight line south-east to Dicks Head (Ras Kiambonl) on
1. See Appendix I for Somali genealogical trees. Also see
Handbook of Kenya Colony and Protectorate, pp. 250-2 and
T.S. Thomas. Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District,
1917.
2. For the geography of Jubaland and the N.F.D. see Ibid.:
Arthur Donaldson Smith, Through Unknown African Countries,
(London, 1897); I.N. Draoopoli, Through Jubaland to the
Lorian Swamp, (London, 191]+), C.W. Haywood. To the
Mysterious Lorian Swamp. (London, 1927); F. Elliot,
"Jubaland and its Inhabitants", G.J. Vol. XLI, 1913,
pp. 551+-561; L. Aylmer, "The Country Between the Juba
River and Lake Rudolf", G.J.. Vol. XXXVIII, (1911),
pp. 289-296.
3. See Maps 1 and 2 (pocket).
the coast. Jubaland covered an area of approximately
li.6,71+0 sq. miles, and for the purpose of administration it
was divided into four Districts of Gosha, Kismayu, Afraadu
and Serenli.
In Jubaland the country consisted of a series of broad
shallow valleys overgrown for most of the time with dense
bush. A low ridge of Hills runs north-east and south-west
between Gobwen and Port D^nford. Immediately behind them
the oountry is flat and thick with thorn bushes. Towards
the north-west of the province the belts of bush are denser
while towards the south open plains are larger and more
numerous.
The two main permanent streams in Jubaland are the
Juba and the Daua. The Juba rises in the highlands of
Abyssinia and as far as Dolo it is known as the Webi Ganale.
It then joins the Daua River and becomes the Juba. It is
. *
navigable throughout the year as far as Yonte but its banks
and adjacent swamps as far as Serenli are the habitat of
the tsetse fly. At that time in the Marehan oountry, in
north-eastern Jubaland, water was to be found at several
places, but the supply was small. In the rest of the
Province there were no permanent water holes, except the
wells at Wajir, Eil Wak, Afmadu, Fungal and Kauroa.. In the
Wajir District which was on the oaravan route from Kisraayu
to Abyssinia, there were several hundred wells of clear,
clean water, but there was no more water for seventy miles
in any direction. The wells of Fungal and Afraadu on the
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Lak Dera are about 180 miles south of Wajir and there
was no water all the way. At Eil Wak, 118 miles to the
north-east of Wajir, there was a collection of about a
hundred wells, spread over an area of eight sq. miles but
their supply was salty.
Water could be obtained from the Lorian Swamp* which
properly speaking is in the N.P.D., and was then situated
in the south-west corner of Jubaland Province. In the dry
season it is a mud flat with a permanent supply of water in
its midst. The Swamp is fed by the Uaso Nyiro River, the
waters of which come down from the Aberdare Mountains and
Mount Kenya. Another source of water is the Deshek Wama,
a lake south of Afmadu, originally fed from the Juba River
and the rainfall. The Lak Dera, which connects the Lorian
Swamp with the Deshek Wama, is another source with a well
defined river-bed. But apart from the two permanent
sources, the Juba and the Daua, the rest of the watering
places were too scant, too scattered and only good for
parts of the year.
The geography of the N.P.D. is hardly different from
that of Jubaland. The N.P.D. is about 95*000 sq. miles
roughly equal in extent to Great Britain and Ireland; and
holds a population of approximately 280,000. It is
bounded to the north by Ethiopia, to the east by the present
Somali Republic, to the South by Mount Kenya and the Tana
River Basin and to the west by the Saraburu District and
Lake Rudolph. The N.P.D. was occupied and administered
by the British in 1909 and was later divided into six
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districts, Wajir, Garissa, Mandera, Moyale, Marsabit and
iBiolo.
The terrain of the N.F.D. is mostly low lying-, hot
semi-desert with occasional rooky massifs. The rainfall
ranges from 5 10 inohes annually and many areas are so
dry that only camels, sheep and goats can be kept. The
grass and herbage watered by the rain soon withers and
dies, scorched by a hot sun.
Donaldson-Smith, one of the first travellers through
the N.P.D., described the country as low, barren and dry.
Travelling westwards from the Juba and the Daua, he noted
that there was not a single river of permanently risking
water till the Omo and Lake Rudolph were reached. Springs
were very rare, the wells were dug in stream beds only a
few feet deep, and sometimes, when empty, took a day to fill
up again. Such wells were found in Sidima and also in
water courses which ran into the Uaso Nyiro south of
Masabit. Even the deep dug wells like the Eil Wak
"the wells of God" though very numerous were filled up
and not in use.
So the N.P.D. holds little permanent water, and the
grazing is very sparse. Except for the Tana River, the
Daua and the Uaso Nyiro, no permanent water is available
in that vast expanse; and even those permanent water supplies
were not always easily accessible for the Somalia for
various administrative reasons. This was especially the
case with the Tana, as we shall see later. Thus, in
addition to the wide dispersal of the tribe throughout the
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N.F.D., the problem to which the administration had to
find solutions arose mainly from the immensity of the
area and the aridity of the country.
The Attitude of Somalia to Foreign Rule before 1895:-
In addition to the above problems which the British
administration had to face on the start of the administration
in 1895* the attitude of the Somalia to the previous
attempts a£ foreign rule by the Sultan of Zanzibar and the
Imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.) did not
ease their task. The administration of the area to be known
as the N.F.D. did not start before 1909 and at the
beginning British authorities had to deal only with Jubaland
which was included in the British sphere as part of the
territory administered by I.B.E.A. on behalf of the Sultan.
The Sultans of Zanzibar saw the importance of the
Somali coast and particularly of Kisraayu at the mouth of
the Juba as a great economic potentiality. Majid, who
showed considerable interest, died in 1870 and his death
delayed further action of intervention in the way of
exerting direct authority of the area. It was not till
about 1872 that a Wali was sent to Kismayu. Hamed, who
succeeded Majid,Ajust managed to complete a stone fort for
the garrison, when an Egyptian force under McKillop" Pasha
appeared in 1875 in an attempt tp subjugate the whole of
the Somali coast.1 But the Egyptian occupation was only
short lived.
1. For more on the period under the Sultans of Zanzibar
see Turton, pp. 81-90.
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After their departure, a Somali petition was sent
to the Sultan of Zanzibar to establish a form of protectorate
over Kismayu and to encourage the traders to visit the
plaoe.1 In reply, the Sultan sent an Arab Commission
which was established in Kismayu and which proceeded to
make itself highly unpopular with the inland tribes. It
was generally accepted that throughout the period when
the Sultans of Zanzibar ruled over the Somali ooast their
influence appeared "...never to have reached any more than
P %
a few miles beyond their walled towns." The reason
seemed to be partly because of the attitude of the local
tribes, the Tunni, the Herti and the Muhammad Zubeir to¬
wards the Arabs from one side, and the tension which
existed between these tribes from the other: this factor
greatly hindered the progress of administration. As a
result, and as was later observed by the Company officials,
"..during the twenty-five years that Kismayu had been
subject to the Sultan of Zanzibar no effort had been made
to improve the place, the country, or the status of the
people...
At this juncture the growing interest in the East
n-
Afrioan mainland motivated the institution of^1886 Treaty
between Britain and Germany. The two Powers were competing
for a sphere of influence in East Africa and had, by the
1. K.N.A,/PC/NFD 4/6/1 Jubaland Political Record pre-1915.
2. History of East Africa. Vol. I, p. 248.
3. P.L. McDermott, British East Africa or *IBEA', (London,
1895)# P. 232.
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above Treaty, agreed to recognize the sovereignty of the
Sultan of Zanzibar over parts of the East African coast
to a depth of ten miles inoluding certain ports as far
as Warsheikh.1 The two European Powers divided the
hinterland along a line running northwestwards from the
mouth of the River Wanga to the eastern shore of Lake
Victoria Nyanza. The British Government took the northern
zone while the Germans took the southern. Britain also
accepted by implication, a German claim to a protectorate
over Witu and the coast * fronting that Sultanate'.^ In
1890 and in return for Britain's Secession of Heligoland,
Germany withdrew her Protectorate over Witu and over the
adjoining coast up to Kismayu, and surrendered her claims
to the territories north of the Tana.^ As a result,
Jubaland fell into the British sphere of influence and the
area was consequently handed over to the administration of
I.B.E.A.
The Company, by agreement from the Sultan of Zanzibar,
assumed responsibility by the concession signed on August
1st, 1889 and on the 5th March 1891 for the administration
of Witu and the Wole of Jubaland. The boundary between
Italian Somaliland and the Company's sphere was then the
'
W
Juba River. The Company cherished the concession as
"... the place is of considerable importance as the outlet
1. The Somali Peninsula: A New Light on Imperial Motives,
(Information Service, Mogadishu, 1962)/p. 1. "
2. Ibid. Quoting R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, Africa and the
Victorians. (London, 1961), p. 197.
3* Ibid. Quoting Foreign Office Handbook, (London, 1920),
East Africa, p. 35.
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of the trade of the Somali country of the interior, and
as the only harbour north of the Manda Bay (Witu) which
affords shelter to vessels at all seasons of the year."1
To the Somalis, the Company like the Zanzibar Sultans
before it, was mainly concerned with the economic
exploitation of Jubaland. Further, the concern of I.B.E.A.
in the Juba-Tana area, after it had received its charter,
was to isolate the Witu Company, already operative there,
and to stake a prior claim, if possible, to the interior
2
beyond the German Protectorate. As a result of this,
the Company adopted a new line of tribal policy towards
the Somalis which essentially aimed at seouring the friend¬
ship of these Somali clans that lived in the interior,
instead of those that lived on the coast. In short the
Ogaden against the Herti.
Further still, the establishment of the Company did
not only present a reshuffle in the position of the
Somali tribes but it had also challenged their economic
position. The Jubaland Somalis had for a long time
mastered and acted as middle-men for the trade of the
interior. Indeed, as MoDermott has put it:-
"The leading idea of the Company was to establish
such relations with the Somali tribes as would
ensure free commercial communication with the
interior, especially with the country of the Boran
Gallas,... a country supplying numerous products
for which there had heretofore been no access to
the sea save through the hands of the Somali
middlemen... "3
1. McDermott, p. 229.
2. Quoted by Turton, Portal to Salisbury 27-10-1889
F0. 8U./1984. p. 126.
3. McDermott, p. 230.
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But the Company was never able to establish any
sort of peaceful relations with the Somalia in order to
achieve its goal and instead its period was marked by
constant feud and bloodshed.
£
Attempting to win over the Somalia, the Company seemed
to have followed two ways both of which hardly worked. At
first the policy was to conclude treaties and pursue
friendly attitudes towards the Somali sultans. At one
stage, Baird Thompson, a Company official, was prepared to
make "verbal agreement with the chiefs of Ogaden and Herti
tribes on 5th May 1893 Qhd one of the terms... was that all
the Somali slaves seeking refuge in Kisraayu would be
returned on application to their masters so long as the
Somalia remained peaceful."'*" The Somalia had by that time
in their possession slaves both from the Boran Galla and
other up-country tribes like the Pokomo, Wan^rika, Akamba,
Kikuyu etc. The Company managed to free about one hundred
and ninety two by October 1892.^ But the Somalia not
having any interest for cultivation themselves, utilized
these slaves mostly for stock raising and domestic works.
However, the Somalia were generally less affected by the
impact of the abolition of slavery than the Arabs down the
East Coast, and the abolition was by no means a factor
affecting the position of the Somalia. It was the fact
that the Company had interrupted their position as middlemen
in a legitimate trade towards the interior that had upset




them and hence accounted for the constant opposition.
The other method by which the Company tried to win
He
the Somalia was by offering heavy subsidies fftw the very
powerful chiefs and elders. The natural consequence of
this was that they became more demanding and disobedient.
At the time the prominent chiefs among the Jubaland, Somalia
were • Shirwa Ismail, Sultan of the Herti (Rer Ali Sulieman);
Ali Nahar, Herti elder; Ismail Duban, Herti elder; Muhammad
Jama, Herti elder; and Muhammad Gfuban, Herti elder. From
the Ogaden section Murjan Yusuf, Sultan of the Ogaden (Rer
Muhammad Zubeir), his sons Umar Murjan and Ahmad Murjan
and Ali Jjbraeil, a Muhammad Zubeir elder. From the Aulihan,
Abdul ar-Rahman Mursal was the prominent chief. But once
again neither the provision of subsidies nor negotiation
with those chiefs helped to change their attitude towards
the Company and consequently the Company had to deal not
only with them but with their different sections.
In spite of difficulties, the Company went on with
its intended economic programme of bringing the trade of
the Boran country to its natural outlet at Kismayu. The
stem wheeler 'S.S. Kenia' was built which, after exploring
the Tana River, was placed on the Juba under the command
of Captain Dundas with Mr. MacDougall as trader. Up to
that time the Boran trade found an outlet via Bardera and
Lugh to Barawa and Merka on the Italian coast; and the
'Kenia* was meant to divert some of this trade to Kismayu.
Unfortunately, owing to the oonstant opposition by the
Somalis, the 'Kenia' project did not materialize and the
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Vieve maple *iorst-
whole scheme was a failure. Moreover, things
by the Somalia again waging an outstanding claim against
the Sultan for a debt of 'blood money1 in respect of
certain members of their tribe who had been killed by the
Sultan's soldiers. The Somalia insisted upon this claim
with warmth,which was a sign that they were either trying
to take advantage of the Company's anxiety to compromise
with them, or was an excuse to start fresh troubles.
In addition to the unsettled 'diya' claim with the
Sultan of Zanzibar, the Somalia had another grievance
which in&ulg&d. the Company in further complications. The
Somali elders claimed large proportions of land around
Kisraayu which, before I.B.E.A. established itself there,
they had sold to Indian speculators. The title-deeds of
these plots were registered at Zanzibar. Todd, the
u
Company's representative, learning of these transactions,
protested that the deeds should have been registered at
Kismayu and also declared that all unoccupied plots, belonged
p
to the Company under the Company's treaty with the Sultan.
The Somalia, who were naturally annoyed by Todd's attitude,
petitioned H. J.R. Pigotb the administrator at Mombasa to
remove him. But Pigott, being unaware of the seriousness
of the situation, ignored the petition.
Meanwhile, Todd decided to hold a baraza (open meeting)
with the Somalia in January 1893 in order to solve the land
1. McDermott, p. 232.
2. See The Somali Peninsula, p. 6; and T.S. Thomas,
Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District, p. 2lj..
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question and strong military precautions were arranged
for by the Company officials. The Somalia in their turn
agreed to attend the Baraza on condition that they be
allowed to bring arms with them. Todd on his part had
already implied to the Somalia his intention of arresting
the principal Somali chiefs in the baraza in case he failed
to come to an agreement with them. He explained to the
seventy notables present his reasons for not recognizing
their claims and pointed out that they were heavily
subsidized by the Company.
The Todd baraza which proceeded in such a tense
atmosphere bed naturally ended up in a disaster. The
Somalis were nervous on learning about the landing of the
naval party and in the confusion which had followed Todd
was stabbed on the neck by a Somali and shooting was
exchanged between the two parties.^" Disturbances were
not only confined to the meeting; fighting spread to
the Somali villages. H.M.S. 'Widgeon' bombarded Somali
villages consisting of about 2,000 armed men. A few days
later combined forces of Somalis, Arabs and Indians
attacked Kismayu and a series of fights were reported as a
result of which the administration, not only in Kismayu
but also in Lamu, Malindi and Mombasa down the coast was
alerted.
1. For more on the Todd's baraza 3ee K.N.A./PC/N.F.D. 4/6/1
Jubaland Political Record Pre-1915» Drysdale, J. The
Somali Dispute, (London, 1964), p. 36.
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On receipt of the news of the disasterous result
of the Todd's baraza, Rennel Rodd, the Consul General
at Zanzibar, proceeded to Kismayu. He ordered a station
to be built and Todd was replaced in May 1893 by Baird
Thompson who was himself succeeded by McDougall. To
their greatest embarrassment the hundred Hyderabad troops
which were sent from Zanzibar to garrison Gobwen under
Hamilton at Turki Hill mutini&ed and half of them joined
the Somalia with their guns and ammunition. Seven days
later the first Somali rebellion occurred with a surprise
attack on Turki Hill station. Hamilton was shot on
August 11th and most of his men were killed.
As a result of these troubles, Somali property was
confiscated, their slaves taken over and freed, their bank
balances appropriated, and their ivory sold for the
Company's personal benefits.1 These occurrences also
gave rise to an interesting correspondence between the
directors and the Foreign Office on the question of the
responsibility for the conduct of the Somalis. When the
Company was withdrawing from Witu the preceding month
(July 1893) Her Majesty's Government insisted that the
withdrawal should include the surrender by the Company
of all administrative rights in the whole territory between
the Tana and the Juba Rivers.2 Further, the Foreign
yiamecj
Office »\Sf«W!KR^d the Company that they were not prepared to
1. K.N.A./C.P. 68/19/61). Farrant to Superintendent Lamu,
10-8-1893.
2. McDermott, p. 2\\.l.
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guarantee the protection of the Company against Somalia
raids beyond the ten miles.
However, matters improved with the taking over of
the Company's administration by Craufurd"1' who replaced
Rennel Rodd. When Gobwen was again raided by the
Somalia in February l89i|» they were met by the Company's
forces and defeated. In June 1895* expedition was
undertaken through the country of the Herti and a tribute
was paid by their Sultan, sheikhs and headmen. In
addition, the quarterly report of the District for March
31st showed that the country was quiet and trade and
revenue were much improved. The total customs of the year
was stated as Rs.2,857#8$2 which added to Rs. 2790 for the
previous quarter gave anhMkWR aggregate of Rs 5j6ij.6 showing
an increase of Rs. 1000 over the latter half of 1893 and
Rs. 1200 more than the first half of the same year. Exports
for March had also shown improvement; Rs. 9081^.39 were
colleoted in addition to thirty-nine tusks of ivory worth
Rs.5,000. These exports were the product of a raid on
the Boran Gallas by the Ogaden and Herti Somalia.
Judging the position of the Jubaland Somalia as a
whole, under the administration of I.B.E.A., it was
obvious that the administration of the Company was mainly
concerned with the economic and not the political affairs
of the Somalia. No efforts were made to establish a sound
system for future administration, in faot its manoeuvres
1. Mr. Craufurd was especially sent out from Ehgland to
take charge of Kismayu in October 1893«
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had deepened the cleavage between the Herti and the
Ogaden on one side and between them and its officials
on the other. Moreover, the challenge it provided for
their mastery of the inland trade had provoked them into
constant feuds. In addition to this the Company had
even failed to establish its own economic programme and
the results apart from the brief period under Craufurd were
utterly discouraging. In fact, as Turton has observed,
in the period between 1891 and 1895 there was no year when
the Company was not faced with a sizeable deficit."'" The
export value of hides and ivory, the most important items
of trade, were constantly falling as a result of the
Company's miscalculation of the economic potentialities
of the area.
As a result, it is not surprising to see that the
Somalia had never welcomed the Company's administration
and their attitude to it had largely affected their views
and behaviour towards the Protectorate Government which
I
ha^ taken over in 1895 after I.B.E.A. had eventually
surrendered its charter.
1. See Turton, pp. 173~U*
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Chapter I
The Jubaland Somali: 1898-1916
On 1st July 1895» A.H. Hardinge, Her Majesty's Agent
and Consul-Genera1 at Zanzibar, declared a British
Protectorate over the territory previously administered
by I.B.E.A. The territory stretched as far as Kikuyu to
the interior and embraced the whole Coast from Wanga to
Kismayu. In the first place, Hardinge recommended that
fbur provinces should be created: Coast, Ukamba, Tanaland,
and Jubaland, to be administered respectively by Pigott,
Ainsworth, Rogers, and Jenner, from Mombasa, Machakos, Lamu
and Kismayu. These officers, to be known as Sub-Commissioners,
to T
should be directly responsible Hardinge as Commissioner.
Hardinge had himself contemplated a visit to Kismayu
to declare British rule in Jubaland but was delayed because
of the Mazrui Rebellion.2 Instead, he despatched a letter
to A.C.W. Jenner, the appointed Sub-Commissioner to the
Province instructing him to leave for Kismayu in July 7th
and advising him as to the projected Government Somali policy
in the future. This policy centred essentially upon a
1. G.H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya 1895-1912, (Oxford,
1966), p. U7.
2. In February 1895* four months before Hardinge was
appointed, a serious rebellion had broken out among the
members of the Mazrui dynasty at Takaunga over succession.
In August, the Mazruis who recognized neither the Sultan
of Zanzibar's rule nor that of I.B.E.A. were united in
their opposition to the newly declared Protectorate
Government. (For more on Mazrui and Arab reaction see,
T.H.R. Cashmore, "Sheikh Mbaruk bin Rashid bin Salim el
Mazrui", Leadership in Eastern Africa, ed. Norman R. Bennett,
(Boston, 1968), pp. 111-137.
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number of factors which Hardinge was anxious to see
implemented.
First, Jenner was instructed to make clear to the
Somalia that no change had taken place or was contemplated
in the Sultan's position as Sovereign of the ten-miles radius
round Kismayu and of the adjacent islands. Secondly, he
was to assure the Somalia that Islamic teachings and customs
would be maintained as before. Thirdly, Jenner's attention
was partidirected to the question of the abolition of
slavery and the violation in this respect reported in the
conduct of the Company officials. These officials had,
"on the grounds of expediency not only tolerated the existence
of slavery in the town, but even occasionally returned to
their Somali owners runaway slaves in Kismayu itself.,,:i"
However, Hardinge was anxious that Jenner should bear this
in mind, but at the same time should not make any public
announcement on the subject, and rather continue quietly
to apply the Sayyid Barghash Decree until he could rely on
the support of a larger and more trustworthy armed force
than was at that time at his disposal.
Fourthly, on the question of his relations with the
Somalia (apart from the question of runaway slaves), Jenner
had at the time to be guided mainly by Craufurd's'advice;
and while insisting on proper respect being paid to the
administration of Her Majesty's Government and to the flag
of the Sultan in the town of Kismayu, outside it he had to
avoid involving himself in disputes or raising complex
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/11/3 Hardinge to Jenner 5-7-1895*
Also see Introduction p. 21.
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questions, provided he was able to postpone them consistently
with the public interest. Fifthly, his attention was
directed to his relations with the Italian Government on the
Benadir to the north. The river Juba being the frontier
between the British and the Italian spheres of influence
in East Africa, it was inevitable that he would come into
contact with the Italian authorities on the left bank. He
was thus instructed to make a point of cultivating the
friendliest possible intercourse and co-operation. , Finally,
in the absence of direct or regular communications with
Zanzibar, Jenner was to rely to some extent on his own
judgment and discretion and his knowledge of the general
principles on which the affairs of the Protectorate were
conducted, reporting to Hardinge whenever possible on
points where he was in doubt.
Due to the delay of Jenner's arrival, Hardinge had
once more despatched fresh instructions to Craufurd who was
acting on his behalf. The geographical limits of the
Province were fixed except for the northern and the interior
frontier which "must necessarily remain for some time to
come undefined, but it will include the whole region west of
the right bank of the Juba so far as it is known and the
territories of the Somali chief Magan (Murjan) Yusuf, and
of the Galla ruler of the Boran with both of whom the Sub-
Commissioner should endeavour to establish such relations
as may in his opinion be both politically and commercially,
1. Ibid
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to the public interest.""1" Further, the Province was
divided into two districts each under a district officer
and an assistant. The two districts to be Kismayu and
Gosha - the former to comprise the Herti Somali's country
and the latter to include the Ogaden.
As a former official of I.B.E.A., Craufurd realized
that of all the policies mentioned, the most important and
pressing one in dealing with the Jubaland Somalia was to
obtain the allegiance of the Somali chiefs, a task which he
as an experienced Company official must have realized was
by no means an easy one, but without which no political or
economic progress could be carried out.
The two distinct Somali groups in the Province, the
?
Herti and the Ogaden, were by the above administrative
arrangement placed into two separate administrative districts,
Gosha and Kismayu. The Herti lived in the vicinity of
Kismayu, Gobwen, Yonte and within a radius of about thirty
miles of Kismayu. Their number had been roughly estimat ed
to be about 6,000 with about 20,000 cattle; they had been
loyal to the Company since 1892 when with the Ogaden (the
two combined are called Kablalla) they attacked Tritton and
McDougall who were returning on the steamer 'Kenia' from
Gosha. The Herti were subjugated by the Company after six
days' fighting.3 Thereafter no trouble arose. In July
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/1/1 Hardinge to Craufurd 30-10-1895.
2. The Marehan, who occupied the North-East corner of
Jubaland are to be dealt with later.
3. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/1/6 Jubaland Miscellaneous 1902.
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1893* when Craufurd was the Company's Superintendent, he
managed to undertake a successful expedition through their
country where their Sultan Shirwa Ismail, his Prime Minister
Ali Nahar, the sheikhs and headmen had been subjected and
had paid tribute. In the following month, upon the estab¬
lishment of Protectorate rule, Craufurd was once again in the
Herti country with Jenner and once again he was assured of
loyal support. In October of the same year Shirwa Ismail
and Ali Nahar placed themselves, their families and their
possessions under Government^ protect ion. ^
Having successfully achieved the support of the Herti,
Craufurd had in November of the same year made an expedition
to Afmadu, the Capital of the Ogaden section of the Darod.
The Ogaden chiefly occupied the interior of the Province and
were said to be about 12,000 strong with large numbers of
cattle, Craufurd's expedition to the Ogaden country, like
that to the Herti, was reported to have achieved its ends.
The Sultan of the Herti accompanied Craufurd and his
presence served to impress upon the Sultan of the Ogaden,
Murjan Yusuf, the fact that a chief of equal rank and
importance with himself regarded obedience and service to
Her Majesty's Government as an honourable duty. Neither
the Marquis of Salisbury nor Hardinge was slow to appreciate
these efforts. Hardinge wrote to Craufurd to express his
satisfaction ".... shared by the Marquis of Salisbury, as
this intelligence affords a fresh proof of your success and
1. P.R.0./F.0. 107/39 Protection Ordinance No. lj.5'
29-10-1895.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD. lj./6/l Jubaland Political Record
Pre-1915 p. 3.
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ability in dealing with the Somali chiefs."1
At this stage, whether it was the result of inter-
clan rivalry between the different Darod sections or whether
it was the result of the proximity of the Herti to
Kismayu, the Herti*s submission appeared to be complete,
and both Shirwa Ismail and Ali Nahar were appothtdd political
officers of the Government. On the other hand, Craufurd had
only just made a start with the Ogaden in his November
expedition. Prom then on his attention was increasingly
directed towards Afmadu and the turbulent Ogadan section.
Being impressed by the above results, he had once again set
off to their country in March 1896 where Hasan Birjin, on
behalf of the Abdullah section of the tribe, declared his
allegiance and paid a tribute of livestock. At Afmadu
a public baraza was held and a deed of submission was signed
and sealed by Sheikh Murjan Yusuf on behalf of the Ogaden.^
Once again All Nahar was present in his capacity as a
political officer for the Sub-Commissioner.
Besides the Somalia, Craufurd was also successful in
satisfying one of Hardinge's requests included in hia
despatch to Jenner outlining the future policy in the area.
Hardinge was anxious that the Sub-Commissioner should care¬
fully handle and if possible completely subjugate the Gosha
and the Boran chiefs as a step in facilitating a sound
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/131/3 Hardinge to Craufurd 20-11-1895.
2. See Turton, p. 192.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD. 14-/6/1 Jubaland Political Record pre-
1915 P. 3-
3k
administration for the Somali Province as a whole, The
District of Boshh was a narrow strip of land along the river
Juba, with a large 'colony* of about 25*000 or 30,000
inhabitants almost equally divided between the British and
the Italian territories. The Wagosha consisted of runaway
slaves of the Somalia. This 'colony* was founded by a
Bantu named Nasib Pondo who became a powerful chief until
deposed by the Italians. The Wagosha were essentially
cultivators and the whole of their land was most fertile
and was said to have a great future before it. On,the
British side, Gosha was subdivided into six sub-districts.
One of Craufurd's successes was that he achieved their
submission; for, under headman Nasib Pondo they acknowledged
in writing the authority of the British Government.1
The Boran Galla as well, under chief Afaleta (who
inhabited the oountry to the west including Eil-Wak and
Wajir) had shown signs of coming to terms with the feritish
administration. The country of the Boran could have proved
very profitable if secured by the Jubaland authorities;
for it was noted for its richness in horses, camels, mules,
cattle and ivory. All its trade previously went throu^i
the Italian ports of Merka, Mogadishu and Barawa passing
just through Bardera and Lugh. This trade, if diverted to
Kisraayu, would not only have definitely raised the revenue
1. Nasib, was holding two sections of his tribe, one section
on the British and the other on the Italian side of the
river. In 1895 Hardinge approved of Craufurd's method
of obtaining from Nasib a recognition of his allegiance
to Italy for the territory held by him on the west bank
of the Juba. (C.P. 1/16-. 26-1-1896).
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of the Protectorate and the Somali Province of Jubaland, but
would also have involved the Somalia in a legitimate trade
which would no doubt ha ve assisted in their pacification.
In short if a sound administration for Jubaland was to be
achieved, it could easily be done through the development
of Gosha, the Somali stock, and the exploitation of the Boran
trade and Jubaland would by no means be a brake on the
development of the Protectorate.
For a while, up to the beginning of 1896, it appeared
that lasting peace might be achieved and Craufurd himself
was able to report that the whole Province as far as the
second degree north was in a peaceful state, the Somali
and Gosha people having been brought under the administration
of the Protectorate."^ In fact a month earlier Hardinge*s
satisfaction vith the situation in Jubaland was so great
that he intended to cut the military strength in Kismayu.
By March 1896 he instructed ;Craufurd to send him one of
the two maxim guns, together with about sixty Sudanese
and 'native* askaris which would be used by Colonel Ainsworth,
Her Majesty's Sub-Commissioner, to put down disturbances in
the Ukamba Province. As the Coast Province force was
occupied with the operations against the Mazrui rebel
"Mbaruk bin Rashid", the Jubaland force was to provide this
assistance. Hardinge, who was very impressed by Craufurd's
management of affairs in Jubaland had written to inform
Craufurd, ".... the peaceful state of affairs which your
1. P.R.O./F.O. I4.O3/226 Enclosure in No. 250 Craufurd
to Hardinge 30-1+-1896.
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fair and judicious administration has established in
Jubaland will, I trust, make this reduction, for a short
period, of your military resources...quite safe."1
The peace in the province did not, however, last for
any length of time. The Somalis had begun to show signs
of discontent which occupied the efforts of the British
administration up to the time when Britain ceded Jubaland
to Italy in 1925* It was during the period when the
authorities were busy quelling the Mazrui rebellion in
1895-6, and carrying out expeditions against recalcitrant
tribes in the interior - expeditions against the Nandi
in 1901, 1905, 1906j against the Einbu in 1901; and 1906;
against the Gusii in 1901; and 1908; against the Kipsgis
in 1905; and against the Bagusu and Kabras in 1907,^ - and
moreover, when Britain was occupied with events inside the
Mahdist state in the Sudan, the defeat of Italy at Adowa
in 1896, and finally the Fashoda incident in 1898, that
the Jubaland Somalis needed special attention.
As early as August 1896, the Acting Sub-Commissioner
informed Craufurd^ that Ali Nahar, the most important chief
of the Herti under Sultan Shirwa Ismail, had been stabbed
in the baok while saying his prayers by an outlaw named
Muhammad Ali. The reason for this incident was that
1. E.N.A./PC/C.P. 73A4/15.. Hardinge to Craufurd 21;-3-1896.
Craufurd had sinoe 26-5-1896 been appointed Vice-Consul
for the Suitan*s mainland Dominions.
2. B.A. Ogot, "Kenya Under the British, 1895 1963", Zamani,
ed. B.A. Ogot and J.A. Kiernan, (Nairobi, 1968), p. 259.
3. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 7l|A5/70 No. 52 Farrant to Craufurd
5-8-1896.
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All Nahar had handed over the latter to be punished by the
British Officials for a certain misdeed. At this stage,
Ali Nahar was viewed with increasing suspicion by the
Hertis who regarded him as a tool of the administration.
Moreover, as Turton has suggested, the tendency of Jenner
and the later Sub-Commissioners at Kismayu to rely exclu¬
sively on Ali Nahar for the implementation for their policies,
must have provoked the Herti into continuous resentment and
disobedience.^
Signs of discontent among the Somalia were not merely
confined to the Coast. In the interior, Rogers, the
Provincial Commissioner (P.C.) of Tanaland, had also reported
that the attitude of the Ogaden Somalia there was causing
great concern. Craufurd was informed that the Abdallab
section of the Ogaden under Hasan Birjin were showing signs
of unrest. The Abdallah were one of the most powerful and
disobedient Somali sub-c^ns. They had managed to remain
aloof not only from the Company's authority at the end of
the nineteenth century but also from that of their Sultan
ft, d ftJlQ Jvi A n & tf-t c[
Ahmad Murjan and^to keep away from their capital Afmadu.
Now they were reported to be moving through the Waboni country
p
towards the Tana with the intention of raiding the Galla.
In addition, Uthman bin Isa, the Llwali of the Siu^ mainland
reported that some Swahili traders who had gone to the
Waboni forest from Wangeh to barter for India rubber, had
1. See Turton, p. 193.
2. K.N.A./C.P. 98/91+ - Rogers to Craufurd 26-8-1896.
3« One of the Islands of the Lamu Archipelago with whom the




come across a large party of Somalia some sixty in number,
who had taken away all their trading goods from them.
Another party of Galla had also complained of Somali raids,
killings and carrying off of their people by the Abdallah
branch of the Biscaya Somalia.^
Rogers, in his oapaoity as P.O. was insistent that some
measures should be taken against these Biscaya Somalia,
otherwise the Wapokomo on the Tana would be afraid to
cultivate at all on the northern bank. The Wagalla who
were essentially herdsmen and hunters were in the greatest
distress, because whenever they succeeded in collecting
cattle, they were sure to be raided by the Somalia; and the
Waboni who were at the mercy of the Somalia were compelled
p
to pay them tribute in ivory.
One of the possible solutions to the Somali menace
suggested by Rogers to the Jubaland authorities was to place
a small force at Biscaya and another at Afmadu, as these
were the only two plaoes where there was water; and if they
were held, the Somalia would lose all their cattle and be
compelled to surrender.^ In another despatch he suggested
that a force of one hundred Sudanese would suffice to break
them. Writing to Craufurd he stated:-
"I have taken the opportunity of Major Hatch, the
Officer Commanding the Protectorate troops, being
present at Lamu to place before him all the
information which I have and he agrees with me
that two small oolumns operating against Biskiah
1. Op.cit.; The Biscaya Somalia included Abdallah, Abdwak
and Rer Muhammad.
2. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 98/914-/188 Rogers to Craufurd 8-10-1896.
3- Ibid.
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from Kiunga and Port D^ujlnford would bring about
the desired effects... I beg that steps may be
taken to obtain the sanction of Her Majesty's
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
for the necessary operations.1,1
This was primarily an offshoot of an idea that Craufurd
himself had adhered to which in essence meant that the
O
control of Afmadu wells meant the control of the Ogaden.
It was not until two years later that Jenner himself b&A
admitted as a result of a tour in the Ogaden country that:-
"What I have seen on this tour and during the recent
expedition, leads me to think that we have unduly
magnified their importance to the Ogadens. There
are other places - such as Yak-a Dintu, Beledsyuba,
Subo - between Afmadu and Mabungu Kisungu and
Fangal... which after a good rainy season could
probably water many more cattle than Afmadu could,
and provide better grazing than is to be found
in the bush which surrounds Afmadu." *
But at the time British Somali policy seemed
increasingly to centre around the idea that it was only
through force that the Somalia could be crushed rather
than the possibility of settlement of the Somali troubles
through an investigation into its causes. To carry out
the latter policy the Protectorate Government needed to
establish a sound administrative system and a proper
machinery of government in order to cope with the compli¬
cated problems among the pastoral tribes who although
numerically small were both war-like and aggressive; it
was this type of government that the Company had previously
failed to achieve.
1. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 98/9^ No. 156* Rogers to Craufurd
19-8-1896.
2. P.B.O./F.O. 107/60 Craufurd to Salisbury 13-7-1896
Quoted by Turton, p. 208.
3. P.R.0./F.0. I4.O3/28O Enclosure in No. llij. Jenner to
Hardinge 18-12-1898.
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In the absence of proper control, and because of
differences in opinion between Mombasjt and Kismayu as to
the policies to be executed in respect of the Ogaden, they
had grown more stubborn and indifferent towards the
Government. Before the administration was able to seek a
solution to the rising discontent among the Hertis and the
Abdallah, it was once more faced with fresh troubles
started among the Ogaden in the latter part of 1896 as a
result of the death of their Sultan and the succession of his
son Ahmad Murjan. Both Mombasa and Kismayu were once
again at a loss as to the method of approach to the young
Sultan. Craufurd was of the opinion that Ahmad Murjan's
support for the administration could be achieved by the
paying of a monthly subsidy of about Rs. I4.O a month and
small proportionate sums to be paid to one or two of his
followers on the clear understanding that he rendered
assistance to the Government. He defended his proposition
on the grounds that, "pending the institution of direct
control by the Government officials, the employment of the
natives of the territory is a politic and economical
proceeding.1,1
But Craufurd had definitely misjudged the ability of
the young Sultan who, apart from the support of his own
clan, the Muhammad Zubeir, had no power over the rest of
the Ogadens. Jenner was however quicker to perceive the
weakness of Ahmad when he visited Afmadu in December of the
same year. He informed Craufurd
1. P.R.O./P.O. I4.O3/228 Craufurd to Salisbury 9-10-1896.
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"He is not a strong man, as is evident by his
pointing out to me that Hasan Berjan's position
as chief of the Abdalla section of the Ogaden
was a totally independent one, and that he, Ahmed,
had no authority over him."
Moreover, Jenner was particularly annoyed with the
young Sultan because he offered what Jenner had considered
an insufficient present of cattle; and in addition he was
three days late in showing up before the Sub-Commissioner.
w cS "n ,
In fact the Sultan did) not «adyt long W caustejmore
vexation to the Jubaland authorities and the Protectorate
administration at large; and the beginning of 1897 witnessed
increasing tension between the Ogaden and the Government.
Hardinge was then determined to impose the Governments
authority over the Ogaden and so, using the issue of an
apparent raiding by the Somalis for slaves in the Boran
country as an excuse, decided to strike a blow at the tribe.
Assuming that Ahmad bin Murjan was instrumental in organizing
the raid, and having consulted with Major Hatch and Craufurd,
he pressed wholeheartedly for a punitive expedition against
the Ogaden. He insisted on the use of force against the
Ogaden because he maintained that their position was
different from that of the other races in the Protectorate
further inland. Taking the case of the Masai raids against
the Akamba, he argued that the construction of the railway
across Ukamba would enable both tribes to be repressed
swiftly within the next two years. In Jubaland, on the
other hand, he wrote,
1. P.R.O./p.O. J4.O3/241 Jenner to Craufurd 31-12-1896.
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"It is I think, imperative to aot at once, especially
with a people like the Somalia, who are fanatical and
self-confident beyond measure, and where fanaticism
and self-confidence have of late been dangerously
excited by the Italian reverses in Abyssinia, and on
their own Coast."
Hardinge had even gone further to suggest:-
"These people must learn submission by bullets -
it's the only school; after that you may begin
more modem and humane methods of education....
In Africa to have peace you must first teach
obedienoe and the only tutor who impresses the
lesson properly is the sword."
Continuing his plea to implement force, Hardinge had
bo
also pressed the Foreign Office to agree far the setting
up of a station at Serenli and the purchase of a steam
launch for the river. He also had in mind the occupation
of a point at the junction of the Daua and the Juba rivers
in close proximity to Dolo. But most important of all and
in support of Rogers' suggestion, he expressed the opinion
that the occupation of Afmadu was vital to the consolidation
of the Government's position, becauss the Ogaden could easily
cut the Government's communications by the river. Moreover
he saw onoe more that the destruction of the Afmadu wells
was important for the punishment of the Ogaden. The
occupation was hoped to "ere long, make them as peaceful
and submissive as the Hertis in the neighbourhood of
Kismayu."^
Hardinge had actually contemplated an expedition to
Afmadu containing 200 men of the Indian Contingent under
1. P.R.0./F.0. l4.03/2l|.r Hardinge to Salisbury, I4.-I4.—1897-




the Command of Captain Barratt. Meanwhile a demonstration
of force would be made in the direction of Biseaya, the
headquarters of the Abdallah, by sixty men of the Tanaland
Soudanese Force, starting from Port I^u)nford under the
Command of McDougall. The latter would act as a Sub-
Commissioner in Tanaland in Captain Rogers absence, and his
■'' -•flv.v'iv.—.,,.;
Command of the force would be specially valued because of
his considerable experience both of Somali warfare and
of the African troops necessary to put Hasan Birjin's people
in check. He would also be able to prevent the Afjtaadu
Ogaden from retreating and seeking refuge in his territory.^"
Hardinge was so insistent on the despatch of the expedition
that he suggested that, in order to enable tie cost for it
to be met they should, "defer till next year the occupation
of Kitui, for which a sum of £1,14.00 has been granted to us,
and to spend the whole of this sum upon the Afmadu expedition,
whilst we might, I think, procure £600 by effecting other
economies in various departments." This he justified as
follows:
"Important as is the occupation of Kitui, it is far
less so than the vindication of our authority in a
region where the disasters which have attended the
Italian arms, have reacted injuriously amongst a
very ignorant, vain and fanatical race on the
general prestige of Europeans."
Despite the repeated arguments for the use of force by
Hardinge, Jenner and Rogers, the Foreign Office was by no
means prepared to risk any further ventures in the Protectorate.
1. P.R.0./F.0. i4.03/2l|.2 Hardinge to Salisbury,. 2I4.—14.—1897-
2. Ibid.
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Salisbury had definitely ruled out the possibility of
conducting a punitive expedition at the time* because
"great demands are being made on Her Majesty's Government
in connection with the African possessions and Protectorates...
and they are not prepared to enter upon any further
operations without the most urgent necessity."^ Salisbury
was to a large extent influenced by Clement Hill in his
decision and was bearing in mind the fact that the mutiny,
which had a few months earlier broken out in Uganda, was
occupying their attention and they were unwilling to enter
into further obligations in East Africa until this mutiny
had been quelled. Moreover, as Mungeam had already
observed, Jubaland occupied a far lesser role in the
proposed policy for the administration of the Protectorate
whereas the Coast, as Salisbury had seen all along, was to
provide a firm base for development of the interior. In
this respect Mombasa was vital, but Jubaland was not.
Hence Hardinge had had to be spurred to aotion against the
Mazrui, but subsequently checked in his enthusiasm against
2
the Ogadens.
On learning about the Foreign Offioe's decision and so
giving up hope for the despatch of an expedition, Jenner
proposed to negotiate instead. He informed Hardinge that
he intended sending a noted Shariff, a friend of the
administration, who seemed to be held in great respect by the
Ogaden, to mediate with them. His mission was especially
1. Quoted by Mungeam, p. 31, Salisbury to Hardinge
29-10-1897 F.O./I07/74.
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important in view of a rumour that the Ogaden contemplated
leaving Afmadu if an expedition was directed against them.
Jenner intended to send the Sheriff to warn them that
should their plan be carried out, "they will forfeit all
right to our protection if the Abyssinians come down upon
them in their new place of abode.Moreover Jenner implied
that he was willing to recommend to the Commissioner the
rem of a fine previously imposed on them on condition
that the Ogaden came down to Kismayu and gave proof and
assurance that they regretted their actions.
Hardinge, on the other hand, was too conscious of the
possibility that the Cigaden would interpret this as an
indication of a desire on the Government's part to retreat
from an embarrassing porition - and hence he instructed
P
Jenner to refrain from such an act. Moreover, Hardinge
had also turned down a suggestion by Jenner that the latter
should himself proceed to the Ogaden country in an attempt
to ease matters. His reason was that the Foreign Office
had already decided to send an expedition to the northern
and eastern frontiers of the Uganda Protectorates in order
to obtain more accurate knowledge and cultivate friendly
relations with tribes residing in that part of the British
sphere. News of the expedition was sure to reach the
Somalis and Hardinge was apprehensive of their reactions:
they could easily interpret it as directed against themselves.^
1. P.R.O./F.O. I4.O3/2I4-3 Enclosure 2 in No. 19 Jenner to
Hardinge 13-6-1897.
2* Ibid. Enclosure 3 23-6-1897.
3. P.R.O./F.O. 2/II4I4./I Salisbury to McDonald 9-6-1897.
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As the dialogue and the search for a Somali policy
continued, the Ogaden seemed more and more difficult to
control. Abdallah raids on the Boran Galla on the Tana
River, led by Hasan Birjin, and other Ogaden raids upon
the Gosha, led by the Sultan's brother Hasan Murjan, had
necessitated prompt action. Nevertheless, dialogue
continued between London, Mombasa and Kisraayu as to what
measures should be adopted against the Somalia. Salisbury
and Hardinge were inclined to think that an economic block¬
ade upon the Ogaden would bring about the desired results,
ef t-Kis
while Jenner was utterly resentful^and sceptical of the
outcome of such a policy.
The blockade which in essence meant the closing of the
port of Kismayu in face of the Ogaden was opposed by Jenner
on the grounds that, "it would not be to our advantage to
adopt such a hostile attitude as blockading their trade when
we are not prepared to take steps to bring them to reason.""1"
They could also still communicate with the Benadir ports and
the expense of guarding the hundred-mile frontier would be an
additional cost. Moreover, Jenner was of the opinion that:-
"our prestige will suffer, as it will be evident that
we are acting hostilely to the Ogadena, and yet dare
not go up to Afraadu and attack them."
Further reports of Somali raids on the Galla, Arab and
Gosha forced Hardinge once more to revert to advocating the
use of force:-
"till the occupation of Afraadu has been effected,
there can be no permanent peace, progress or
security in Jubaland...
1. P.R.O./F.0. I4.O3/2I4.3 Enclosure 1 in II4.3 Jenner to
Hardinge 11-8-1897.
2. Ibid.
3. P.R.0./F.0. I4.O3/26I No. 7 tel, Hardinge to Salisbury
5-I4.-I898.
But Salisbury was still holding to the idea that
h
until the Foreign Office was sure of ground at Uganda it
seemed very desirable to postpone action in the Province.
It was not until April 1898,when a renewed Somali offensive
resulted in the burning of the Government camp at Yonte and
killing of several people^that the Foreign Office consented
to act. The Somali behaviour was then interpreted as a
-
sign of suspicion the part of the Somali tribes on the
efficiency of the British administration. For this reason
a provision was made in the Draft Estimate of 1898-99 for
the establishment of a station at Serenli and the purchase
of two Steam launches, one for the Juba and the other for
the Tana. Moreover, approval was given to the despatch of
a punitive expedition which went on through the whole of
April, May and June.^"
The operations appeared to have cost the Ogaden great
loss of life and property and they in their turn managed to
kill about twenty-eight of the Government Indian troops and
shatter the rest of them in a surprise attack. However, by
August the Ogadens began to show a desire for peace and
Hardinge, who arrived in Kismayu in September, held a meeting
with their Sultan. Hardinge decided to fine them five
thousand head of cattle to be paid as follows:- One thousand
within five days, two hundred more within ten days and the
remainder within a month. Two of the chiefs were, further,
to be held as hostages, pending the return of the remainder
!• See The Times. 1-10-1898 "The Somali Rising."
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of the rifles.1 After the settlement of the question
Hardinge returned on September 20th and Jenner had then
dissolved the Ogaden Expedition.
But despite the apparent friendship of the Sultan, the
rest of the Ogadens were never really reconciled towards the
Government. No sooner was the Ogaden Expedition concluded
than most of the prominent chiefs began to prepare for fresh
trouble. In the first place it was obvious that, despite
Hardinge's satisfaction with the settlement of the fine,
the Ogaden had been reluctant and slow to pay. Two-hundred-
and-eighty head were still due in November and the situation
was such that Hardinge had to communicate the affair to
Salisbury laying the blame on the chiefs - the Sultan was
not suspected as being instrumental in the delay.
The signs of discontent among the Ogaden had culminated
in what was termed the Third Somali Rebellion, or the Jenner
Campaign. Jenner left Kismayu on July 28, 1900 with a
force of twenty police and ten syces^ on a two months journey
through the Lor^fn Swamp to Nairobi (the same as the one
Dracopoli undertook to explore the Lak Dera).^" Arriving at
Afmadu, the police and the Ogaden had a quarrel as to who
should first draw water from the well. Jenner ruled that
the police had prior right and in the confusion which followed
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 4/8/1 Major Quentin to Officer Commanding
British East African Troops. 5-11-1898.
2. P.R.0./F.0. I4.O3/263 Hardinge to Salisbury 27-11-1898.
3. A syce is an attendant who follows on foot a mounted
horseman or a carriage.
ij.. In other sources Jenner was supposed to be conducting
a tour of inspection in his District.
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Jenner was said to have flogged two Somalia. In his
report Jenner admitted flogging the two men but he stated
that it was done with the sanction of the Sultan Ahmad
Murjan."*" The Ogaden who numbered between 3,1^00 and 6,800
composed of Muhammad Zubeir, Aulihan, Abdallah, Abd Wak and
Rer Muhammad bitterly resented the flogging.
The incident was not taken seriously by Jenner who
proceeded on his journey. On November 12, the District
Commissioner (D.C.) of Kismayu, Mr. Blake, received information
that three hundred Ogaden were following Jenner and in his
turn at once informed the Officer-in-Charge of the Troops,
Jubaland. On November IS, the Military authorities at
Yonte heard of Jenner's death, Martial Law was proclaimed
three days later. On November 20, definite news of the
death of Jenner reached Kismayu.
The reasons given for the murder of the Sub-Commissioner
varied. It seems that the incident mentioned above was
only the climax to an already planned action. Jenner's hot
temperament was no doubt something more than the arrogant
Somali could accept and this was certainly one of the
reasons for his murder. Moreover, the incident was said
to be the revenge by a certain Ogaden chief, Hasan Yero, who
had been detained for some time at Kismayu on Jenner's orders
on suspicion of complicity in the murder of three 'friendly
natives'. Although he was subsequently discharged, Yero
seems to have conceived a violent hatred against the British
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD ip/6/1 Third Somali Rebellion or
Jenner Campaign, 1900.
authorities and against Jenner in particular. Upon it
being known that Jenner was undertaking his journey, Hasan
Yero with another Ogaden chief, Hasan Odel, carried out the
plot to murder him.
Other sources state that while Jenner was on his
journey, rumours prevailed that Umar Murjan, the Sultan's
brother, Hasan Yero (Muhammad Zubeir), Hasan Warfa (Aulihan),
and Hasan Odel (Abd Wak) were planning to attack him. In
fact Ahmad Murjan was said^to have warned hiMaSvdifcf^Hasan Odel
was definitely planning to attack Jenner saying, "if anything
wrong will happen to Mr. Jenner it will be through this man
or himself will have done it.""'' On the other hand, the
authorities were in doubt as to the position of Ahmad Murjan,
not knowing for certain whether or not he himself was a
party to the murder. It was established that shortly before
leaving on his journey, Jenner had interviewed the Sultan
at Kismayu on the subject of the murder of the three
'friendly natives' mentioned above. A fine had been
inflicted which was not paid. It was obvious that he was
O
fully aware of the plan, if not its actual instigation.
1. K.N.A./C.P. 71/26/66 Ogaden Punitive Expedition,
Intelligence Reports, Sultan Ahmad Murjan to the Consul
at Kismayu.
2. P.R. 0./P.0. I4.O3/2°'6/lll4. Ternan to Salisbury 25-11-1900;
Ahmad Murjan was later threatened with deportation then
held at Kismayu where he escaped. Major Chenevix-Trench
had attributed this to the fact that there was no clear
agreement as to who was responsible for his custody.
Colonel Hatch advised civil custody for the Sultan while
Colonel Ternan recommended Military custody. To this
Captain Ward had utterly disagreed. Even when the
military guard was appointed it remained without effective
control over the Sultan's appartments and thus he escaped.
(R.H.L./Mss.Afr.S.583 Chevenix-Trench - papers on N.P.P.,
Kenya: 28-3-1002.)
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Whether it was the result of Jenner's 'euphoric'
approach to the Ogaden, the weakness of his intelligence
his death had certainly confirmed the fact that despite
their defeat by the Protectorate forces, aided by Indian
troops, in the middle of 1898, the Somalia had never really
accepted British control in the area. The motives for the
murder of Jenner were certainly more than personal and care¬
ful investigation showed beyond doubt that all the Ogaden
sections except one were in revolt. As a result Colonel
Teman, Her Majesty's Acting Commissioner and Consul General,
left Mombasa for Jubaland with Lieutenant Hatch and a Company
of K.A.R.. Having realized the extent of the troubles, he
communicated with the Secretary of State and asked for
permission to undertake yet another punitive expedition
against the Ogaden - the Jenner Punitive Expedition.
The Times of January 18, 1901, declared that the
Indian troops necessary to conduct the expedition had arrived
in Kismayu five days before. On February 18 the Ogaden
were defeated and Ternan informed Lansdowne that he had
p
occupied Afmadu without opposition.
1. See Turton, pp. 226-232.
2. P.R.O./F.O. ij.03/308 Ternan to Lansdowne 19-2-1901; The
experience gained in the recent Somali risings and the
operations against the mutineers in Uganda necessitated
the readjustment of the military forces in the two
Protectorates. Brigadier-General Manning was appointed
Inspector General and the preparation of a scheme for the
formation of a Camel Corps for Jubaland and Yonte was
recognized. Yonte was made the military headquarters of
the Province. (K.N.A./PC/NFD 1+/6/1 Jubaland Political
Record Pre-1915.)
system or his underestimation of the Ogaden's hostility,^"
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The Ogaden were to pay a fine of 30,000 head of
cattle with an annual tribute of 200 head and an ultimatum
was sent to them that no peace could be entertained without
the surrender of the five ringleaders in the Jenner
murder.''' At the time of the Jenner Punitive Expedition,
the Biscaya Somalia on the Tana were reported by Rogers
to have raided the Tana River tribes for the third time in
a short period. Rogers decided to retaliate and raided a
Somali village, killing twelve men, capturing 800 cattle
and l4.,000 sheep.
At this point, news of the murder of Jenner and the
subsequent rising in Jubaland led Sir Charles Dilke to ask
the under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in- the
Commons whether these disturbances were in any way to be
connected with the religious 'agitation* of the Sheikh
p
Muhammad bin Abdallah ~ in Northern Somaliland. But neither
1. Ibid., p. 7.
2. The Parliamentary Debates. 1900, Vol. LXXXVIII Commons,
Sir Charles Dilke, "Murder of Mr. Jenner" 11-12-1900;
Muhammad Abdille Hasan was born on 7 April, 186I4., in the
Dulbahante country in the eastern part of British
Somaliland Protectorate. His father was a Bagheri Ogaden
and his mother a Herti Dulbahante. He was the hero of
Somali nationalism who led a 'Jihad' against the British
Administration from 1899 to 1920. The British applied
the name 'Mad' Mullah to the Sayyid, and the use of the
word Mullah was apparently used by the British in
corruption of a word common apiongst the Indian Muslims in
India for the religious Sheiks or (Mawlah) essentially
denoting the piety and not the madness of the sheikhs
concerned. (for more on the "Mullah" see Chapter VI,
Douglas Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. (London,
1923). Somallya; Antologia Storico-Culturale. which
contains reprints by I.M. Lewis, S. Touval, L. Silberraan
and Muhammad Ahmad Ali.) also see Leadership in Eastern
Africa; Six Political Biographies. Robert L. Hess,
"Muhammad Abdullah Hassan , edl N. Bennett, (Boston, 1968).
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the Under-Secretary of State nor the authorities in the
East Africa Protectorate were clear as to whether these
events were actually part of the general state of unrest
in the northern portion of the Ogaden country. However,
the subsequent movements among the Soma lis had definitely
had a religious appeal and later on - from the conclusion
of the Jenner Campaign to the First World War period -
Muhammad Abdille Hasan's connections either directly or
indirectly were easily traceable.
Already, by 1902, rumours were in circulation that the
"Mullah" was on the west bank of the Webe Shebelle;,"that he
was intending to move to Bardera and from then he will be
1 P
compelled to cross over and go with the Ogadens." Eliot,
had, however, no news of the "Mullah" actually crossing
over but he informed the Foreign Office that the Officer
Commanding in Jubaland was insisting that troops should be
posted at Serenli in case it had taken place. Later Eliot
assured the Foreign Office that there was no immediate
danger of a general rising or organized revolt among the
Somalia, and even if the "Mullah" crossed the Juba, they
would not be glad to make common cause with him, though they
might have felt compelled to obey him. But he warned that
there was always a risk that a small section, impelled by
personal animosities or desire to win a reputation for
courage, might attack and kill Europeans travelling in the
1. K.N.A,/PC/Jub. 2/1/6 No. HQ Perducci to Harrison
7-10-1902.
2. Sir Charles Eliot, replaced Hardinge as Commissioner and
Consul-General of the East Africa Protectorate (1900-1901^.).
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country, as in the case of Jenner."*"
A look through the correspondence of the periody
certainly indicates that the "Mullah" had seriously tried
to appeal to all the Ogaden both in Jubaland and the area
later to be known as the N.P.D., despite the strict security
p
measures adopted by the British against the spread of his
teaching. In February 190i|. Captain Hannyngton informed
Eliot that an emissary of the "Mullah" was travelling in
the area preaching among the tribes. The emissary, Ahmad
Jama, who was himself a Muhammad Zubeir had travelled widely
among his people and the Abdallah.Hannyngton was very
conscious of the possibility of him gaining adherents and
had to make a number of trips throughout the District to
warn the people against giving him refuge or listening to
his doctrines. Not only that, he had also employed a
northern Somali, a certain Dualla, to obtain information
about him. Dualla confirmed that Ahmad Jama had actually
told the Somalia that, "if the people would follow him he
would attack the English and drive them out."-^
According to Hannyngton, the Maghabul section had sent
a deputation to impress the Government that they had
nothing to do with Ahmad Jama or the "Mullah" doctrines.
This could be acceptable in view of the fact that the
1. P.R.O./F.O. lj.03/331 No. I4J. Eliot to Lansdowne 2I-I4.-I9O3.
2. Jubaland was subjected to military administration for
the period 1902-5 as a result of the continued risings.
This was in itself a factor resented by the Somalis
and was to a certain extent responsible for the
increasing disobedience by the tribes.
3. K.N.A./PC/Jub. lA/7/1 J.A. Hannyngton to Eliot
17-2-19014..
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Maghabul were at the time less inclined to defy the
Government than the other tribes. But his assumption that
the Muhammad Zubeir had sent Ahmad Jama away telling him
"... to move on as they had had enough trouble for a
space,"'*' and also that Mursdl Umar, Aulihan, the father of
Abd ar-Rahman Mursal, came in to consult him about the
Sheikh and implicated that he wanted the Sheikh arrested^
towne* statements that cannot be substantiated in view of
the later attitudes of both tribes.
In fact, the anxiety of Hannyngton himself fre the
possible danger of Ahmad Jama's movement all over the Somali
country was obvious when he suggested to Eliot that, "both
myself and the Sub-Commissioner Tanaland should be authorised
p
to put Rs. 1000 or even 1500/- on his head dead or alive."
In addition he warned Jama's people, the Muhammad Zubeir,
that if the Sheikh came to their area and they failed to
seize him and send him to Kismayu, he would enforce a
blockade against them and stop all payments of salaries to
the Muhammad Zubeir (so called) loyal official. Hannyngton
knew only too well that the key to the situation lay with
Ahmad Murjan and the Muhammad Zubeir because no other
section of the Muhammad Zubeir would care to go against
Ahmad Murjan and no other tribe would go against the Muhammad
Zubeir for fear.
Owing to continued threats and pressure by the




him that the Sheikh Ahmad Jama was captured and brought to
the Sub-Commissioner's office.1 This was not achieved
without a fight with at least one of the Ogaden sub-sections,
the Aden Kher, the Sheikh's own group;who bitterly resented
his arrest. Major Harrison, the Officer in charge of the
Province, informed Eliot that great credit was due to
Captain Hannyngton, who by his skilful seizure of Sheikh
Ahmad Jama "probably saved a serious rising among the
Ogaden of Jubaland."^
Though the Muhammad Zubeir Sheikh was eventually caught,
neither the tribes nor their religious leaders were
frightened by the administration's move to prevent their
risings. In fact, not only among the Ogaden but also
among other Darod sections, deep sympathy with the "Mullahs"
cause began to appear. By 27th December 1905 a Herti sheikh
by the name Ashgar, of the Uthman Mahmud section, who had
lately returned from spending some months in the country of
Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan near Illig, announced that
he was ready to fight the Government, "and began to act
as a Mullah.
Ashgar, who resided on the Ruga plain about five hours'
walk from Yonte was travelling between Yonte and Kismayu and
attempting to rally the Sheriff^ community of the town to
join him. Captain Salkeld who was conscious of the nature
1. Ibid. 23-3-19014..
2. P.R.O./F. 0. JL|.03/3I4.2 Harrison to Eliot 16-1|-1904.
3. P.R.O./C. 0. 533/H tel. No. 447 Salkeld to Deputy
Commissioner Mombasa.
4. Those who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad;
here they could either be Somalia or Arabs resident
in Kismayu town.
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of his movement issued a warrant for his arrest; but
without success. He then moved against Ashgar who collected
a large number of his Somali followers, and ultimately
nipped his movement in the bud. Salked raided Ashgar's
camp at the Deshak Wama on 2nd December 1905 and killed him
and several of his followers. The other Herti sub-sections,
Uthman Mahmud and Warsengeleh, were warned against any
further movement. The death of Ashgar was once more viewed
with relief as it had ended "what may have been a dangerous
movement.
However, the Hertis did not let the incident pass with¬
out retaliation and on the 28th May 1906, Ali Nahar, their
Regent, who was constantly under attack from his tribe for
complicity with the Government, was murdered by five men
2
of the Herti in revenge for the death of Ashgar. The Sub-
Commissioner of Jubaland did not altogether dismiss the
possibility that the Uthman Mahmud and their Sultan,
Muhammad Shirwa, were instrumental in the murder and though
they did not actually commit it, "they were cognisant of
the plot and in secret sympathy with it."^ He thus
recommended the deportation of Haji Umar Ismail, whom he
considered the most dangerous of the Herti. Also to be
deported were Haji Jama Ismail and Samatar Ismail, his two
brothers; Haji Farah Duffe (Umar Mahmud); Ahmad Abdi
(Warsengeleh) and Muhammad Samatatar. But Sadler, the
1. P.R. 0./F. 0. [4.03/366 No. 53 Grant (Admiralty) to
Edward Grey 10-3-19.
2. P.R.0./C.0. 533/15/337 Sadler to Colonial Secretary
19-6-1906.
3. P.R.0./C.0. 533/18/14.28 No. I4I4. Kirkpatrick to
Commissioner E.A.P. 21-6-1906.
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Commissioner at Nairobi, had strongly advised against
severe measures against the Somalia advocated by
Major Kirkpatrick and Colonel Harrison. He was of the
opinion that the best way to deal with the matter was to
impose a fine of a thousand head of cattle on the offending
sections and to continue the embargo on their trade at the
port of Kismayu until the fine was paid."'" The Colonial
Secretary consented to Sadler's request and 1?0 head of
cattle were paid by the Herti; the rest was paid in money
owing to outbreak of a disease among the Somali cattle.
A few years later, however, the influence of Muhammad
Abdille Hasan's movement was still being felt among the
Somalia and was still a factor in the problem of administering
p
the Jubaland Somali. The Marehan tribe, the third clan
of the Darod, who had had a long history of tribal raiding
and had the reputation of being one of the strongest
tribes in the north east corner of Jubaland, was not un¬
connected with the "Mullah" episode. The Galti section
of the Marehan was said to have actively taken part with
Muhammad Abdille Hasan in northern Soraaliland. This
section's immigration into the Protectorate was naturally
viewed with great concern by the Jubaland authorities,
especially when it was learnt that a certain Abdallahi Maho
Igo was reported to be raiding ten miles to the east of
Lugh and a few months earlier had sent a letter to the
1. Ibid.
2. For more on the Marehan see Turton, Ch. x, pp. i4.52-l4.9i;
Mungeam, pp. 233-238; T.S. Thomas, pp. ij.9-50.
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Marehan saying that the Sheikh had appointed him governor
of Jubaland."'" The Marehan were also feared because of the
quantity of arms they had acquired by trading on both sides
of the river, and by 1911 concerted efforts were made by the
officials on the spot to persuade the Government to disarm
them.
But before the Government could move, the Marehan
themselves had started a rising. In March 1913 a party
of A'ulihan crossed the river into British territory with a
lot of stock and some rifles. This party, though ordered
to report to the Government, was seized by the Marehan
Farah Ugas section on the pretext of affording them
protection. When instructed to hand them over, the Farah
Ugas not only refused to do so, but stated that if the
p
Government wished to fight them they were ready. Eventually,
in January, a Marehan Expedition was launched under
i
Colonel B.R. Graham, but the result of the operation was by
no means satisfactory from the point of view of the
Government. It was obvious that Graham had underestimated
the gravity of the situation and the strength of the Marehan,
and this was a natural consequence of the ignorance of
events in the interior in general. In communicating the
outcome of the Expedition to the Colonial Secretary,
authorities in the East Africa Protectorate seemed to dwell
upon another misconception: Belfield, the Governor at the
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/72 W.E. Barratt, "Intelligence Report
from the Abyssinian Frontier" 29-1-1910.
2. T.S. Thomas, p. 1^.8.
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time, informed the Secretary, "the result though disappointing
has I consider definitely committed the Aulihan to our
side.
In fact no sooner was the Marehan Expedition concluded
than the Aulihan themselves showed grave signs of discontent
and declared war against the Government. The principal
figure behind the Aulihan discontent was Abd ar-Rahman Mursal,
the son of Haji Mursal Umar, both of whom were deserters
from the Italian side. As early as 1898 Abd ar-Rahman
had been implicated in the attempted Ogaden raid on Yonte;
but neither that nor the Italian protest had deterred Jenner
from giving him a position whereby he and another Somali
escort were asked to garrison Bardera. Further, in 1900
he had also been sent to Serenli to assist in maintaining
2
a trading depot. In the Ogaden Expedition of 1901 he
acted as the Intelligence Officer in return for the payment
of a hundred rupees a month by the Government. However
Mursal's friendship and aid to the Government did not
continue after this.
From the beginning of 1910, Mursal was under continuous
suspicion from the authorities. In March, he was said to
have prevented his tribe the Aulihan from paying the blood
money or 'diya' to the Rer Tulhak section of the Marehan
because they did not pay the 'diya' due for Hasan Warfu
of the Aulihan.^ Intelligence reports also tended to throw
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/133 tel. Belfield to Colonial Secretary
26-2-1934.
2. P.R.0./C.0. 534/33 Summary of Intelligence regarding
Abd ar-Rahman Mursal.
3. See T.S. Thomas, pp. 56-63 for Aulihan-Marehan relations.
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some doubt on his loyalty and according to one, "Abdurahman
Mursal has a following of many hundreds; his own tribe the
Aulihan and many malcontents from other tribes on both
sides of the river. He tells them that the Government
when they oome in strength will take away all their cattle
and that they should trust to him to look after their
rights. He promises them loot if they stand by him.""*" Two
months later, Reddie was again apprehensive of Mursal's
attitude and activities. He telegrammed the Acting
Secretary of the Administration that Mursal together with
Falari and Jiri - two Aulihan chiefs - had been gun-running
and that Bili Ibrahim, another Aulihan chief, had declared
against the Government and retired with the Rer Abubakr
section towards Eil Wak trying to persuade the rest of the
Aulihan to follow.
By October 1911, Mursal was also accused of being
p
"... at the bottom of the murder of Deria Sherwa." The
latter was murdered because he was a friend of the
Government and had helped the Administration in obtaining
camels and information. The murderer, Tabari Jiri, was
known by the Administration to be Mursal's right hand man;
and it was thus assumed that Jiri would never have dared
to murder someone from Mursal's tribe without first
receiving his consent.^
In 1915* Abd ar-Rahman Mursal himself had visited
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/17/1 No. 66 Reddie to P.O. Kismayu
17-5-1911.
2. Ibid. J. Bois to Reddie llj.-10-1911.
3. Ibid.
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Nairobi and promised that the Ogaden as a whole would be
willing to contribute money towards the expenses of the War,
a claim too difficult to accept at this time when the
Somalis, especially his own section, the Aulihan, and the
Marehan, were occupying all the attention of the Government.
Moreover, Mursal was reported to have returned from Nairobi,
"... with a very large sense of importance and was
apparently placing the widest construction upon the
reception accorded to him there by the Government."^ In
addition, he announced that when he was in Nairobi the
Governor had given him all the country between Serenli and
Wajir. These pronouncements, together with his threats to
the Jubaland authorities over the settlement of the
Aulihan-Marehan dispute proved to the administration that
Mursal was prepared to defy the Government.
On 1st February 1916 Mursal had artfully suggested to
Eliot, the D.C. of Serenli, that the askaris wandering about
at night with their rifles often caused trouble with the
'natives', and so it was arranged that the rifles should
p
be placed in the guardroom each night. The following night,
Abd ar-Rahman Mursal marched to Serenli with 1,000 Aulihan,
having informed them that he was going to attack the
'boma' (station) to show that he was not afraid of the
Government. Lieut. Eliot was killed, and the askaris,
unable to get their rifles from the guardroom were speedily
1. T.S. Thomas, p. 56.
2. P.R.0./C.0. 53^/33 Summary of Intelligence regarding
Abd ar-Rahman Mursal.
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overcome, sixty-five of them being killed. But, shortly
afterwards, Mursal was defeated by the Government forces,
and thereafter he fled to Abyssinia through the Gurreh
country.
It is worth noting, at this juncture, the reasons for
Mursa1's complete change of attitude towards the Government,
a change which had culminated in the sack of Serenli in 1916.
The Somali point of view was that the movement of Mursal
was inseparable from that of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan
and that the Aulihan-Marehan dispute was only a pretext to
embitter feelings towards the Government. According to
Sheikh Abd al-Hakim bin Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan,* his
father was in constant touch with Mursal, and Wsafc Mursal
himself belonged to the Salihiya Tariqa (religious brother¬
hood). This order was brought to Somalia by the Sayyid
from Mecca and was responsible for the sense of unity among
the Muslim Somalia, who joined his 'Jihad* against the
British. Moreover, Sheikh Abd al-Hakira was certain that
both Mursal and the "Mullah" had exchanged letters, copies
of which were still in his possession. Nor was the British
Intelligence in the East Africa Protectorate in any doubt
about this. It was established that when Mursal fled to
Abyssinia, "he wished to join the Mullah and had written
to the latter proposing this."^
1. Sheikh Abd al-Hakim is the youngest son of the Sayyid.
In fact he was only one year old when his father declared
the Jihad upon the British in the Somaliland Protectorate
I am grateful to him for the above information which he
conveyed to nre when I met him in Mogadishu in September
1970.
2. P.R.0./C.0. 53^/33 Summary of Intelligence Regarding
Abd ar-Rahman Mursal.
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The British authorities were, moreover, of the opinion
that the sack of Serenli was engineered from Abyssinia
through Lij Eyyasu who had succeeded Menelik in 1913 and had
become more and more identified with the cause of Islam,
eventually announcing his conversion to Islam in April 1916.
Lij Eyyasu was thought to be considering the formation of
a Muslim Kingdom with himself as the head and had thus
been in constant touch with Sayyid Muhammad Abdille and his
movement.1 In this, he was thought to be helped by Mursal
and other prominent Muslim religious leaders among the
Somalia: Muhammad Yusuf, Jama Sahe, and Haji Arsha Muhammad
who in December 1916 were reported to be endeavouring to
persuade Lij Eyyasu's faction in Abyssinia of the advantage
of joining the "Mullah".^
T.S. Thomas was further of the opinion that German
agents must have been at work and were definitely behind the
attack on the Government's post. This theory was accepted
owing to the fact that Mursal had a son working with the
German East Africa forces. The Turks were also suspected
of being at work through Sheikh Ali Nairobi. The latter
was formerly in service in the British East Africa
Protectorate and had been dismissed by Colonel' Ainsworth
in 1902; he then returned to Bardera after spending some
time in Mecca. Finally, T.S. Thomas felt also that Mursal
had taken advantage of the fact that Britain was engaged
1. K.N.A./PC/C.P. lj.6/1061 Somali unrest in Northern
Territories. 1916. Note by T.S. Thomas 21-2-1916.
2. Op.cit.
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elsewhere and thus attempted to throw off British rule and
make himself paramount in Jubaland.
Apart from personal aims, the sack of Serenli by the
Aulihan and their leader Abd ar-Rahman Mursal had a wider
religious implication behind it. His support for Muhammad
Abdille's movement and his contacts were unquestionable.
Indeed, Mursal was himself described by the officials as
"a potential second Mullahwho had, at a certain stage,
tried to mobilize the Muhammad Zubeir, the Gurreh and other
Somali tribes. But, like Ashgar*s movement before, Mursal
failed to mobilize the Somalia in a general rebellion against
the British Administration. This was mainly due to the
divisions among the Somali tribes themselves. In fact,
while the Marehan-Aulihan quarrel was at its peak and while
Mursal was attempting to rally all the tribes into a mass
revolt, news reached Jubaland that severe tribal fighting
between the Muhammad Zubeir and the Abd Wak in the newly
established N.P.D. area was causing great concern. However,
these inter-tribal fights among the Somalia were welcomed
by the Government, who were certain that these quarrels
"point to the improbability of any general combination of
Ogaden tribes against us."^
Despite this it was obvious that^ from the establishment
of British rule in Jubaland up to the time of the First
World War, the Somalia had never actually submitted to the
British rule. During the war and when Britain was occupied
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/173 Unrest in Serenli District 3-I4.-I9I6.
2. P.R.O./C.O. 533/133 Lieut. Ward. Operations Against
the Marehan l8-2-191i|..
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with events elsewhere the Soma lis took up a considerable
amount of her attention. The administration in Jubaland
had to ratify a whole series of claims in connection with
the attack on Serenli which meant going to great pains in
extracting the amounts from the Aulihan. Many people,
military and civil employees of the Government submitted
their claims because their property had been looted and
their men killed in action. The Somalia, on the other
hand, felt without any doubt that it was the British
Administration rather than themselves who should be blamed.
Like the Company before them they had done nothing to
improve the social and economic well-being of the tribes.
They had been subjected to a military type of administration
for at least four years, against whose oppression they had
steadily stiffened their resistance, culminating in the
sack of Serenli in 1916.
Moreover, one thing was clear, whether due to the
neglect of the administration or to the continued unrest
in the Province, Jubaland had never over this period actually
contributed effectively to the economy of the Protectorate
as a whole. Sir Charles Eliot had once written:
"It is difficult to hazard even a vague opinion as
to the value of Jubaland. The general impression
left by the country is certainly that it is arid
and unpromising."
But he did not dismiss the possibility of the future
prosperity of the Province if Jubaland was provided with
irrigation and hence used for cotton cultivation. In addition
1. Sir Charles Eliot, The East Africa Protectorate.
(London, 1905)» p. 37.
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the Province would also support a considerable cattle
industry for its essentially pastoral people.
The possibility that Jubaland could be transformed
into a successful agricultural province was hindBred by a
number of factors. Firstly, the Somal had never been a
landowner and had no agricultural tradition as had the up-
country and the coastal population of the Protectorate.
Secondly, the Somal was very much averse to the idea of
labouring. It was the Kismayu Somalia who had warned and
actually instigated the disturbances among the Berbera
Somalia brought in by the authorities to work in the Powyland
Plantation down the Coast. These Berbera Somalis were
brought in in accordance with the Somaliland Native Labour
Regulation of 1901 to work in Kilifi in 1913. According
to the Report on the rioting by these imported labourers,
" the Somalis at Kisraayu told them that they were
bound for a place where they would all die, that the work
will kill them."'*' Thirdly, the problem of transport was
said to be another obstacle to the development of agriculture.
The region was inaccessible and remote and there were no
roads or regular steamer services to connect it with the
other flourishing ports. Finally, the continuous unrest
and opposition to the British rule convinced the authorities
of the futility of introducing white settlement to start the
O
cultivation of the rich banks of the Juba.
1. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 15A/2 Plantation Agent to P.O. Mombasa
March 19ll|..
2. Kirkpatrick, the Officer in Charge of troops, Jubaland had
anxiously enquired about opening the district for white
settlers; but for the above reasons it was not encouraged.
(PC/Jub 2/2/2 Kirkpatrick to Sub-Commissioner Kismayu
6-5-1907J
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The other aspect of economy, which might have improved
the position of the Somali and added to the revenue of the
Province, was trade. Even before the coming of I.B.E.A.,
the Somalis were the chief middlemen for the flourishing
trade of the interior. This pattern was greatly disrupted
with the advent of British rule. British administrators
were inclined to appoint Boran agents in Kismayu to look
after the caravans that arrived from the interior, to
represent the British authorities in office, and generally
to guide and protect caravans.'*" Naturally, the Sopialis
felt that they were being deprived of this privilege. More¬
over, the Somalis used to trade to a large extent with the
Boran along the southern Abyssinian border but this was
occasionally interrupted because it was believed that the
Somalis were trading in rifles. As a result of continued
suppression the Somalis frequently went their own way and
indulged in a considerable amount of illicit trading,
especially in ivory with the Waboni hunters of Jubaland and
the Bajuns at the coast. These activities which were
undertaken in order to avoid the restrictions at Kismayu
imposed by the East African Protectorate Regulations were
obviously a great loss as far as the revenue of the Province
and the Protectorate at large was concerned.
The most important exports of the Province were ivory,
rhino horn, ostrich feathers, hides, cattle, sheep and ghee
(butter). These items were normally exchanged between
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/2/2 No. 8 Acting Sub-Commissioner to
Deputy Commissioner 7-1-1907.
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Jubaland, N.F.D. and Nairobi; and were carried from
Kismayu via the Wajir road to Moyale and southern Abyssinia.
Another important outlet to this trade was via the coast
from the port of Kismayu to Lamu and Mombasa. This latter
route was always subjected to restrictions for political
reasons as in the case of the blockades against the Ogaden
and the Herti mentioned previously.
Apart from the restrictions on Somali trade owing to
constant risings and livestock diseases such as rinderpest,
the Somali was also generally very unwelcome in most parts
of the Protectorate. The District Commissioner Moyale once
remarked, "I believe that Somali traders do an infinite amount
of harm in this District... I am of the humble opinion that
all Somali traders whether from Jubaland or elsewhere should
be excluded from this District unless they come here employed
by, or with a reliable European."'*'
Another handicap to the development of the Somali trade
was the amount of goods smuggled or allowed to pass through
the ports of Jubaland to the Italian side without the
payment of ad valorem duty of 10$ to which they were liable.
This had threatened to cause the diversion of trade -
especially hides - in future to Italian Somaliland and the
loss of revenue was therefore imminent. The problem of
the smuggling of hides, acoording to Captain Salkeld, was
due to the shortage of customs and frontier staff to deal
with the situation. He complained, "With only four
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD l/3/l Mandere Annual Reports,
W.E.H. Barrett (D.C.) 191I|.-28.
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administrative centres, none overstaffed, between Lamy
and Abyssinia, I fear little can be done.""*" The Chief of
Customs was reluctant to establish an effective Customs
Preventive Service because he thought it would be too
expensive to justify its existence and he therefore did
not recommend any change of policy. It was not until the
war period that the export of hides regulations were
tightened.
In addition to the above, no direct taxation was imposed
upon the Somalis for the whole period under consideration in
this chapter. It was found that a hut tax could not be
effectively levied on the Somalis as they were nomads and
owned practically no houses with the exception of a few
Hertis dwellwAsvyvof Kismayu township. It was then suggested
that a tax of 5% on the Somali trade coming into Kisraayu,
viz. cattle, goats, sheep, ivory, ghee etc., should be
2
imposed instead. It was estimated that this tax would
bring a revenue of i|.0,000 Rs., an equivalent to a hut tax
on ten cultivating people and would take the place of an
income tax. Another suggestion was to levy a water tax
and hold the River Juba and other permanent wells such as
Kurkanes and Afmadu. But this was considered to be risky
and difficult to enforce, and at the same time too expensive
to collect.
On consenting to the imposition of the 5% tax, on Somali
trade, Her Majesty's Commissioner suggested that out of the
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/6/2 R.E. Salkeld to F.W. Major I4.-I-I913.
2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. l/6/l No. 27 Officer in Charge of Troops
Jubaland to Officer in Charge of Troops B.E.A. 7-^-1902.
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proceeds of the first year's tax, windmills should be
erected at Kurkanez and Afraadu with large troughs for
watering cattle. The Somalia would then appreciate how
quickly and amply compensated they had been for a tax
which they would not feel to any great extent.1 But
Lieut. Mead was in complete opposition to this 5$ tax on
Somali trade. He felt it was difficult to agree t6 the
above suggestions without infringing upon the common right
of every man to do what he wished with his own property.
Further, the plan would prohibit the sale of horses, sheep,
camel, goats, donkeys, ghee etc. throughout the Province of
Jubaland and Tanaland except through an official broker.
Mead also argued that if the regulations were confined
to the sale of these products of the Province, as far as
they were the property of Somalia, they would transfer them
to persons not subject to the same regulations. In addition,
it would be necessary to prohibit Somalis carrying these
articles of produce by dhow to Mombasa and Zanzibar or
elsewhere. Under the treaty between Great Britain and
Zanzibar, an export duty was already levied upon all the
above-mentioned articles of produce except ghee, ranging
from ten dollars for a horse to twenty-five cents for a
goat, the duty normally being collected at the place of
export. In conclusion, Mead suggested that:-
"In view of the fact that Somalis pay no hut tax
these duties might be increased. I would suggest
this course as an alternative to the course
proposed by Major Harrison and Mr. McDougall.
1. Ibid. Harrison to 0/C Troops B.E.A.
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I am inclined to think it would add nothing to
the present cost of collection and would not
hamper trade."
This suggestion was not accepted and in 1906 it
was decided to purchase fibre from the Jubaland producers
p
in lieu of a hut tax. But apart from this, no definite
taxation policy was adopted. It was not until 1931 that a
direct tax was imposed on the Somalia and hy then Jubaland
had already passed to the Italians.
So it was obvious that, at the period under consideration,
Jubaland Province and the Somali were far from providing a
satisfactory contribution to the economy of the Protectorate.
Owing to continued political unrest and the lack of a
definite policy on the part of the British Administration,
the various possibilities for the betterment of the Somali
Province were never studied. It was occasionally pointed
out that the future of Jubaland lay in the cultivation of
cotton, maize and sub-tropical products. Given that the
Somalia disliked cultivation, the Wagosha, residents along
the banks of the Juba, might nevertheless successfully
have cultivated the land and the revenue of the Province
could easily have been improved. In addition, Sir Charles
Eliot himself was not without hope for the future economic
prospects of the Somali, in comparison to those of the
other groups in the Protectorate. He stated:-
"Should the Somalia show any inclination to adopt
a more settled and civilised mode of life, they
have sufficient intelligence and commercial
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/1/6 Mead to Acting Commissioner
7-14.-1902.
2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/3/1 No. 26I4./O6 A. Linton (Agriculture
and Forest Department) to Collector, Kismayu 8-3-1906.
73
aptitude to become a very important factor in the
trade of East Africa."
Unfortunately, neither the Somalia intelligence nor
the economic potentialities of the Province were exploited.
The political unrest, inherent in the clash of interests
between the Somalia and their administrators, the obvious
dislike of British officials far the Somali, the tendency
of the Somal to dislike foreign rulers, were all factors
in the events which distinguished the period 1893-1916.
These events, however, helped to formulate a specific
attitude from the side of the British authorities towards the
Somalia and remained the base for their future Somali policy.
In I9II4. Britain had secretly signed a treaty with Italy
ceding to it the Jubaland Province in reward for the part
played by Italy in the war. Although Jubaland was' not
in fact handed over to the Italian administration before
1925» the period 1916-25 was not marked by any success in
the attempts to improve the welfare of the Somalia, on the
contrary, all suggestions for political and economic
progress were shelved pending the forthcoming cession -
as will be seen in the next chapter.
1. Eliot, p. 22k-
CHAPTER II
The Development of the Somali Question: 1916 - 1925
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to examine
the political and economic position of the Jubaland Somali
up to the end of the First World War. This chapter traces
the development of the Somali position not only in Jubaland
but also in the newly, formed Northern Frontier District"*" up
to the time when Jubaland was detached and handed over to
Italian administration in 1925*
Although the N.F.D. was acquired in 1909, it did not
come under effective administration until the post-war period.
After its acquisition, events in Jubaland dominated all
aspects of tribal life and the attempt by the British Government
to draw a line between Jubaland and the new District in 1911|
did not prevent unrest among the Somalia in both areas. Far
from itf"fhe Somalia of the N.F.D. caused the British
authorities incessant trouble during the war - so much so that
Wajir itself had to be evacuated between 1916-17 as a result
of the sack of Serenli by the Aulihan.
The immediate post-war period was obviously spent in
dealing with the aftermath of the troubles involving the
Marehan, the Aulihan, and the Muhammad Zubeir and in dCvising
1. As previously stated (see Introduction p.15), the N.F.D.
was acquired by the British East Africa. Administration in
1909. This was done in order to counter continuing
Somali westward expansion from Jubaland and to stop the
ever increasing raids by Ethiopian soldiers on the tribes
and the livestock of the region. (See The Somali
Peninsula. p.13; and Drysdale, pp. 37-38)• Also see




the means by which their resistance could be crushed. It
was also clear by then^ that unless these-tribes were pacified,
no development could be effected in the whole of the Somali-
inhabited area. But to carry on this programme of tribal
pacification in the period 1916-25» the administration had
by necessity to abandon two major features of "British Somali
policy normally adopted in the pre-1916 period. Firstly, the
authorities had to substitute a more forward-looking policy
for the earlier one of reprisal raids and "the levying of
tribal fines; and secondly, they had to seriously reconsider
their policy with respect to the Somali - a policy maintained
since the Government assumed charge of the Protectorate -
which was "to leave them alone".
One of the most effective means by which the pastoral
Somalia could have been brought to order was by the adoption
of peaceful measures which in essence meant the reconsideration
of their economic and social needs. Most urgent of these
was the provision of adequate water supplies for their stock.
In realisation of this, the Governor of the Protectorate,
H.C. Belfield, agreed that a sum of £1,000 should be allocated
to finance a proposed report on water supply in Jubaland by
Messrs. J.H. Parkinson and H.E. Evans. The sum, which
included the salaries of Parkinson and Evans, was approved
and was met from the savings on the amount voted for special
expenditure for the N,.F.D. At the end of four months'
survey in Jubaland and the N.F.D., Parkinson reported that
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/156/707 Belfield to Andrew Bonar Law
20-9-1915.
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the majority of wells in Wajir and many at Eil Wak were
non-productive due to choking by the accumulation of
debris. Their recommendations did not go beyond a demand
for the improvement and extension of existing wells and it
seems to have provided nothing more than a- practical and
useful base for future work. It revealed nothing striking.
Once again in March 1919, the K.A.R. authorities
instructed Major P.J.* Jennings to proceed to Jubaland and
investigate certain aspects of Jubaland administration. He
was to present first a report on the water supply of Afmadu
wells. In the course of his investigation, Jennings reported
.s»
that there were two wells in Afmadu one under the military
guard and reserved for the use of the garrison and the other
used by the Somalis for stock watering and domestic purposes.
He observed that the wells were located in the bed of a
clearly defined water course - the Lak Dera - and that
wells of similar depth could undoubtedly be opened up in the
vicinity with favourable prospects of similar yield.. He
stressed the faot that the political significance of
establishing permanent watering places in that valuable
grazing district was apparent and could not be over-emphasized.
This was obviously because Afmadu was the main area for the
troublesome Muhammad Zubeir section.
Given such considerations, and the fact that Afmadu was
a good grazing area, Jennings recommended that steps should
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/15U/388 Parkinson to Chief Secretary
(Nairobi) 17-C-1915.





be taken to drill for water to augment the available supply
and that the authorities should obtain a plant capable of
drilling to a depth of two to three hundred feet. He then
concluded that, "the expenditure necessary* to establish a
reliable watering place at this point, which is an important
caravan route, would be very quickly recovered by making a
small charge per head, of stock watered. This charge it is
believed, would be readily paid by the Somali owners, who
appear to be wealthy in stock, a permanent source of
revenue could therefore be established.
It was obvious, therefore, that for both political and
economic reasons a successful British Somali policy in the
Protectorate must centre around the solution of the watering
problem. The Secretariat at Nairobi was not slow to grasp
the idea and directed the attention of the Public Work
Department (P.W.D.) to it:-
"the political situation in Jubaland undoubtedly
invests this matter with additional urgency at
the present time. The Mohammed Zubeir, the tribe
principally to be benefited have behaved very well
recently and handed in their rifles promptly in
obedience to Government's orders. It is also
probable that the distribution of tribes now
contemplated will increase the population round
Afmadu and render an improvement in the water supply
an imperative necessity."^
But to their great disappointment, the Secretariat was
informed by the P.W.D. that fitters and supervisors for the
installation of engine driven pumps for Afmadu wells were
not available and no further promises were made in this
h
direction ^either by the P.W.D. uorjthe Government. The
1. Ibid.
2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/15/3 No. 1829/514- Bowring to Director
of P.W.D. 27-5-1919.
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matter was thus neglected despite the fact that subsequent
examination of the soils of the N.P.D. and of Jubaland
proved that they would both have responded to Water provision.
The Economic Commission had in June 1919 reported that the
country between the Juba and the Lorian was well grassed and
it was quite feasible to lead pipe lines from the Juba into
the interior. Further, on the north side of the Uaso Nyiro,
north of the alluvial plain, there were stretches of well
grassed but practically waterless country, suitable for both
cattle and sheep if water were led there from the Marsabit
Lake. They specifically pointed out that boring might be
tried with advantage in this area.^
The Economic Commission^ report was further enhanced
by F.G. Jenning^s second report on well boring in Jubaland.
In his report of October 1922, he once more stressed the
pressing need for permanent water in the area, without
which "no serious development from a tribal, commercial, or
p
agricultural standpoint is possible...". Jennings was
also of the opinion that a great deal could be done by dams
and reservoirs and the erection of break-waters in dried
water courses that flood in the rain. He was very
critical of the previous policy in regard to the watering
facilities which amounted to flooding the Desheks (Lakes)
with the Juba River; and described it as, "the most harmful
incident that could have oocurred and [one that] has acted
1. P.R.O./C.0. 533/210/559 Report of the Economic
Commission 5-o-1919.
2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/10/7 conf. Jennings to Native
Commissioner 2-10-1922.
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detrimentally to the Somali". The Somalia then gave up
their dams and efforts to secure water and" expected the
Desheks to be permanent while, in fact, they were dry for
three years afterwards. In conclusion to his plea to aid
the Somali by the provision of adequate water, Jennings
stateds-
"I describe the Somali as a hard worker for Africa.
He is perhaps too intelligent but show him a course
which benefits his purse and his race and he will
never leave it. It must not be los4; sight of that
before any marked progress^can be effected
Government must assist..."
Jennings did not only point out the most practical
area where the Somali, could be aided but had also proposed
to carry out an experiment himself aimed at providing water
in the vicinity of Afmadu if a young P.W.D. Assistant were
assigned to him together with scrapers, chains and a small
supply of tools. By this he proposed to develop dams
within a thirty mile radius. The outcome of this experiment,
he anticipated, would firstly demonstrate that the
administration were really solicitous for Somali welfare and
wellbeing; secondly, other sections would clamour to follow
suit; and thirdly light would have been shed on Jubaland,
thus enabling quicker development.
Unlike other officials, heads of Departments and
travellers, Jennings had closely studied the possibilities
of the Province and as a result he was very sceptical about
the picture they had given that the Province was a thorny
desert peopled by some delirious savages. In contrast, he
1. Ibid.
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stressed that it was a wonderful stock country possessing
large agricultural possibilities. He theti warned that
after twenty years of unproductive and costly administration,
the situation should be faced and dealt with, otherwise,
the expenditure would increase and the pessimistic opinion
entertained would be enhanced. But despite this plea, and
the previous ones to Nairobi and the Colonial Office, nothing
positive emerged and the problem was neglected for a long
time to come.
The failure to provide enough water for Somali stock
was a major factor in the economic stagnation of the Somali
country but it was by no means the only factor which acoounted
for the lack of development in the area. Another, closely
connected with the stock watering problem, was that the
administration had equally failed to provide routes and
markets for an essentially stock-trading community. The
Somalia possessed considerable potential wealth in cattle,
camel, goats, sheep and donkeys which needed special
attention regarding marketing and supervision.
The Somali trade was conducted through two channels;
the local market inside the Province; and the outside market
which involved selling to buyers in the big trade centres
of the Colony. The former was conducted mainly by three
groups - the Somalia (as masters of the cattle trade), the
Gosha, (as masters of the agricultural produce) and the
Indians and Arabs of the luxuries."'" The encouragement of
1. The Somalia exchanged trade items with the Indian and
Arab traders. These items included rice, sugar, salt,
spices, ghee, aim aim, oil, bananas, dates, tea, coffee,
matches, clothes (local and European) hardware, knives,
paraffin oil etc.
81
this trade by the different groups would no doubt have
counted as a factor in the prosperity of the Somalia and
hence their pacification. On the other hand, Somali
outside trade which normally went to the Coast and down
country could have easily been mastered through supervision
and a regular customs policy. This could have also helped
to divert the trade southwards instead of "its being taken
to the Italian ports to the north.
But owing to the dislike of the British officials for
the Somali both as a person and as a trader the latter
possibility was always jeopardized. This can be seen
clearly in the response of the Senior Commissioner of the
Coast Province to a proposal put forward in 1921 that the
•p
Somalia should be attracted to trading posts at the Coast.
The suggestion had come from the authorities at Kismayu
and the Senior Commissioner was furious and replied:
"I am in full accord with you regarding the trading
centres but inclined to disagree that they should
be on the Coast unless you are in a position to
control the Somalia by the pass system. If the
Somalia are allowed at points on the Coast they will
establish themselves as they have done elsewhere
and they cannot be got rid of without force. Again
Somalia on the Coast are a menace to the whole
population...."
The opening of the Somali area for trade with the Coast
was therefore completely disregarded and not revived until
after the Second World War. The same thing happened later
down country.
Continually harassed by the authorities, the Somalis
K
1. K.N.A./PC/C.P. HcCellan to Senior Commissioner
Kismayu 16-5-1921.
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were more often inclined to engage in illicit trading with
the Bajun, the Waboni, and other tribes across the Juba in
the Italian side. This posed a serious threat to the
economy of the Protectorate and the Colony as without doubt
the value of smuggled ivory was greater than the amount
legally obtained by the Government. In addition to the loss
in the trade, the cattle trade which had considerable
economic potential, suffered from diseases like rinderpest
and East Coast Fever owing to the lack of veterinary super¬
vision. In 192i|., 60$ of the Muhammad Zubeir cattle were
lost owing to an epidemic of rinderpest.t
This lack of interest by the administration towards
exploring and developing the economic possibilities of the
Somali territory was inherent in an idea which had more
than once been proved unjustifiable. It was normally
argued that Jubaland and the N.F.D. were no more than a
drain on the economy of the country and, therefore, that
investment in the region w§s not worthwhile. This
argument continued throughout the period in which the British
were in charge of the Protectorate and the Colony despite
the fact that Sir Charles Eliot, had already outlined the
future possibilities of the area.'*' His views were
supplemented by the hearing of the Economic Commission
when C.S. Gabriel, the only white settler in Jubaland
stated,
"For the ultimate future Jubaland possessed enormous
potentialities for cotton and sugar dependent upon
1. See Chapter 1, p.72-73-
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the undertaking of a vast scheme of irrigation from
the Juba river....The cotton produced should by reason
of its quality and quantity be able to compete in the
World's market and prove a.source of supply for the
industries of the Empire."
The same idea was expounded by H. Hasting-Horne, the
Senior Commissioner, Jubaland in 1922 when he observed:-
"The richness of Jubaland once water is given would
be evident. I will go so far as to say that Kenya,
if pastoral development takes place, depends on this
Province for such development. Moreover, the beef
supply of the Colony can be made much cheaper by
opening up the area."^
Home's views were more than once supported by the
Jennings reports, referred to in this chapter, which were
based on a serious study of the possibilities of the Province.
But despite all these facts, the post-war economic position
of the Somalis remained much the same as that of the pre-war
period outlined in the previous chapter. Owing to the
above attitude, the shortage of staff, the absence of a
sound civil administration, and, above all, uncertainty
about the future of Jubaland, the chance of pacifying the
Somalia by improving their economic position was never
taken up.
Another area in which the Government failed to satisfy
the Somalia - and hence another factor in its failure to
pacify them - was in the field of education. British
administration in Kenya, like that of the Italians in Italian
Somaliland-^ had virtually neglected education in Jubaland
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/210/559 Report of the Economic Commission,
East Africa Protectorate. (Nairobi, 1919).
2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. I/I5/3 No* 393/958 H. Hasting-Horne to
Director of P.W.D., 27-1^.-1922.
3. See Robert L. He3s, Italian Colonialism in Somalia,
(London, 1966), p. 187.
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and the N.P.D. Apart from the Swedish Mission Stations at
Yonte, Gobwen and Mofi which had been established since
19H» no other type of Government education was given. The
sons of chiefs as well as other Somalis attended the Quran
schools (Madrasa) which provided primarily religious
education through the Sheikhs but very little reading and
writing. Despite the Islamic fanaticism of the Somalis,
they did not hesitate to send their children to the
Swedish Mission for education when a chance was provided.
1't is worth noting here that the attitude of the Kenya
Somalis to education was distinctly different from those
in the Somaliland Protectorate where the religious sheikhs
continually opposed the introduction of Government education.
In Kenya, for political reasons Somalis were always conscious
of the opportunities they got compared to the other
communities in the country; and in fact they were always
anxious that they should be treated equally if not better
than the others.
Yet, while the Missions had already by 1920 produced
a new elite among the Africans which had its greatest
impact in western Kenya, especially central Nyanza and
Kikuyuland the Somalia in the northern territories were
struggling unsuccessfully to get some education for their
children. Even private efforts to aid them were often
discouraged by the authorities in Nairobi. The following
letter from a certain Hasan Muhammad is an interesting
example:-
1. See Bothwell A. Ogot, "Kenya Under the British, 1895 to
1983"» Zamani, p. 266.
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"Some two months ago I decided to start a school
for Somali boys and girls in Kismayu. I purchased
a makuti (thatch) house on the outskirts of the
township and added one large room, a well and a
compound, I obtained the services of Abdurahman,
a Mwalim who has lived in Kismayu for many years.
He is a Hawiya Rahanwein. Unfortunately this man
although an excellent teacher of koran. and of
writing is not capable of teaching English, Arabic,
Geography, Arithmetic etc. There are now in the
school over thirty Somali children who attended
regularly. I would be very glad if the Government
would consider the appointment of an Arab as a
teacher and suggest that pecuniary help for this
purpose might^be obtained from the Educational
Department."
The idea while being readily embraced by the officials
on the spot did not meet with any positive response from
the authorities in Nairobi. This occurred at a time when
the Department of Education was considering the erection of
a village school in every location in the rest of the
Colony for all boys and girls under sixteen and when the
issue of extending technical education by grants to other
Missions - in addition to those already receiving grants -
2
was receiving wide consideration. The Somali, however,
was deprived such privileges.
Major Hasting-Horne, who incessantly advocated a
forward policy for the Somali since his appointment as
Acting Senior Commissioner, did not hesitate to state his
opinion on the issue of education of the Somalia. After
a visit to the two stations of the Swedish Evangelical
Fatherhood Society in Jubaland, he informed the Director of
1. K.N.A,/DC/Kis. l/6/l Hasan Muhammad to Resident
Commissioner Kismayu (n.d.) attached to file dated 1920.
2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/7/1 Minutes of P.C*s Meeting held at
Nairobi 28-9-1920.
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Education that the work of the Mission was useful despite
the fact that the results were not great. He went on to
say
"I was greatly surprised to find strict Somali and
Nubian Muhammedans sending their children for
instruct ions...We badly need a Government school
here, non-religious, it would be well attended.
We certainly lose by not having one...I think the
time has arrived when we should do something."
He then concluded,
"The Somali is anxious to be instructed, can we
assist him?"1
But once again, Nairobi was against any forward policy
in this direction. The Director of Education wrote to
inform Major Home that there were no funds and he was
further debarred from any action "until the fate of Kismayu
p
is definitely known." Kismayu was ceded to the Italians
in 1925 and hence Somalia were not given any assistance
from the British administration as far as education was
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/9/3 No. 1031/20/68 Home to Director
of Education 12-10-1922; Major Home's remark also shows
that there was no foundation for the assumption by some
HisHbrianS that the Somalia and their kin were averse
to western influence. A.J. Hughes argued that "the
Hamitic tribesmen of Kenya's remote Northern Province
have had little contact with western influences, and their
resistance to them was hardened by their Islamic faith."
(See A.J. Hughes, East Africa: The Search for Unity; Kenya.
Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar. (London, 1963), p. 17^
2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/9/3 No. 2O/7/23 J.R. Orr to Home
3-11-1922; Home was also rebuffed when he asked the
Native Commissioner to sanction plans for the development
of Jubaland in general. He was informed, "While I quite
appreciate your keenness to push the development of the
Province in which you are in charge, I regret to have to
inform you that in view of the present financial position,
and of the uncertainty of the future of Jubaland, it is
useless to put schemes of expenditure on an area which is
costing the Colony a great deal and yielding practically
no revenue." (K.N.A./PC/Jub. l/l5 No. 26ll/l6 G.O. Maxwell
to Hasting-Horne 17-10-1922.)
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concerned. Major Horne had emphatically stated, on the
eve of the cession of Jubaland that, "The chief reason why
we have never really gained the hearts of the Jubaland
Somali was because of our inability or unwillingness to help
him in that direction."^*
It is obvious from the preceding pages that the search
for a policy which would pacify the Somali through his
economic and social development in the period 1916-25 met
with no success. However, the administration had, during
the same period reverted to its old policy of the use of
force to achieve some measure of peace in the Somali
territory. This in essence meant the conduct of military
operations, disarmament and the restriction of tribal
movement.
Since the sack of Serenli by Mursal and the Aulihan
in 1916, the Government had seriously considered the re-
occupation of the station; not only to inflict a severe
lesson upon the Aulihan but also because Serenli was the
key to the interior of the Province. But at the time the
War Office was reluctant to launch a campaign into the
interior as they realised that "military operations in this
direction can never be carried out either effectively or
economically until motorable roads are constructed from
Kisraayu and Yonte to Afmadu and Serenli.The question
of the inadequacy of the means of transport in the Province
was yet another obstacle in the development of the Somali
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. l/16/ij. Hasting-Home: Provincial Annual
Report, 1921^..
2. P.R.O./C.O. 533/175 War Office to Under-Secretary
Colonial Office 21^-10-1916.
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country; a fact that had been incessantly pointed out by
the officials concerned. Since 1913, the Chief of Customs
had directed the attention of the administration to the
fact that reliance on the Juba as a means of transport
should be reduced. Prom his own experience, and that of
the officers who preceded him up and down the river, they
were convinced that the Juba even at its best an inconvenient,
unreliable and costly means of transport. He strongly urged
the immediate improvement of the road to Gobwen and the
landing facilities at Kismayu; even if such measures were
only temporary because the results would be worthwhileMie fot-nre.
F.W. Major had also pointed to the possibility that even if
private capital was being furnished for the construction
of a railway or a road for motor transport to Serenli or
other parts of the northern frontier it would also be worthy
of consideration for political and military reasons."1"
At first the Foreign Office seemed reluctant to promise
any improvement in transport in Jubaland. Although they
were aware of the vital necessity cf communications, they
felt unable to consider making any start until the close of
O
the German East African operations. But after a short
while sanction was given by the Foreign Office for the
commencement of work on the road even though Nairobi itself
hesitated owing to the shortage of labour. The Foreign
Office had given its consent after taking into consideration
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/10/7 Secretariat No. 87 F.W. Major to
Chief Secretary 12-9-1913.
2. P.R.0./C.0. 533/189 W.C.B. Bottomley to Fiddes 20-6-1917.
the increasing influence of Muhammad Abdille Hasan's movement
in the Province. The latter had instigated a series of
risings despite the authorities' precautions; and, moreover,
the British Government was also much influenced by the fact
that the Italians had already made a motor road on the other
side of the Juba, from Mogadishu to Bardera to Lugh."'"
Work on the Kisraayu-Serenli road commenced on 25th July
with a gang of 26l|. convicts and a section of four miles had
been completed by August 31st. The Military Authorities had
also arranged for some 600 prisoners of war to be sent to
Kismayu to assist, and motor cars were provided to assist
p
in the construction work. But at this juncture, when the
road building was only in its initial stages, the situation
in the interior obliged the authorities to act immediately
following disturbances in the Marehan country. A certain
sheikh Muhammad Yusuf, who was formerly a resident in
Jibuti, was said to be preaching a 'jihad* in the area north
of Dolo. Muhammad Yusuf was also reported to be sending
&lAfLvi C^ci
letters to all Somali tribes^announcing the
of the Mahdi.^ Barratt, who was in charge of the patrol
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/192 POrcelli to Jubaland Administration
lj.-1-1917.
2. The Kismayu-Serenli road was completed as far as Afmadu
by March 1919 covering a distance of eighty miles. But
for reasons military and political it did not extend
beyond Afmadu except for a track cut as far as Diff,
half way between Wajir and Afmadu. The road was said to
have greatly facilitated the administration of the
central and northern Jubaland and the N.P.D. (C.O. 533/
216 Bowring to Milner 2l|.-12-1919. )
3. P.R.0./C.0. 533/182 Paraphrased telegram from the
Officer Administrating the E.A.P. to the Secretary of




sent to deal with the disturbances in the Marehan country
reported that if Muhammad Yusuf*s movement was not checked,
he would become dangerous. The immediate reaction of
the authorities was to re-occupy Serenli.
Despite the situation in German East Africa, the War
Office was of the opinion that the re-occupation by troops
of 5th Regiment K.A.R. had to proceed without delay. Also
that the erection of a wireless station there, once the
station was occupied, would facilitate easier communications
with the interior."*" The idea of the re-occupation was
made even more desirable by the reports that the 'friendly*
Gurreh had suffered from simultaneous attacks by the Degodia
and the Marehan.
Owing to the above factors, the re-occupation of
Serenli was sanctioned. Barratt attacked the station on
September 25th 1917 and was met by strong resistance from
the Aulihan, who attacked the steamer wounding some of the
crew. But at the end of the operation the Aulihans were
defeated and both Mursal and Muhammad Yusuf were reported
to have fled to Abyssinia, in December of the same year.
As in the previous attempts to establish peace by
means of a military operation, the re-occupation of Serenli
was a success. The Aulihan, who were attacked by a patrol
of K.A.R. and the N.F.D. Constabulary were subjugated and
for the first time the Aulihan and the Muhammad Zubeir
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/189 H.H. Faucet to Under-Secretary
Colonial Office 19-6-1917.
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were reported to have supplied labour for the building of
a bridge over the Uaso Nyiro. The re-oooupation had also
saved the administration from an imminent revolt among the
Muhammad Zubeir.^
Carrying on with the programme of forceful pacification,
the authorities both in Jubaland and the N.F.D. had proposed
a Joint plan against continued Somali resistance. A
meeting took place in November 1918 between J.O.W. Hope,
the P.O. of Jubaland, H.B. Kittermaster, Officer-in-Charge
of the N.P.D. and Mr. Isaac,D.C. of Tanaland^ with Colonel
Philips from the Military authorities; and it was decided
p
to disarm the Somalia. Already by March 1919, the policy
of disarmament was declared a success in the N.P.D. The
Governor of the Protectorate congratulated the authorities
there, "On the successful completion of the Somali disarmament
in the Wajir and the Lorien area in circumstances demanding
great judgement and skill on the part of those concerned.
In Jubaland, J. Hope and Captain R.E. Rainsford, 5th
K.A.R., proceeded to the Deshek Wama on 29th January 1919
for the purpose of issuing the order for a general disarmament.
In southern Jubaland all the Ogaden (Muhammad Zubeir, Sheikh
Ali, Maghabul) chiefs and also the Hertis were interviewed
by the P.C. and an order was given for them to disarm on
the 30th at Malka Dadtoh. A general baraza was also held
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/213 Bowring to Colonel Secretary
17-9-1919. Afmadu itself was re-occupied in December
1922 to ensure the pacification of the Muhammad Zubeir.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/2 H.B. Kittermaster Provincial
Annual Report 1918.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1+/1/5 W.J. Ronson (for Chief Secretary) to
Kittermaster 25-6-1919.
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at Yak Dimtu on 3rd February, and the order was once more
explained in detail. Hoe promised the Somalis that no
questions would be asked as to where the arms were obtained,
and that the arms would be handed in by sections instead
of by individuals. This was thought advisable as otherwise
certain guns which had been stolen would not have been
handed in."*" In all, the Muhammad Zubeir handed in 270
rifles and fourteen revolvers; the Maghabul, twenty-four
guns; and the Sheikh Ali, five rifles. The Herti handed
in six rifles, only a small proportion of what had been
expected. Despite this Rainsford declared that the dis¬
armament of the southern Juba side was practically complete
and he even suggested that there was no longer a need to
open up posts at the Deshek Wama.
Unlike the case in southern Jubaland, in the northern
Marehan country the Government was uncertain as to the
validity of subjecting the Marehan to the same policy of
disarmament. The P.O. was of the opinion that, "Should
unrest on the Abyssinian border not be settled in the near
future, it would not be advisable to disarm the Marehan
p
at present." Major Dunn, the Officer-in-Charge of Northern
Jubaland, had been instructed by the P.O. to warn all the
chiefs in his area to register all arms in view of future
disarmament, but that this disarmament would not be
effected until the administration was in a position to
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/10/10 No. 10/20/1+372 Rainsford to
Assistant Commandant K.A.R. 15-12-1919.
2. Ibid.
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guarantee their protection from Abyssinian raiders."''
Along with the above mentioned factors, the authorities
introduced other means to bring about the pacification of
the Somalia. It was thought that by issuing the Somalia
with passes and by their registration, some measure of
control over their movement and behaviour would be achieved.
All the Provincial and District Commissioners were instructed
that "no Somalia should leave their districts without such a
p
pass." This policy more than any of the previous attempts
to suppress them, gave rise to considerable signs of discontent;
Yo
and the Somalia did not hesitate ©row, point A/tagy this out
incessantly to the authorities in the Protectorate and later
the Kenya Colony. When Edward Northey visited the N.F.D.,
the only problem the Somalia discussed with him was that
concerning their restriction; and they asked that they
should be allowed to wander at will and without passes in
the N.P.D. and Jubaland.^
In addition, the Somalia all over Kenya were utterly
opposed to the pending decision by the Government concerning
1. It is interesting to note here that the Italian
administration north of the Juba, probably impressed by
the results of the policy of disarmament on the British
side, had decided to disarm the Somalia on their side
during the Fascist era. In 192l|.» De Vecchi had denounced
the "policy of weakness" adopted in the pre-Pascist period
by arming the tribes of the upper Webi Shebelle against
the incursions of the Ogaden Somali But unlike the
British experience in Kenya, the Italians were met with
greater resistance in implementing the policy. (See Hess,
p. 150).
2. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 47/1125 No. 3288/675 Hope to all D.C.'s
Coast Province 18-5-1918.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD l/l/2 Report by Captain C.T. Baily
5th K.A.R. 1921.
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their registration. The issue of the registration of all
the natives of Kenya arose as a result of the passing of
a new Ordinance repealing all the pre-1920 registration
Ordinances, which had been introduced largely with South
African pass laws in mind but which had not been put into
effect."*" Northey, Kenya's Governor, decided to implement
the new registration law which laid down that evexy African
male over the apparent age of sixteen should be registered
and should carry with him a registration certificate (the
Kipande). As far as the Somalis were concerned, it was
reported that even the Telemugga, "who were at one time
anxious to be registered and taxed,...were the first
Somalis in the N.P.D. to refuse, when they realised that
their registration was at hand."^
The issue was also strongly rejected by the Jubaland
Somalis and was the cause of a considerable amount of
discontent, aocording to reports by the Officer-in-Charge of
Jubaland in 1921+. The latter pointed out that the Somalis
were apprehensive of the Registration Act and that, "it
had been widely circulated that they will be treated as the
Wakikuyu in the Reserve."**" The possibility that they might
be made to carry Kipandis like the other Bantu tribes was
obviously beyond the endurance of the Somalis who had in no
1. John Middleton, "Kenya: Administration and Changes in
African Life 1912-1+5 » History of East Africa. Vol. II,
P. 356. ' ~ ~~~
2. See Harry Thuku: An Autobiography. (Nairobi, 1970), p. 19.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/2 Report by Captain C.T. Baily 5th
K.A.R. 1921.
1+. K.N.A./PC/NFD 3/1/1 Report by Major J. Ward, Central
Intelligence Officer, Kenya Colony April 1921+.
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way considered themselves as "natives" in the same sense
as the other Bantu tribes in the Colony. This was to some
extent also accepted by the Colonial administration; and
in this case the Soma lis were exempted from the Registration
Act on the grounds of their constant opposition;"*" and also
owing to the extremely ill defined position of the Somali
once the cession of Jubaland to Italy should be effected.
So far, apart from the success in the field of military
operations and perhaps, in the policy of the disarmament of
the Somali tribes, the Government had by no means been
successful in formulating long term peace measures which
were satisfactory both for the Somali and the local British
officials. One of the obvious limitations to this, apart
from the factors mentioned previously, was the fact that
both Jubaland and the N.P.D. had suffered from the inadequacy
P
of both the staff and the police force. Reporting on the
position of Jubaland, the D.C. of Kismayu remarked that owing
to this inadequacy "the District shows no progress 3ince
I was last here in 1917-18, its atmosphere is one of general
insufficiency...! attribute this state of affairs, which has
only gradually come to my knowledge, largely to lack of
supervision.He complained that no taxes were collected
1. See K.N. A./PC/NFD l/5/l Wajir Annual Reports 1918-29;
This is one of the cases when the British authorities
were at a loss in placing the Somali as "native" or
"non-native". Here it is clear that he was considered
differently from the Bantu communities in the country
under the pretext of the uncertainty over the future of
Jubaland and the Somalia* opposition.
2. See A.A. Castagno, "The Somali Kenyan Controversy:
Implications for the future", Journal of Modern African
Studies. Vol. 2, 2 I96JL4., pp. I65-I88.
3. K.N.A./DC/KIS/l/i|/l Elliott to Acting Commissioner
Kisraayu 8-9-1921.
and no supervision for places like Gobwen, where political
propaganda was at its height, was provided. The Kismayu
office itself was in a general state of disorder with no
files or records left.
The natural outcome of this neglect was that the
intended policy of pacification had never come to fruition
and because the tribes were unable to feel any progress in
their position, the pattern of intertribal feuds was never
checked. Feuds continued between the Degodia and the
Aulihan, between the Aulihan and the Telemugga, between the
Marehan and the Degodia and between the Degodia and the
Gurren.^" So it might be said that in the period after the
First World War there was no sign of peace either amongst
the Somali tribes or between these tribes and the British
adminis trat ion.
But perhaps the major factor behind the failure of the
Government's policy of the pacification of the Somali in
the period 1916-25* was inherent in their inability to put
the Somalia in distinct administrative areas. Since lc>05
the administration of the Somalia in Jubaland, N.F.D. and
Tanaland had occasionally been shifted from one district
to another, and from province to province. The authorities
were undecided between containing the whole of the Ogaden
Somalia into one administrative unit, splitting them between
the N.F.D., and Jubaland, or adding only the Telemugga to
either of the latter two. As a result of this indecision
the Somalia, especially in the Tana River District, had
1. Gastagno, p. 170.
constantly posed a problem since they tended to move about
causing clashes among themselves, with other Somali sections
and with riverine Bantu tribes.
It was because of this state of affairs that the
authorities had seriously considered the question of
containing the Somalia into a reserve in the 1920*s,
though the idea of creating native reserves in Kenya was
by no means a new one. Since 1905, the Imperial Government
had recognised the principle of "Reserves for Natives" and
a commissioner for Native Affairs was appointed in 1907.
By 1915 the Crown Land Ordinance gave statutory recognition
to 'native* Reserves and in 1926 about twenty-three of them
were gazetted all over the Colony.^" This policy of land
reservation on racial and tribal lines served as the base
for the theory of Separate development in Kenya Colony and
Protectorate in the period between 1923 to 1952; and
guaranteed land and labour for the white settler.
As far as the Soma lis were concerned, the idea of
creating a reserve was viewed from a different angle. The
Somali owned practically no land and was inhabiting what
was essentially Crown Land and further he was by no means
a potential source of labour. The concept of concentrating
him on a reserve was primarily meant for administrative
convenience to pacify him and to check his south westerly
drift towards the interior of Kenya and most important the
White highlands. This was the main idea behind
1. Ogot, Zamani, pp. 271-72.
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Captain Salkeld's proposition of 1912 and 1911]..1
Salkeld's recommendations concerning a Somali reserve
were transmitted to the Secretary of State with the
request that they might be considered in connection with
the scheme for the administration of the N.P.D. and
Jubaland. But the issue was not seriously discussed
before 1918 when, as a result of increasing trespassing
by the Biscaya Soma lis on the Wapokomo property, the
authorities in the N.P.D., Jubaland and Tanaland presented
their views on the subject.
The N.P.D. view on the question of the reserve was
presented by Mr. Deck in a despatch to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies in July 1918. Deck was of the
opinion that the Somalia should be concentrated on the Juba
River and towards the Tana oweb to leave Wajir free for the
Galla. This proposition led to a long controversy
concerning the right of settlement of Somalia and Galla
on the Wajir area, and also as to whether all the Somalia
should be included in one administrative area or divided
between two.
1. Salkeld divided the proposed reserve area for the
Somalis into three divisions
(a) the northern area comprising the districts occupied
by the Marehan and Aulihan and gazetted as the
Serenli district.
(b) the central area of Afmadu district as gazetted.
(c) the south western onTana River district, i.e. that
frequented by the Abdullah and Abd Wak. (See
T.S. Thomas, p. 55» Also See T.H.R. Cashmore,
'Studies in District Administration in the East Africa
Protectorate 1895-1918', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis
(Jesus College, Cambridge, Nov. 1965)» p. 328.
2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/10/7 quoted by Kittermaster to
p.C. Kismayu, 28-10-1918.
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First, Mr. Hope, presenting the Jubaland point of
view regarding the administration of the Somalia and the
question of the Reserve, was of the opinion that as both
Jubaland and the N.F.D. were similar, and the questions
which arose affected one as much as the other, it would
be more satisfactory if the two districts were put in the
charge of one Officer."*" But that would only be possible
if mechanical transport between Wajir and Kismayu were
maintained: a railway built or failing that a sufficient
service of light motor cars permitted. In the event of
the above scheme being impossible, Hope put forward the
idea of a Somali reserve in the Tana and Wajir areas to
include the Abdwak, Abdallah, Aulihan, Maghabul, Sheikhal
and Muhammad Zubeir^all Ogaden) and half the same tribes
to be concentrated in the Deshek District and Blscaya.
This essentially meant that he was averse to the idea that
the Somalia should be evicted from Wajir because, he
maintained, "Since 1910 the immigration of Somalia to Wajir
has been tacitly allowed by Government and this has enticed
more Somalia down from the north... It would be most unfair
now to order them to raove."^
On the other hand, Kittermaster, the Officer-in-charge
of the N.F.D. was in full agreement with Deck's point of
view regarding the Somali claim to Wajir and was very
critical of Hope's attitude which ewSSaailjad: the Somali claim.





"...I cannot consent without protest to the
formal recognition of the Somali claims to Wajir
at the expense of the Galla... Our future
relations with Abyssinia and Italy may make a
vital difference to the expediency of allowing
the Somali claim to Wajir and I advise that this
aspect of the question should be carefully-
considered when a decision is being made."
Kittermaster was also very critical of Hope's suggestion
regarding the division of Soma lis in the reserve. He
regarded as incomplete, the latter's suggestion that the
Ogaden were to be included in the Somali Reserve but not
the Hawiya. This in the case of the Rer Muhammad would
put half of that section into the reserve and half outside,
while the Pai etc. would be outside though with large
numbers of relatives living among the Marehan. He also
dismissed as being Inequitable and inexpedient the
alternative suggestions of, one, crowding all Somalia
except the Galla-speaking Ajuran into the area proposed by
Hope and, two, extending the reserve north and west. He
rejected the former on the grounds that it would produce
congestion and the latter on the grounds that it would
entail the expulsion of the Galla and Galla-speaking Ajuran
from territory they already occupied.
Kittermaster's own recommendations on the subject
amounted to a request that the de facto arrangement should
be allowed to stand and that the Somalia at Wajir should be
included formally in the N.P.D. He informed the Chief
Secretary,
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/10/7 Kittermaster to Chief Secretary
28-10-1918.
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"...I state my opinion most emphatically that if
it be found impossible to put all these northern
territories under one officer the existing
arrangement with more clearly defined boundaries
will be more satisfactory than the proposed
Ogaden reserve including Wajir.
The third point of view regarding the question of the
Somali Reserve was put forward by J.W. Isaac, the P.O. Lamu,
representing the Tana River opinion. He suggested that
the question should first be considered from an Imperial
standpoint, which in essence meant the control of Somali
immigration from northern Somaliland into East Africa.
This would curb the gun running which was bringing the
country into much the same condition of lawlessness that
existed in Uganda, during the rebellion of Mwanga and
2
Kabarega. In addition, he commented,
"The time has now come when we have sufficient
military strength to deal with the situation finally
and effectively, and to prove to the Somalia that
these encroachments, and the defiance of law and
order, do not pay, and to the Abyssinians that
border raids must cease. We can also clear up
the somewhat obscure position existing between
ourselves and Italy, whereby undesirable Somalia
are constantly trickling through Italian territory
into British East Africa."^
J.W. Isaac, further argued that, if the Somalia were
to be dealt with from an entirely local standpoint, the
administration would not be able to solve the difficulties
by enlarging Jubaland Province, taking in a strip of
Tanaland, and then gazetting this area as a Somali Reserve.
This would mean administering a larger Somali area which
1. Ibid.




would be more difficult to guard and the coat of
administration would tend to increase rather than decrease.
His own suggestions for an alternative scheme considered
solely from local standpoint amounted to four points.
Firstly, to make a census of the Somali population
and their livestock while disarmament was progressing.
Secondly, to establish some large pumping stations on the
Juba River and run out canals for irrigating pasture land
and watering stock - this to be paid for by Somalis. Thirdly,
to apply the Native Authority Ordinance and compel Somalis
to clear the bush where these canals run and thus establish
permanent pastures. Finally to place all the Somalis in
a Reserve along the Juba River and thus create a buffer
state which would prevent immigration from the north.
Once established along the River in Reserves with good grazing
and abundant water, the Somalis would not wish to leave nor
would they allow other clans to invade their areas.
In reply to these suggestions, Kittermaster altogether
declined to tackle the question from the Imperial standpoint
because, "if re-arrangements of any sort should be made with
Abyssinia or Italy the question would take an entirely
different complexion and would have to be viewed from a
fresh angle."'1' The N.F.D. authorities were also very
sceptical about Isaac's suggestion of a reserve on the Juba
kept going by pumping stations and irrigation. They were
doubtful if enough pasture even by irrigation from the Juba
valley could be obtained. Further, the Officer-in-charge
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/10/10 Kittermaster to Isaac 13-5-1919.
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N.P.D. was unable to verify which of the Somali sections
Mr. Isaac was intending to include in his reserve - the
Herti, the Marehan or the Ogaden and what was he going
to do about the Hawiya sections, to include them with the
rest of Somalis or not.
Like the previous suggestions for the pacification
of the Somali, the idea of creating a Somali Reserve did
not meet with any success.1 Edward Northey, the Governor
of the Protectorate, had then suggested yet another
proposal for the pacification and the administration of the
N.P.D. Somali. Northey was of the opinion that the
administration of the N.P.D. at that time was both expensive
and unsatisfactory. He explained:-
"In a country so far distant and so unsettled the
retention of the civil administration is wasteful
and superfluous superimposed on the military who
should I consider have quite a free hand and are
quite capable of keeping law and order. The civil
servants employed in this administration are much
more urgently required in the more settled areaa, and
we can ill afford to keep them where they are."2
As an example of this anomalous situation the Governor
pointed out the case of Kittermaster, who as an official of
the Protectorate, was actually in charge at Gaddaduma in
Abyssinia, which post the British were occupying in
operations against the Tigre. Northey, backed by
General Llewellyn, recommended that such administration
as was required in the N.P.D. and also northern Turkana
1. The 'handing-over to Italy scheme' was also a factor
in the failure of the Reserve policy because it was
not then clear what boundaries and what tribes were
going to be included in Jubaland and handed to Italy.
2. P.R.0./C.0. 333/211/655 Northey to Milner 11-7-1919.
10k
should for that period be carried out entirely by the
military officers Commanding Detachments, to whom the
necessary civil powers of Acting Assistant District
Commissioner would be given. The suggestion was also
agreed to by Sir Robert Coryndon."1"
In reply to the above suggestion, Fiddes had on
behalf of Milner communicated a telegram to Northey to say,
"N.F.D. proposal approved but in first instance new
arrangements for administration must be regarded as
experimenta1"£ Moreover, he indicated that the authorities
in London had approved the taking over by the military
provided that no additional K.A.R. personnel would be
required and that the Commandant would carefully select
officers who were to take over the administration. The
Military administration which eventually took over the
affairs of the Somalis had certain obvious limitations.
First, it did not in any way aid the programme intended by
the Government for the pacification of the Somali. The
various sections of the Somali clans found themselves more
divided than ever. The Darod were split up under
different forms of administration, civil in Jubaland and
military in the N.F.D. This aspect was illustrated lately
by the Senior Commissioner Kismayu who reported,"I found when
I wished to get a general council to settle outstanding
questions it was impossible.... The Tellemugga on the Tana
are all under Sankuri (N.F.D.), a portion of the Mohammad
1. Ibid.
2. P.R.O./C.O. 533/211/655 Milner to Fiddes 13-9-1919.
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Zubeir, Maghabul and Aulihan are under Jubaland. The
arrangement deliberately fosters inter-tribal friction more
especially when you take into consideration the difference
between civil and military administration.""''
In the N.F.D. itself at the time of the assumption
of military rule in 1920, the boundaries between the
different sub-districts were very vague. No definite
administrative boundaries between Gurreh, Moyale, Wajir,
Garba tulla, and Samburu existed. The result was that the
control of the movement of the different tribes was very
difficult, especially in Wajir where it represented
greatest administrative difficulties with the Degodia and
the Gurreh continually feuding.
On the Tana, the situation was far worse. On the
eve of the Military administration, the D.C. Sankuri was
informed that the Teleraugga had been placed under the orders
of Jubaland. In addition, it was stated that any question
between the Telemugga Somalis and the other tribes on the
Tana could be settled by the Assistant D.G. of Sankuri and
the D.C. of Kipini,^ in the north, by the Assistant D.C.
and the Officer Commanding Wajir. The officer at Sankuri
had been made an Assistant D.C. in charge of Somalis in the
area. This was done while in Jubaland itself Mr. Jennings
was the Civil Officer in charge of all the Ogaden. This
anomalous position of the Tana River Somali did not only
1. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 5kAkk3/k9 No.s.21 956/33 Maxwell to
McCellan 28-11-1922.
2. Kipini was then the Headquarters of the Tana River
District. No sooner was the above arrangement made
than it was decided to close it in 1922. Kipini and
Kao were handed to Lamu in 1922.
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prove difficult for the administration but the Somalia them¬
selves led by the turbulent Abdallah section of the
'Telemugga, were not slow to realize the weakness of the
position and therefore did not hesitate to tantalize
the authorities.
In their fury at being subjected to military
administration,"*" the Abdallah were constantly in clashes
with the Government. They were particularly indignant to
the policy regarding their watering rights and their south¬
ward movement. The administration had limited their
southernmost watering point on the Tana to Masabubu; a
point which the Somalia thought utterly unsatisfactory.
On the other hand, the administration was very anxious that,
whatever the outcome might be, the Somalia must be kept
north of Masabubu. This was viewed as a necessary measure
if their southerly movement was to be checked and if the
Pokomo and the Galla were to be protected. Further, to
ensure the latter policy, the Tana River was declared a
closed district and Somalia were not allowed to cross south
of a line drawn between Masabubu and Dick's Head except the
Location of Chora, which was in the Ten Miles Strip - an
area described by the Senior Commissioner Kismayu as,
p"useless and dangerous for health".
Hasan Uthman, the Chief of the Tanaland Abdallah
was instrumental in rallying Somali opposition to the
disappointing British Somali policy, in the 1920's. Having
1. The Abdallah were placed under K.A.R. administration in
August 1922.
2. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 5k/lhb3/h9 No. IOI4.6/20/69 Senior
Commissioner Kismayu 16-10-1922.
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already had a bad record with the Protectorate administration,
and having been severely censured in 1912 by Sir P.
Giroutrard for his remissness and disobedience, the
administration was not slow to ask for his deportation.
Only a year before, in August 1922, Hasan Uthman had
presented himself before the Chief Native Commissioner at
Kozi, with a view to getting permission for himself and
his people to water below Masabubu - he was already at Kozi
with his people and their stock. Although he was informed
by the Chief Native Commissioner that he was out of boundary
and that the Government could not hear him until he had
withdrawn beyond Masabubu and applied in writing for a
watering place, he refused to obey the orders and the
Abdallah were again found below the permitted boundary.
Moreover, in August 1923, Hasan Uthman visited Lamu and
asked to be administered from Lamu, the implication being
that he and his people resented their subjection to Military
administration. He once again renewed his appeal that
the Abdallah should be allowed to water below Masabubu, and
once again the authorities refused to hear him unless he
submitted a written application - an order he resented.
However, the case of the Abdallah did not completely
escape the sympathy of some of the officials on the Coast
Province. The District Commissioner, Lamu, once suggested
that there was reason in allowing the Abdallah south of
Masabubu in that they were not on friendly terms with the
Abd Wak who were immediately north of Masabubu, and that
in a dry year there was not enough water for their stock
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unless they were allowed to have access to the River."'' He
repudiated the idea put forward by various officials in
charge of Somali affairs that the only satisfactory means
of dealing with the problem was to debar the Somalia from
the River and that any of them appearing in its vicinity
should be shot. In contrast, the D.C. argued that in
consulting the Wapokomo, the tribe mostly affected by Somali
appearance on the area, he found that provided access to the
River was only allowed at gazetted watering points and no
Somalia were allowed to live within five miles of the River,
they would be glad to have the Abdallah in the hinterland.
The measure would have created better opportunities for
trade between the Somalia, the Bantu and the Coastal
population and, according to the D.C., this would not entail
any necessity for increasing the military or police strength.
He said that Assistant District Commissioner, under the
general control of the D.C., Lamu, should be posted at
Sankuri for the civil administration both of the Somalia,
2
Northern Galla and Korokoro.
It was obvious that the local administration was
beginning to realize that the Somalia could not be crushed
by military administration and that it was essential to put
them under civil rule like other districts in the Colony
and to provide them with gazetted watering places. This
policy was more likely to have produced successful results
than the force of arms. The fact that the military rule
imposed upon the Somalis had its limitations was pointed out




by Mr. Fazan in his Handing-Over Report to Mr. Wade in
1923. In the first instance, the term of K.A.R. service
for officers had been cut from five years to three so that
there was very little chance of a military officer learning
administrative duties. Secondly, intelligence collected by
the military was not normally sent to Lamu and even if it
was, one could not make much of it, without local knowledge.
The result was that the Abdallah, because of the distance
from them of the various Government stations like Kismayu,
Lamu and the alienated K.A.R. administration at Sankuri,
had enjoyed a position of complete independence obeying
Government orders only in so far as it suited them. This
position facilitated their contact with other Somali groups
like the Herti who influenced them in the way of political
thinking and their district was said to be, "a hot-bed of
ivory poaching, and the rendezvous and haven of refuge of
all Herti ivory traders.The Abdallah had never
recognized the K.A.R. authority and with the exception of
Chief Hasan Birjin had constantly refused to contact Sankuri.
In this way they had also influenced the Rer Muhammad section
who also refused to recognize the K.A.R. administration at
Sankuri. Their Chief, Yusuf Gedi, who went to Lamu in
June 1923 to claim the Sultanate of Rer Muhammad was in&arane^
to report to Sankuri but he refused.
In I92I4., the authorities were obliged, by the constant
resistance of the Abdallah to change the boundaries of the
Telemugga District in favour of the N.F.D. The eastern
1. K.N.A./PC/DTFD l/l7 Garissa (Telemugga) Annual Reports
1923-1929.
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boundary was defined along the old Provincial boundary. The
western boundary was adjusted so that the five mile zone
to the north of Sankuri was abolished and the left bank
of the River was included in the Telemugga District. The
southern boundary was changed to allow the Abdallah increased
watering facilities on the Tana. This alteration added
approximately 1300 sq. miles to the District."1"
It was after this that Hasan Uthman had, on behalf of
the Abdallah and all the Telemugga, submitted a petition to
O
the D.C. of Lamu. The petition consisted of four main
points. Firstly, Hasan Uthman stated that Biscaya, the home
of the Abdallah was a long way from Sankuri. Secondly the
Abdallah had been for a long time supervised from Lamu which
was their natural headquarters and they saw no reason for
the change. Thirdly, they argued that they were peaceful
people and had given no trouble: the military authority
usually governied troublesome people and they maintained
they had done nothing to deserve being subjected to it.
Finally, they pointed out that the military rule had proved
harsh and unjust. The K.A.R. askaris had interfered with
their women and commandeered their goats. In reply to the
Abdallah petition the Governor Sir Robert Coryndon, who
attended an interview with Hasan Uthman at Lamu, said that
he was unable to give a definite answer immediately and that
he would have to consult the Military Authorities in Nairobi.
1. On February 29th 192)+, a special number of the Official
Gazette was issued fproc. No. 8I4.) in which the new
boundaries between the N.F.D. and Tana River District were
promulgated. (C.P. Sk/lkk3/b^ No* ^05/15/9/2 Captain
Mahony to Officer i/c N.F.D. Meru 17-10-1^2lj..)
2. This was done verbally but recorded and attached to
C.P./Uj43A.q Ag» D.C. Lamu to McCellan 3-7-192J+.
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Moreover, he pointed out that the impending cession to
Italy of a large part of Jubaland would necessitate certain
changes in the administration which would affect this issue.
The question initially responsible for raising the
petition against subjection to the military was that of
Somali watering and access points on the Tana below
Masabubu. However, despite the lengthy discussion of
the problem, the question was lost sight of or ignored."1' It
is true that the order of 29th February 19214. granted some
additional watering places on the Tana but the continual
harassment of the Soma lis from the newly-extended area meant
that what was a partial solution in theory was no solution
at all in practice. Not only that, Hasan Uthman was shortly
arrested by the Officer-in-charge - Sankuri. However, he
managed to escape to Larau and later to Nairobi where he was
recaptured by the authorities. • After his deportation,
temporary permission was given to the Somalia to water their
stock at seven points below Masabubu but no sooner had
that been granted than offioials again complained that
"Considerable damage has been done to Pokomo cultivation in
the vicinity (a) by cattle trampling and grazing it (b) by
looting by the Somali, women and children principally.
It is obvious from the preceding pages that the
Government had completely failed to implement the proposed
1. K.N.A./PC/C.P. Uj43A9 No. I4.O5A5/9/2 D.A. Cook to
0/1 N.F.D. 17-10-192li.
2. The seven points were:- Gabuba, Wallu, Hammar, Gurmusa,
Abalatio, Bubesi, and Agarun Gabir.
3. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 1144.3A9 A.W. Sutcliffe to D.C. Lamu
18-2-1925.
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programme for the better administration and pacification of
the Somali tribes in the northern territories of the Colony
and Protectorate of Kenya. The period 1916-25 witnessed
no change in the social, economic and the political position
of these tribesmen and the question of creating a proper
and practical Somali policy, though frequently brought to
the forefront by the officials on the spot, remained a dream
that never came true. This was particularly due to the fact
that the administration had till then failed to grasp the
actual problems involved in the administration of these
pastoral tribes - the result being the hesitancy and the
muddle which distinguished the policies in the period under
consideration. The situation was made even worse by the
projected handing over of the Province of Jubaland to Italy.
As previously stated, all the suggestions for the admini¬
stration of the Somalis in both territories were either
delayed or completely neglected pending a decision by London
on the subject.
The negotiations with Great Britain for the transfer of
Jubaland to Italy took place intermittently from 1919 to
192l±. The first phase of the negotiations was concluded in
September 13* 1919, when Lord Milner agreed to transfer a
tract of Jubaland, including the port of Kismayu, to Italy.
This was the one positive result of Article XIII of the
Secret Wartime Treaty of London by which the British
promised to compensate Italy if Britain enlarged its African
holdings at the expense of Germany. But realizing that the
1. Hess, pp. 156-5^.
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British offer was considerably less than what they had
actually demanded, the Italians broke off negotiations.
In 1923 Mussolini seemed more prepared to come to terms
over Jubaland but it was not until 1921; that both powers
resumed negotiations. When on July 15» 1921;, the Italians
withdrew their claim for more land, Britain ceded Jubaland
to Italy on the bases of the boundaries agreed between
Milner and Sciaja in 1919.
The Somali question in the Kenya Colony was, however,
no nearer a solution as a result of the decision on Jubaland.
Par from it, the problems resulting from the drawing of an
artificial boundary with no ethnic classification had
actually added a new dimension to the already existing
problems. Ever since 1920, both the Jubaland and the
N.P.D. authorities had been at a loss to decide which of
the Somali tribes was to remain in the N.P.D. and which of
them was to be returned to Jubaland, in the event of the
cession taking place. Kittermaster, in a memorandum on
the Ogaden in the Northern Frontier District,^ had advocated
the idea that the Ogaden should be turned out of British
territory and joined to the rest of the Somali tribes in
Jubaland. But his proposition was vehemently criticised
by the Jubaland authorities who were unable to understand
how the Ogaden could be controlled and kept from returning,
where they were to be placed in Jubaland and whether the
Italian Government would be prepared to accept the extra
1. Quoted by Jennings, Acting D.C. of Afmadu in his despatch
to P.O. of Kismayu (K.N.A./PC/Jub. l/k/l No. 22/1/2Q
16-12-1920).
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Ogaden in their new territory bearing in mind that for some
years these Ogaden had not been living in the ceded area."'"
The idea was further opposed in view of the fact that if
all the Ogaden tribes were excluded, the camel supply at
p
Wajir would not be sufficient to meet transport demands.
The idea of excluding all the Ogaden was then replaced
with that of splitting the Muhammad Zubeir cattle and camel
men between the two territories. As the country around
Wajir affords better grazing for camels than that in southern
Jubaland, the Kenya Government had had for some time allowed
the camel people to use the grazing in an allotted area of
the British zone, conditional on their good behaviour when
removed from the authority of their principal Headman and
from full tribal control. On the other hand, the cattle
people who had better facilities than the camel people for
watering and grazing stock in southern Jubaland, were
returned in 1921 to their proper grazing grounds around
Deshek Wama.^ But in doing this both the British and
Italian authorities clearly failed to foresee the seemingly
obvious danger inherent in dividing a tribe as turbulent as
the Muhammad Zubeir between the two different administrations.
With regard to the Aulihan, the administration had also
1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. I/I4./7 No. 22/1/2Q Jennings to P.O. Kismayu
16-12-1920.
2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/1+/7 Enclosure. A copy of a discussion
which took place at Garba TuILa on November 6th 1920 at
which the following were present:- Lt. Col. J.M. Llewellyn -
O.C. Troops, Jubaland, Mr. E.J. Waddington, Ag. Off. i/c
N.F.D., Mr. H.B. Sharps, Ag. D.C. Wajir. Enclosure in
Salkeld to Chief Secretary 17-5-1920.
3. P.R.0./C.0. 533/292 Jubaland: Revised Memorandum n.d.
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proposed to treat them in the same way as the Muhammad
Zubeir by allowing some of them to remain in the British
zone on condition they would register themselves and their
herds; the others to be returned to the Aulihan country
in the Serenli area. The case of the Marehan was, however,
treated differently. The Marehan, in the northern part of
Jubaland had never been allowed to encroach west of the
proposed international boundary. The country west of the
boundary was recognised as Gurreh country, and it had been
the fixed policy of the Kenya Government, quite apart from
any question of cession of territory to Italy, to prohibit
any incursion of the Marehan into the country west of the
proposed line. In particular, the Italian Government was
informed by a Foreign Office note to the Italian Ambassador
on December 23# 1921# that the claim of the Marehan to
permanent water at Eil Wak had not only never been tacitly
recognized, but had been strongly resisted.
The defects of a policy aimed at splitting off at least
two of the Ogaden sections and at the complete stoppage of
the Marehan from having access to watering facilities in
British territory, are not difficult to see. Moreover,
in a land of nomads an attempt to regulate tribal movement
through demarcation of boundaries could only lead to further
problems and the case of the N.F.D. and Jubaland was no
exception. The nature of the country (difficulty of
transport, lack of water, comparative absence of topographical
detail together with the practical impossibility of confining
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notnadic tribes within fixed boundaries), rendered any
attempt at a continuous demarcation impracticable."1" In
fact only a year after the cession reports of ra^/s by the
p
Aulihan across the north eastern border were common. Also,
the cession by no means helped the administration to control
the turbulent Abdallah section of the Ogaden and their ex-
Sultan Hasan Uthman. The latter found his opportunity by
establishing himself once again as a salaried chief among
the Abdallah at the Juba, but in Italian pay.^ This
situation helped him to tantalize the British administration
from the other side. In short, the post-1925 period
witnessed, in addition to the previous problems, the
increased trespassing of tribes over an undefined border and,
more difficult still, the control of the unchecked Italian
banda.
The cession of Jubaland had, apart from serving the
purpose of the Abdallah, pleased neither the average
Jubaland Somali, nor the N.P.D. authorities, nor the
authorities at Nairobi. According to the Intelligence
Reports of Kenya Colony, the Jubaland Somali was very hostile
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/329/J+7 Cession of Jubaland: Boundary
Delimitation February 1925. Although Jubaland was
officially handed over in June 1925» the boundary was
not yet demarcated. According to Convention between
Britain and Italy this was to be decided by the
Boundary Commission. The latter did not commence before
1927.
2. P.R.O./C.O. 5hh/2-O/Vol. II Kenya Administrative Reports
1926, p. 23.
3. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 5k/lkb3/k9 T.B. Butler to Officer
Commanding Troops Nairobi, 11+-3-1927.
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to the cession for four reasons.^ First he realised that
the methods employed by the two Governments were entirely
different. Seoond, trade in Italian Somaliland was
relatively much poorer and so he anticipated low prices for
his cattle. Third, he believed that his existing system
of chiefs and councils would be more or less abolished and
that their powers would be largely usurped by appointed
qadis and the powerful chiefs who resided in Italian
Soraaliland. Finally, during the war, the Somalia in the
neighbouring territory suffered losses and starvation
having had food and livestock requisitioned by the
authorities while the Jubaland Somalis had had prosperous
2
years.
Besides the dissatisfaction expressed by the Jubaland
Somalis and the N.F.D. authorities over the outcome of the
cession, the Governor of the Colony, Sir Robert Coryndon had
himself bitterly criticized the decision by Britain over
the cession issue, particularly as London had placed him
in the embarrassing position of having to keep the whole
affair secret. Writing to the Colonial Office, he
complained: -
"With reference to Jubaland Cession the public here
naturally dislikes the thing going through without
any notice to the Colony. They fully realise that
it was an imperial matter, and had to be considered
in that spirit; but it would have been simple for
1. Hess maintained that the Herti were hostile to Italian
administration partly because of the anti-Italian feeling
stimulated by the British Commissioner and partly because
of their fear that any Colonial administration would
favour the case of the Muhammad Zubeir. (see Hess, p.158).
2. K.N. A ,/PC/NFD I4./I/3 E.J. Waddington to Off icer-in-charge
N.F.D. 3-2-1925.
118
you to have given me some guarded statement which I
could have made at the time or a few days before.
You will understand that none of us like to have to
rely upon the local colonial press for news of such
matters as these; ... I did of course say that there
has been correspondence, but that it obviously could
not have been communicated at the time and cannot be
disclosed now.... I am afraid I shall have a bad time
in Kismayu in June, and,will probably be mobbed by
angry Somali chiefs."
A few years later, Sir Edward Grigg, who succeeded
Sir Robert as Governor, was even more critical of the decision.
He stated in a memorandum on Railway Development
"The transfer was made without her knowledge (Kenya),
and she was confronted with the assurance that her
expenditure would be considerably reduced... The
promise has not been fulfilled. She retains an equally
long and far less convenient frontier which threatens
much future trouble and expense. Owing to its
character she has had to face an immediate increase
of smuggling which entails for 1926 alone an estimated
loss of £25»000 in ivory revenue and seems likely in a
few years to destroy that branch of revenue altogether.
In Kismayu and the Juba River, moreover, she has lost
an asset capable of great future development both as
a stock and crop producing area."2
The cession of Jubaland to Italy on June 29, 1925 had,
therefore, brought satisfaction to neither the Somali nor to
his administrators. To the former it meant yet another
artificial barrier planted between him and his kin; and to
the latter, far from aiding the prospects of peace in the
area, the cession had added a new dimension to the problem of an
already undefined Abyssinian frontier.
The period 1916-25 had thus witnessed the development
of the Somali question in its most acute form as a result
of the failure of the administration to bring about a workable
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/311/lij.l conf. Coryndon to Bottomley
7-6-192k.
2. The Mombasa Times. 19-12-1926, p. 2.
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solution to the question of administration and pacification
of the Soma lis in the northern territories of the Colony.
The period which followed, up to the Second World War, was
not marked by any improvement in the position of Somalis
as a result of the inevitable difficulties of controlling
a frontier people - as we shall see in the next chapter.
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Chapter III
Britain, Italy, Abyssinia, and the Administration
of the N.F.D, Somalia 1925-19L0.
In the previous chapter, the problems relating to the
administration of the Jubaland and N.P.D. Somalis and the
failure of the government*s efforts to pacify them were
discussed. This chapter traces the position of the N.P.D.
Somalis in the subsequent years up to the end of the Second
World War - a period which was marked by the development of
yet another aspect of the Somali question - the difficulty
of controlling a frontier Province.
Naturally, the task of administering a province which
shared boundaries with four different countries"'' was not
an easy one; especially when it is taken into consideration
that these were artificial boundaries drawn with no
consideration for geographical and ethnographical factors.
Since the nineteenth century, trans-frontier migrations,
raids, and feuds became very frequent between the tribes
on the Kenya-Abyssinian border. With the cession of
Jubaland and the further division of the Somalis, the
situation between Kenya and Italian Somaliland once more
became acute in that quarter. This was further worsened
by the results of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict of 1935
and the International conflict of I9I4.O.
As already observed, the cessions of Jubaland, an
area where the Somalis had never really submitted, to
1. The N.P.D. was bounded by Italian Somaliland,
Abyssinia, The Sudan and Uganda.
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British territory, had by no means eased the task of td&e-
en m
a dm inistyfitarsn etfi the rest of the Somalia in the N.F.D.
Attempts to control trans-frontier movement were first
begun by the survey of the border between Kenya and Italian
Somaliland by the Jubaland Commission of 192l|./25, which
commenced its work from Mandera working its way south to
Kiunga. In 1928 the boundary between the two countries
was demarcated and a report on the work of this Boundary
Commission was published.1 The limitations of the boundary
thus drawn were pointed out by E.H.M. Clifford, a member of
the British Commission who remarked that the boundary ....
"has this disadvantage that, as the topography of
the country offers no natural lines, no obstacle
is provided to raids or immigration by the nomad
tribes who inhabit that region and peace on the
frontier can only be maintained by effective police
and administrative measures."^
The boundary line which followed longitude I4I0 running
from Eil Wak to Kolbio was also criticized as being
arbitrary and utterly meaningless running as it did "through
the middle of nowhere for a hell of a long way."^ Naturally
this line had in no way helped to check border trespassing.
1. Representing the British side in this Commission were:
Lieut. Colonel L.N. King and Captain E.H.M. Clifford.
Colonel Dotto Giovanni represented the Italian side.
This Commission is known as the Boundary Commission to
distinguish it from the previous Jubaland Commission of
192l|-.
2. E.H.M. Clifford, "A recent Boundary Commission in Africa",
The Military Engineer. July-August 1929, pp. 319-22;
Also see L.N. King, "The Work of the Jubaland Boundary
Commission', G. J., 72, 1928, p. I4.2O.
3. Harlod G. Marcus, "Ethio-British Negotiations Concerning
the Southern Border with British East Africa, 1897-1912",
R.H./Mss/Afr./s./583. Also see A.C. McEwen, International
Boundaries of East Africa, (Oxford, 1971)# PP. 113-121.
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The Telemugga Somalia in the N.P.D. were continuously under
the pressure of fresh immigration from Italian Somaliland.
No policing or economic measures would have prevented the
Aulihan and the Muhammad Zubeir, who were legally residents
in both countries from treiking backwards and forwards.
Already by 1928 the District Commissioner of Wajir complained
that "a large number ot Bartiri and Italian Aulihan have
crossed to the south side of the river.In addition the
Garissa administration was particularly apprehensive about
the immigration of the troublesome Herti from Kismayu.
Captain Mahony complained that "those Herti do much harm,
and much of the anti-registration agitation in 1923 was
due to them...the Herti were entirely responsible for the
p
Muhammad Zubeir unrest in Jubaland in 1925»n Mahony was
particularly concerned because the Herti were close friends
with the Abdallah in his District and therefore they might
have instigated trouble. Besides these continuous
trespassing incidents by the Aulihan, the Muhammad Zubeir
and the Herti, the Marehan of Italian Soraaliland were
constantly reported to have infiltrated in large groups
since the cession and thus to have deprived the N.F.D.
tribes, especially the Gurreh of some of the best grazing
and watering areas in the District.
However, despite the incessant trespassing of tribes,
the Kenya-Somalia border had, in comparison with the
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2+./1/7 No. 175/57/1 D. Stones to Senior
Commissioner N.P.D. 26-3-1928.
2. K.N.A./PC/GRSSA 3/1+ M.R. Mahony Garissa District
Political Records, Vol. II, August 1928.
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Abyssinian frontier, given no major troubles. With the
exception of 1939 when the border suddenly assumed a
strategic and international importance - as Somalis were
fighting on both sides of the line - the border seemed to
have deserved no serious attention. It was not until
1953* with the emergence of the concept of 'Greater Somalia'
that a serious boundary problem inevitably started between
the two territories. In contrast, the Kenya-Abyssinian
frontier had always proved difficult to guard; and the
situation was made even worse by the almost complete lack
of co-operation between the frontier officials on both
r .
sides of the boundary. The natural consequences of this
was the immense difficulties in administrating the Somalis
and their kindred tribes in the N.P.D.
The history of the frontier between Kenya and
Abyssinia could be dated from 1891, when Emperor Menelik
addressed letters to Great Britain and Italy defining the
frontier of Abyssinia. On the Kenyan side he claimed
■tr
"the Galla country called Asbore as far as the Samburu Sea,
the Galla country known under the name of Borani, all the
country of the Arussi to the limits of the Somalis,
including also the Province of Ogaden."^ But Britain had
then tended to underestimate the actual intentions of the
Emperor. It was not until after the Battle of Adowa that
Britain realised that Ethiopia was then a force that should
be seriously reckoned with. Further, subsequent reports
by travellers in the frontier region tended also to direct
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1+/2/8 Conf. Report on the work of the
Kenya-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, 1950-37.
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attention to the magnitude of the problem. Donaldson-
Smith, one of the first travellers through the area warned:-
"It is absolutely imperative that the British prevent
the Abyssinians from advancing to any great distance
.... aided by the French and Russians, the Emperor
Menelik will see his dominions extending rapidly
south and west, unless he be prevented from further
oonquest... A natural sequence to the extension of
Menelik's conquest would be the occupation of a vast
amount of the,newly acquired territory by the French
or Russians."
In addition, continued reports from the frontier
reflected the serious condition there. In 1898, Adam Musa
(a Somali interpreter), reported that a well-organized
party of Ethiopians raided Buna and Takaba in order to
obtain tribute from the Ajuran.^ Turton^ has also
attributed the failure of a Somali raid over the Boran in
1898 to the possibility that they had encountered a southward
moving Ethiopian force instead of the Galla.* Two years
later, the Ethiopians descended upon the 'friendly* Gurreh^
and Eil Wak was occupied by them for about two months.
Somali clans, and also most of the Galla sections, had
in the face of the Ethiopian advance pleaded for help from
Britain. The Gurreh and the Degodia tribes, and the
Aulihan led by Farah Ibrahim were all anxious for protection
against Abyssinian incursions.^ All these factors led
1. Arthur-Donaldson Smith, Through Unknown African Countries,
(London, 1897)# p. 371.
2. P.R.O./F.0. 2/285 Report by Adam Musa 1898.
3. See Turton, p. 280.
!(.. The Gurreh are Somalis who adopted the language and
culture of the Boran Galla. They inhabited the area
around Eil Wak and along the Daua as far east as Malka Re.
5. P.R.O./F.O. 107/96 Hardinge to Salisbury 21-9-1898;
also see T.H.R. Cashmore, "Studies in District
Administration in the East Africa Protectorate, 1895-1918"
(Jesus College, Cambridge, 1965)# P. 333*
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Harrington, the Head of the British Legation at Addis Ababa,
to repeat his anxiety about Menelik's advance.
In 1902, Britain encouraged Mr. W. Butler, a private
citizen to make a survey trip to the southern border of
Abyssinia at his own expense and to arrange with Menelik a
frontier between Abyssinia and British East Africa, Butler
was also to instruct Captain Maud, the official British
Surveyor accompanying the expedition, to map the Ethiopian
outposts and the limits of Ethiopian occupation. With the
consent of Menelik, the expedition left Addis in November
1902 to explore the southern frontier region between the
junction of the rivers Ganale and the Daua in the East
to N. 6°, E. 35°. This was taken as the southern terminal
of the Sudan-Ethiopia boundary in the west, on the basis of
a line agreed with the Emperor in 1900 as indicating
roughly the line of the frontier. A treaty based on
Captain Maud's recommendations was concluded in 1907#
defining in general terms the boundary between Abyssinia
and the Colonies of British East Africa and Uganda."*' It
also provided for the settlement of the boundary in detail
by a delimitation commission. The dissatisfaction over
the Maud line was not only expressed by the subsequent
Commission but it was also apparent from the writings of
the authorities and travellers across the border. Commenting
on the Line, Negley Parson remarked:
"An Anglo-Abyssinian border-line, drawn by a certain
Capt. Maud in 1902-3, cuts through all the best
grazing and watering lands of the Galla Boran and
Somali tribes, so that not one tribe of either Boran
1. C.W. Gwynn, "A Journey in Southern Abyssinia", G.J.,
Vol. xxxviii, (1911), pp. 113-139.
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or Somali is complete in either territory, and as
all the headmen remain in either Ethiopia or over
in Italian Somaliland, life in the N.P.D. has been
distinguished,by Abyssinian bandit raids down into
the N.P.D." 1
John Boyes± was also very critical of the limitations
offered by such a line. He stated:-
<r*
"It appeared that the Abyss inians had got everything
that was worth having in that part of the country -
all the land_of any value being on their side of the
frontier."
Major G.W. Gwynn,^ who was appointed in 1908-9 as
British Commissioner to carry out the final demarcation of
the line, suggested border changes which would allow the
border to be really defensible. He realised that it was
necessary, in carrying out demarcation in detail, to ensure
that there should be such water points on the British side
of the frontier as would enable police work to be carried
out effectively in future.^" This entailed some minor
rectification of Captain Maud's proposals and provided
that the line near Moyale should be pushed slightly north,
to give the British control of the wells necessary for
continuous patrolling. But from the beginning, the
Emperor seemed reluctant to consent to any definite
demarcation let alone those which would be to the benefit
of the other side. Gwynn found on his arrival at Addis,
that owing to the Emperor's illness no step had been taken
1. Negley Parson, Last Chance in Africa. (London, 19i|-9),
p. 267.
2. John Boyes, The Company of Adventurers, (London, 1928),
p. 286.
3. Gwynn was accompanied by Capt. R.L. Waller, Dr. Drake-
Brockraan, Capt. Gordon and two non-commissioned officers.
Their Commission was subsequently known as the East
African Boundary Commission. (See Sketch Map 3 for Maud
and Gwynn lines).
I4.. C.W. Gwynn, "The Frontiers of Abyssinia: A Retrospeot",




to appoint either a European or Abyssinian Commissioner.
After some months delay, Gwynn then proceeded and carried
the delimitation on his own. The Gwynn line was, however,
never accepted by the Ethiopians.
Meanwhile, since 1905* on realization of the serious¬
ness of the situation at the frontier, Captain Maud had put
forward the idea of a travelling inspector backed by an
armed escort to guard the frontier.'* J.A. Harrington who
also suggested that some British representative should be
plaoed on the frontier to ensure against Ethiopian violation,
had in the same year chosen a Greek by the name of Philip
Zaphiro to act on his behalf on the southern frontier of
Abyssinia. His sphere of duty extended along the Red
Line on Captain Maud*s map; but later, owing to the action
of the Abyssinians in these regions, Zaphiro was asked to
extend his sphere southwards in order to cope with
Abyssinian raids and the trade in rifles between them and
the Ogaden Somalia. In 1907 Port Harrington was built
in British Moyale and the Moyale Boma was completed in 1909
with an Assistant D.C. and a garrison of K.A.R.
However, on his arrival at the station, Gwynn was
very critical of Zaphiro's methods and maintained that
though he had done * extraordinary good work* in the past, he
1. All the Colonial Office was able to consent to previous
to this was the establishment of the Boma Trading
Company which maintained tenuous trading links at Dolo,
on the Juba, at Moyale, on the Ethiopian frontier, and
at Marsabit, 200 miles to the north of Meru. (See
Mungeam p. 229). However, Gwynn was far from being
impressed by the achievements of the Company.
2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/3/1 Copy J.A. Harrington to Hayes-
Sadler 20-9-1906.
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was unable to check the incursions of the tribesmen and
asked for his replacement. Zaphiro was said to have
encouraged the Somali and Boran to sell their goods at
Kismayu at the time when the administration was trying to
place an embargo on all trade.But despite these limitations
it had to be admitted that Zaphiro had acted almost single
handed in dealing with the very difficult situations along
k.
the frontier despite the limited resources at his disposal.
His removal in 1909 and the steps which resulted in
the formation of the N.F.D. in 1910 were the result of the
efforts by Sir Percy Girouard the new Governor for the
Protectorate. Girouard telegraphed the Colonial Office
saying:
"I consider the time has now come to supersede
Zaphiro and substitute control by officers of this
Protectorate on the Abyssinian boundary. I regard
this as essential both for administrative reasons
and owing to the growing importance of trade in
horses and cattle. I suggest that (a) frontier
district should be formed withpstations at Meru,
Marsabit and Port Harrington."
In Maroh 1910, the N.P.D. was thus formed with
J.O.W. Hope as Officer-in-Charge; but the problem still
remained as to how to control the undefined frontier to
the north and to stop Somali migration. In fact, since
the formation of the District frequent feuds between the
Degodia on both the British and the Abyssinian sides and the
British Gurreh were reported.^ Owing to this situation,
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD I4./I/2 Political Record Book, Marsabit.
2. P.R.0./C.0. 533/63 Girouard to Crewe 15-11-1909.
3. The Anglo-Abyssinian border problem had in fact mostly
affected the Boran on both sides of the frontier. The
Somali tribes mostly affected by it were the 'friendly'
Gurreh and to a lesser extent the Degodia and the Ajuran.
For more on the position of the Boran in Anglo-Abyssinian
relations see Turton, pp. 266-312.
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most of the time and the finances of the District were spent
on settling trans-frontier raids instead of looking into
the means by which the general position of the Somalis and
their kin in the area could be improved. In April 1919*
for example, major operations were carried out against the
Tigre forcing them to surrender in October of the same year.
The decision by Northey, the next year, to subject the
N.P.D. to military instead of civil administration was
primarily adopted because of the state of affairs along the
Abyssinian border. In May 1920 continued Abyssinian
raids in British territory during several months for the
purpose of returning Boran refugees were reported. For
this reason, the British consulate in southern Abyssinia
was transferred from Gardula to Mega to improve co-operation
with the British authorities on the other side.
However, as the administration of any pastoral people
depended largely on the control of watering and grazing
facilities, Anglo-Abyssinian relations in that area had
centred mainly on that question. Gaddaduraa, on the
Abyssinian border, was the bone of contention between the
two administrations. The different boundary lines
contemplated were done with a view to its inclusion because
of its wells which were the only available watering site
for many miles in that region. If the Boran were to be
checked and their constant clashes with the Somalis were to
be minimized, the N.F.D. administration had to have
Gaddaduraa in its hands. Major Gwynn, who saw the special
importance of Gaddaduma in its capacity both as a source of
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water and as a pass from the upland districts to the western
Golbo, did not hesitate when he modified the Maud Line, to
include it into British territory. He had specially in
mind the fact that the Gurreh in the British side were the
most to be affected by it.1
Kittermaster, the Officer-in-charge of the N.P.D. was
also persistent in his demand that the wells in the' vicinity
of Gaddaduma and beyond should be retained by His Majesty's
Government. He suggested that in case the Abyssinians
protested against the measure, His Majesty's Charge d'affaires
at Addis Ababa could be instructed to demand from the
Abyssinians a sura of £50,000, being the amount estimated by
Kitterraaster as compensation due to the British tribes in
respect of raids by Abyssinians. Pending the satisfaction
of the latter claim the British authorities would feel
obliged to retain the wells in order to prevent damage
?
being caused by further raids. Another suggestion pointed
to the possibility of granting the Abyssinians an enclave
in the Gadabursi district of British Somaliland so as to
make that tribe entirely tributary to them.^
The Colonial Office was by no means ready to concur
vfith the Foreign Office views. Read wrote to Sperling to
express his doubts on the procedure proposed in relation
to the control of Gaddaduma. He stated:
1. The wells of Gaddaduma, though in Borana country in
Abyssinia were said to be primarily used by the Gurreh
Somalia on the British side.
2. P.R.0./C.0. 533/214-1 No. A3/I33/715/I Sperling to
Under-Secretary, Colonial Office 2-6-1920.
3» Ibid.
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"We follow the idea as far as the demand for
compensation goes, but it is not clear to us
why when their demand is not oomplied with, we
should then,offer a territorial compensation
instead."
But on the other hand, the British Government instructed
His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa to inform Her Majesty's
Government in Abyssinia that, "In view of their continued
inability to maintain order in the frontier districts, His
Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right
O
to re-occupy Gaddaduma at any time should occasion require."
The Abyssinians seemed reconciled for a while, however, when
a gesture of co-operation was announced by Ras Taffari
concerning the Officials administering the frontier.
Taffari announced that he had been sent by the Empress on
behalf of Her Majesty's Government to inform Dodds that:
"In view of the friendship the Ethiopian Government
fostered for the British Government, it had been
decided that Dejazmatch Desta should not proceed to
the Magi Province...that the Abyssinian Government
accepted the frontier line laid down by treaty and
approved by King Menelik, and would take necessary
measures_to ensure this frontier was respebted in
future. "•*
Yet, no sooner toas that declared, than the situation
on the Kenya-Abyssinia border was reported as serious
with the renewed Abyssinian raids on the British tribes.
In December 1920 Britain had threatened the re-occupation
of Gaddaduma which had been evacuated by them in October
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/214.1 No. A3I333/75I/I H.J. Read to
Sperling 29-6-1920.




1919. Gaddaduraa was actually re-occupied in February 1921J
and the officer commanding the detaohment reported that the
re-occupation was welcomed by the British tribes who were
then able to use the wells.The re-occupation, which
was carried out because of the state of lawlessness on the
frontier was said to be only a temporary affair. As soon
as the Abyssinian Government would make an effort to
maintain order on the frontier, the British would be willing
to withdraw. This had eventually happened in August of
the same year when the Acting Governor of Kenya informed
the Minister at Addis that Gaddaduma had been evacuated
after a meeting between the British frontier authorities
and Dej Dejazmatch Assafu which had taken place on the
25th July.^ After the meeting, the British Officials were
satisfied as to Dejamatct^s intentions and capability to
restore order in the country. The Acting Governor was
of the opinion that any other course would have resulted in
hostilities.3
The evacuation of Gaddaduma was not, however, followed
hy any prospects of peace in the area. The immigration
into British territory of Abyssinian subjects continued
until the end of 1922. Whole portions of the Borana
Province were reported to be depopulated. Those immigrants
had entered the N.F.D. providing further hardships to the
tribes on the British side. The feuds between the Gurreh
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/256/tel. 90 Northey to Colonial Secretary
15-12-1921.




and the Degodia both on the British and on the Abyssinian
sides became so frequent that by October 1922 what was
later known as the "Gaddaduma Convention" was signed as an
attempt to put both tribes in order. The Kenya Government
was represented by the Officer-in-Charge of Moyale and the
Officer-in-Charge of Gurreh. On February ll+th 1923 they
decided on terms by which stock was to be handed over as
agreed in the Treaty of Gaddaduma on 27th October, 1922.
Both Chiefs, Burali, on behalf of the Degodia, and Chief
Gababa, on behalf of the Gurreh received their due amount
of the compensation.
It was also rumoured that the Abyssinian authorities
intended to move the Degodia into the deserted Boran
Province and to offer to the British Gurreh that part of
the Yeben vacated by the Degodia.1 This was thought
possible because the Gurreh, like the rest of the Somali
tribes had shown considerable hostility when the British
authorities contemplated the imposition of taxation upon
the Somalis in 1923. Moreover, as the Acting Governor had
remarked, "it is not impossible that some of them would
accept such an offer especially as it would mean the exchange
of a parched wilderness for a well watered and fertile
country."2 What actually happened was contradictory to
the former idea. With the continuous refusal of the
Abyssinians to the settlement or the delimitation of the




frontier, constant migrations of Abyssinian tribes into
Kenya continued as a result of maladministration, mis-
government and oppression in the Abyssinian frontier
districts.
The N.F.D. authorities, being constantly bothered
about this trans-frontier migration, consulted the Foreign
Office, impressing upon them the importance of inducing
the Abyssinians to carry on a better administrative policy
in their frontier Provinces. This would facilitate the
return of the refugees across the border. In addition, the
officials on the spot had already started a policy of
repatriating the Abyssinian Degodia; a policy which had
already shown signs of success. It was reported later
that as a result of this, the Abyssinian Government really
did make an attempt to improve conditions on the frontier
by appointing Fitaurari Ayella in charge of the Boran
Province."'" No sooner had he taken charge than the Kenya
Government, after consulting with Major A.T. Miles, His
Majesty's Consul for Southern Abyssinia, and the Officer-in-
Charge, N.F.D. decided that the issue of repatriation should
be discussed further. Miles was instructed to inform
Ayella that the Kenya Government had the tribe collected on
the Daua River and was prepared to facilitate by all peaceful
and humane measures his efforts to induce the Degodia to
p
return to their own country.
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/314.8/151 Conf. Immigration of Abyssinian
tribes into Kenya - Memo. I4.—14.—192I4..
2. P.R.O./C.O. 533/333/149 Conf. Northcote to Amery
27-8-1925.
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The Kenya authorities had earnestly dismissed the
use of force to bring about the complete repatriation for
two reasons. Firstly it would have required about six
platoons to effect the return, secondly it would no doubt
have resulted in a considerable amount of fighting. The
difficulty was that, despite the peaceful approach by the
Kenya Government, the Abyssinians had viewed with indifference
the whole question of repatriation, and hence prospects of
misunderstanding could not be dismissed. Northcote was then
of the opinion that there were only two ways of preventing
further incursions into Kenya from the north. These were
by means of military and police forces on the boundary, and
by causing the available grazing and wells along the border
to be occupied to their utmost capacity. Once more the
former expediency was dismissed because the District had
only two platoons of soldiers and a few police at Moyale
and at the Daua. The second method was found more feasible
and was supported by the Officer-in-Charge of the Gurreh
District who felt that there was enough room in that area
for both the Degodia and the Gurreh. If the Degodia declined
to return to Abyssinia, the saturation policy of allowing
the border to fill up with people and cattle as quietly
as possible should be adopted."1"
The Colonial Office, had on the other hand, once again
rejected this alternative and were determined that all would
be settled by the repatriation of the Degodia and their
subjection to Fitaurari Ayella. The Assistant Under-
1. Ibid.
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Secretary remarked, "The Degodia are described as turbulent
so we shall be well rid of them.""*" In December 1925#
Ras Taffari wrote to inform Bentinck that Ayella had been
sent to the frontier to arrange with the British authorities
for the repatriation of the tribe. Nothing further was
heard until the 16th February 1926 when the Foreign Office
sent an urgent enquiry as to the progress of the repatriation.
It stated that the Kenya Government would create an impression
of bad faith in the minds of the Abyssinian Government if
it were unable to co-operate after instituting a better
Government in the disturbed provinces of Abyssinia in the
hope of inducing the Degodia to return. In consequence
of this an urgent telegram was sent to Kenya asking what
steps, apart from the use of compulsion, had been taken to
encourage or discourage the repatriation since October 1925.^
The Governor replied that, "Kenya is in no way committed
to the Abyssinian Government in respect of compulsory
repatriation nor could I support any such policy. Information
at present to hand does not indicate that immigration had
deprived our tribes of necessary water and grazing.. On
the other hand, Grigg had emphasised that, "It has always
been made clear to the Degodia that their intrusion is most
unwelcome and only regarded as temporary. Their return to
Abyssinia has been a subject of constant discussion with
their chiefs."^- He admitted, however, that this attitude
1. Ibid. Minute by Gilbert G.A. Gyrindle 2-10-1925.
2. P.R. 0./C.0. 533/3^8/3169 Gonf. Memo. Immigration of
Abyssinian Tribes into Kenya 16-12-1926.
3. P.R.0./C.0. 533/3MV66 Tel Grigg to Colonial Secretary
19-2-1926.
[j.. P.R.O./c.O. 533/1+8 Conf. Grigg to Amery 21+-1-1926.
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was then governed by the impracticability of repatriating
them by force, anticipating that it would be advisable to
pursue the same policy with regard to future immigrations.
These were bound to occur, until the capacity of the border
country to absorb newcomers was exhausted, and those already
established would resist further infiltration. The
attitude of the Governor puzzled the Foreign Office who
were unable to understand the 'change of policy'. Previously,
whereas the Government of Kenya considered the intrusion of
the Degodia as unwelcome, now they stated that they were not
opposed to their presence in Kenya and were prepared to
absorb them.*
Besides the issue of the incursions of the Degodia
which was a factor in the security of the British Somalis
and their kindred tribes on the frontier of Kenya, and the
failure of the Abyssinians to hasten the delimitation of
the frontier, the N.F.D. administration was disturbed by
another factor. The simultaneous disarmament recommended
for the Somali and the Boran in both British and Abyssinian
territories, the completion of which the British authorities
were able to report had been successfully carried out in
1928, was never carried out by the Abyssinians. A telegram
received from the Provincial Commissioner of the N.F.D.
on 18th June 1930 indicated that, "recent troubles caused
by recrudescence of Boran-Gurreh feud on the Abyssinian
side of the boundary resulting in deaths by the Gurreh of
17 Boran tenants and return to British side of most of the
1. K.N. A./PC/N.F.D. I|./l/7 Conf. L.S. Amery to Grigg
26-14.-1927.
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Gurreh, was due to failure of Abyssinians to disarm their
tribes.""'" He stated that various attempts to induce the
Abyssinian Government to do it had failed and asked if it
was possible to approach them through diplomatic channels.
The attempt like that pursued in order to reach a
satisfactory delimitation of the boundary between 1927-30
passed without results. Continued troubles, as a result
of the possession of the Boran of rifles, went on against
the Somali tribes on the British side.
However, another measure which was thought would be
instrumental in forcing the Abyssinian tribes to retreat and
hence would amount to a possible pacification of the frontier,
was by the imposition of taxation on the Somali of the
N.F.D. Up to the mid twenties, the Somalis had managed to
evade taxation and attempts by officials on the spot to raise'
the issue by 1923 had not materialized. It was once again
p
brought to the forefront by the Governor. in connection
with the re-opening of the Isiolo Quarantine station. The
re-opening of the latter would have facilitated the movement
of Somali stock from the Province to the other parts of
the Colony and the contribution by the Somalis in paying
the tax could have hastened its start. The Governor's
despatch mentioned that at the meeting held at the Government
House on 8th January, 1927, (at which Bottomley, Assistant
under-Secretary of State, was present) it was decided that
the imposition of taxation upon the Somalis was very desirable,
1. P.R.O./.CO. 533/401/16235 Governor to Colonial Secretary
18-6-1930.
2. In his despatch P.R.O./C.O. 533/327/lx.10354/27.
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though it was recognized that care should be taken having
had regard to the experience of British Somaliland. The
Governor was however thinking of the tax in terras of the
general improvement of the revenue and expenditure of the
Colony. He remarked, "The time had arrived when the
inhabitants of the N.P.D. could be called upon to contribute
to the cost of their administration by the payment of a
direct tax on similar lines to that imposed on the tribes
v- p
in other parts of the Colony."
It was Edward Denham, who as a result of his Safari
in the N.P.D. in 1927» direoted the attention of the
authorities to the taxation of the Somalia as a factor to
the pacification of the frontier. He remarked, "the fact
that many of these tribes have come from Abyssinia, where
they pay taxes, into Kenya territory where they pay none,
is both bad for them and also for our administration...one
check on immigration from Abyssinia should at least be
in the imposition of taxation in British territory.
When the Acting Governor had himself discussed the question
of taxation with the Somalia, he found that they were
opposed to any form of monetary tax. They urged that
being purely a stock owning community, flocks and herds
represented their wealth and their currency, and they could
not pay tax in any other form. It was clear to the
administration that the Somalia had then realized the
justice of their being called upon to make some contribution
•
1. The pronouncement of taxation in British Somalilend had
brought about considerable trouble against the
administration of the Protectorate.
2. P.R.0./C.0. 533/380 Minute by Parkinson 10-8-1928.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD 6/1/1 Edward Denham to L.S.Amery 19-8-1927.
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towards the cost of government and they promised that they
would pay in kind. It was especially in the North Eastern
region of the Colony that they requested Denham for this.
In the baraza held with the Somalia at Wajir on the 3r(i July
1928, the Ogaden were represented by Aden Hassan (Sultan
of the Aulihan), Mahdi Ali (Headman of Maghabul), Ali
Muhammad Jama (Headman of the Muhammad Zubeir), Abdi Musa
(Headman of Gurreh), and Dima Abdi (Headman of the Ajuran).
They all insisted on the payment in kind.
The Colonial Office, then uncertain as to the outcome
of any pronouncement over taxation, consulted with the
Governor and the Inspector General K.A.R. on the subject
1-
beoause the imposition of tax upon Somalia was very closely
bound up with the Military position in the N.F.D. The
latter advised the Colonial Secretary that the issue would
raise two questions. First that adequate protection of
British tribes from trans-frontier raids was a oondition
that should be fulfilled before the imposition of taxation.
This was obviously contradictory to Denham's idea whereby
taxation was seen as a first step to guarantee Somali
protection against such raids. Secondly, the Inspector
General was of the opinion that support should be given to
U
the Civil Authorities efforts to enforce
the tax led to a situation which required military inter¬
vention. Moreover, in view of the experience in British
Somaliland in 1920 and 1922 in connection with the attempt
to impose direct taxation on the Somalia, possibility of
unrest resulting from taxation could not be disregarded
and thus the partial mechanisation of troops and re-organization
Ikx
became necessary.1 Later, in the same despatch, the
Governor was openly inclined to disagree with the imposition
of taxation from purely political and administrative points
of view. His reasons were that, "very little has been
done for them (Somalia)... opening of the Isiolo Quarantine
station might benefit native who would have access to it
but it seems to me that practical steps for helping the
tribes in this Province as a whole, especially in the
direction of medical and veterinary assistance and education,
p
ought to precede taxation." For these and for military
reasons, the Colonial Secretary asked for the measure to be
postponed. The Governor was subsequently instructed to
refrain from publishing or introducing the Bill.
Despite the fact that the imposition of taxation was
already announced officially at a Baraza at Bura^ on
September 17 1928 on the basis of a poll tax of Shs. 20/-,
the matter was postponed owing to the above instructions
by the Colonial Office. The reaotion of the N.F.D.
officials was that of definite disappointment. The Annual
Report of 1929 came out with an interesting remark from
the Official-in-charge. He stated, "The failure to
impose taxation after the pronouncement in 1928 acted un¬
favourably on the Galla and Somali tribes causing revival
of the old idea that Government was afraid to undertake
it..."^
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/380 Amery to Grigg 10-8-1928.
2. Ibid.
3. The Headquarters of the N.F.D.
I4.. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/3 Annual Reports 1929.
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However, the Governor of the Colony was able in
March 1930 to convince the Colonial Secretary that estimated
receipts from taxation would be £16,6ij6 which would make
possible the erection of a hospital at Wajir, the centre
of Somali population; also a hospital at Lamu which
would Serve some Galla and Pokomo in the Tana River District.
Further the Government needed about £3,000 for the improve¬
ment of water boring, £8,030 as capital expenditure on a
veterinary centre, and £2,587 chiefly to promote trade
providing an outlet for livestock at that time hampered
by disease. For all these reasons the Governor urged
the Colonial Secretary to sanction the passing of the Bill
at the April Session so as to enable collection in the
1
current year.
The Colonial Secretary had in the end complied with
Kenya's wish for the imposition of taxation. In a telegram
he informed Grigg, "I approve of your announcing that
taxation will be introduced generally in the N.F.D. as from
the first January next, but I am only able to agree to a
flat rate of 10/- a head for all concerned including Somalis."^
The announcement that the tax was going to be in cash was
regarded as 'the most disturbing incident of the year. It
had also caused considerable political feeling among the
Somali tribes especially when their economic well-being as
a whole was generally affected by the depression of 1 j29.
The depression had affected the circulation of cash,
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/3Q6/600ij.3 tel. Grigg to Amery ll4_-3-1930«
2. P.R.0./C.0. 533/396/^0014.3/108 Conf. Amery to Grigg
2-7-1930. Somalis were asked in 1931 to pay commuted
tax but later in 1935 they paid indivisual tax.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/3 Annual Reports 1930.
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because of attempted imposition of rigid quarantine and
the endeavour to close the main outlet for sheep to the
coast and the hinterland. The difficulty was, therefore,
not in the acceptability of the duty to pay tax, but in the
obstacles put on the tribes' way of obtaining the necessary
cash for the purpose of paying. Sheep and goats were
practically the only marketable livestock, and the tribes,
say, from Moyale District, had to take their sheep and
goats five hundred miles to the market: as a walk like that
was obviously not going to improve the marketable value of
stock, tax money was by no means easy to obtain. However,
apart from prominent Somali chiefs like Sultan Stambul Abdi,
who was reported to have deposited, "...his tax and that of
his 5 sons early in December","'' the consensus of opinion was
2
very much against the imposition of the cash tax and some
of the tribes were reported to have crossed the boundary
to escape payment.
Though the collection of tax was in a way beneficial
from the point of view of revenue, it was ineffective
as far as the check on the immigration of Abyssinian tribes
was concerned. Despite the fact that the Abyssinian
Government had expressed a wish, since 1 "'27, to discuss the
question of the delimitation of the frontier, they were
very reluctant to join in the discussion to that effect.
Par from it, Major Miles's reports from 1927 onwards revealed
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/7/2 Garissa Annual Reports CTelemugga)
1930.
2. For example, Stambul Abdi's arch enemy Kuno Jibraeil
was reported to have started to "sow the seeds of
sedition" against him because of his attitude towards
taxation. (Ibid). Stambul Abdi had in I93I4. received a
certificate of honour, the first one to be given in the
N.F.D.
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that conditions on the southern Abyssinian border were
worse than ever and were a standing danger to Kenya, Colony.
The extent of disturbances could be seen from the claims
of the Government of Kenya for the raids on the N.P.D. tribes
which amounted to £25,000 against the Abyssinian Government.
The Governor had even threatened to appeal to the League of
Nations or the Hague on the whole southern frontier problem
if Ras Taffari should prove unreasonable. When the issue
was discussed in Parliament on 21st November, 1928,' Austen
Chamberlain suggested the publication of a white paper
covering the period from 1915 onwards on these raids. Later,
a report was prepared by Major Miles and Glenday regarding
their enquiries in conjunction with the Abyssinian frontier
Commission, into raids by Abyssinians into the Northern
Territory of Kenya during the years 1025-26.About 1930,
the Kenya Government had again made overtures to Abyssinia
for the demarcation of the frontier, but His Majesty'®
Government decided that it was worthwhile to test the
ability of the Ethiopians on the British Somaliland-Abyssinian
border first, a suggestion afterwards agreed to by Ras Taffari.
Meanwhile, a memorandum prepared for the Colonial
Office on the meeting with Fitaurari Ayella at Moyale on
18th January 1931 pointed to the general state of lawless¬
ness of the frontier once more. The Acting Provincial
Commissioner drew Ayella's attention to the state of unrest
1. Reports on Abyssinian Raids, Incursions into British
Territory and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Abyssinia,
No. T, (London, 1928), Cmd. 3217.
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which had prevailed since May 1929 and pointed out nineteen
incidents which occurred culminating in a big one near
Gadama. It was generally believed that that state of
affairs was due to the fact that the Abyssinian Boran were
never disarmed. • This had led to constant fighting between
the Boran and the Degodia living with the Ajuran and Debel
thirty miles south east of Moyale. Again in 1931, serious
disturbances between the British and Abyssinian Boran
against the Degodia and Ajuran took place. This series of
clashes between the Boran and British Somalis was the result
of the continuous push southwards of the Somalis into the
N.P.D. The Boran, before the occupation by Britain and
Abyssinia of the N.P.D., had owned the greater part of the
area and pagan tribes living there paid tribue to them.
They and their tribute tribes were gradually being driven
back to the highlands of Dirre"'" by the advance of the Moslem
Somalis from the east. This push was clearly noticeable
in the period between 1925-30 by the Moslem tribes mainly
Gurreh and Degodia. The Gurreh had moved north and west
into Abyssinia to avoid the taxation recently imposed upon
the frontier tribes in British territory and the Degodia
who moved west from the country of Bai in Abyssinia had
come up against the Boran on the escarpment east and west
of Moyale. Feuds between the advancing Somali tribes
and the Boran began by isolated murders but annually increased
until the feud had almost grown into a pagan-Islamic war.
1. Abyssinian Borana.
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This state of feuding between the Galla and Somalia
in British and Abyssinian territories was intensified by
the general tension between the Somalia and Boran in the
N.P.D. at that time. In Garissa District the Somali-Wardeh
question which had existed ever since the establishment of
the administration there, had in the period January to
April 1931 nearly burst into flames. The Wardeh Galla
were originally slaves of the Somalia but they had grown
rich and prospered as members of the Somali community. The
Wardeh stock had in fact originally been given to them by
their masters the Somalia for their subsistence; and since
the Somali-Wardeh relations had worsened, the Galla would
have wanted to leave but they were bound by the Lamu 50/50
Agreement. According to the Agreement, the Wardeh were to
forfeit half of their stock to their masters, which would
be anathema to them. The Government had to stand by the
50/50 Agreement; and the Somalia, though unwilling to allow
the Galla to leave were also obliged to stand by it. In the
Annual Report of Garissa District, the D.G. remarked that the
affair between the two groups was reaching such a stage that
all the Galla-Somali element in the Abdullah country were
rounded up and brought into Bura, the District's Headquarters.
The Galla were given the opportunity of crossing to the
free Galla south of the River with their wives and children
1. Since 1919» as a result of the Somali chase and
eventual.defeat of the Wardeh, an agreement was signed
in Lamu to end the fight and provided for the payment
by the Wardeh of ^>0% of their stock in case they decided
to leave their Somali masters (See Appendix IV).
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and 50$ of their stock. But surprisingly enough the
Galla themselves shortly returned to their Somali owners
and the local administration attributed this to intimidation
by the Somali Sheikhs and holymen.^
While the N.P.D. administration was busy settling
the affairs between the Somalis and the Galla both in the
frontier and the interior of the Province between 1925-32,
the Italo-Ethiopian relations were constantly deteriorating
on their respective boundaries. This had eventually
culminated in the attack of Abyssinia by Italian forces
in "Wal Wal", the incident which kept the League of Nations
P
talking for nine months in 193U-— 35- The incident which
was also the result of frontier problems between Ethiopia
and Italy, had its repercussions on the administration of
the Somalis in the N.P.D. In the first place the incident
had prevented a possible solution to the chronic problem
of the demarcation of the Kenya-Abyssinian boundary. It
happened at the time when the Emperor had just agreed with
His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa to a number of
modifications to be made to the Maud Line; but the outbreak
of the Italo-Ethiopian war prevented the matter being
taken further.-^
The War had, on the other hand, added to the already
existing difficulties regarding the administration of the
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/7/2 Annual Reports Garissa (Telemugga)
1932.
2. See Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, pp. 1^8-55•
3. Discussions on that issue were not resumed before 19^7,
when exchange of Notes between the British and
Abyssinians rendered things possible.
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N.P.D. Somal. However, this was not obvious at the
beginning of the conflict as the Officer-in-Charge had
remarked in November 1935, "On the western side of the
District (Moyale), the theatre of warfare is so far removed
that many of the tribesmen know little arid care less about
it. As ever, their main concern lies in the welfare of
their stock, their personal needs and the incidence of
rainfall."1 But the authorities were gradually be.ing
faced with the aftermath of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict.
The Italians were incessantly reported as being actively
occupied with the conscription of men from the Somali tribes
in British territory like the Muhammad Zubeir, Aulihan and
Maghabul who crossed over to Italian territory without
passes. In addition, the compulsory enlistment of Somalis
of Italian Somaliland meant that the latter would in their
turn cross over to British territory during the rains thus
aggravating the problem of the westward treck of Somalis
into Kenya.
The War also meant that considerable military
preparations and expenditure were necessary to guard the
N.P.D. and its inhabitants. The administration was then
busy shifting K.A.R. units from other districts to Moyale,
Mandera and Eil Wak; camelmen, African police at Marsabit,
lorries and mobile police were constantly shifted to the
frontier. On the other hand, the Italo-Ethiopian war
had given much inoentive to the Somalis to join the police
1. K.N.A./DC/MLE/3/i4_ Secret. V.G. Glenday, Intelligence
Reports, Provincial Monthly November 1935*
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or the array. In Garissa, constant streams of applications
for enlistment in Police, tribal police and K.A.R. were
reported; and in 1935 twelve Somalia were enlisted in
K.A.R. and five others in the Police.
By July 1935# further repercussions due to the Italo-
Ethiopian dispute were felt in the area. It was widely
1
reported that Ras Desta had ordered his subordinate to
collect large numbers of camels and other meat stock from
the Gurreh and Gabbra in Gulgulla and the Hurrufi country
as provisions for the troops. The direct result of these
orders had been the influx of several large manyattas
(villages) of both tribes into the Jara and Sankurar areas
to escape persecution. These problems increased with
the eventual occupation of Ethiopia by the Italians and
from then onwards reports of Italian banda maltreatment of
British subjects and the capture of their livestock were
very frequent. The D.C. of Moyale requested the Officer-
in-Charge of the N.P.D. that a strong protest should be
made to the Italians in regard to three incidents. First
the capture of cattle by banda at Ramu Dimtu on 20th
February 1936; the capture of goats and cattle at Girimou
on the 22nd February, and finally the banda capture of
twenty head of cattle at Ramu on 28th February.^ Also,
the state of lawlessness in the area between Mega and the
Daua River as a result of the Italians arming of the Gurreh
1. K.N.A,/PC/NFD 1/1A5 Annual Reports 1935.
2. K.N.A./DC/MLE/3A V.G. Glenday Provincial Intelligence
Reports July 1935.
3. K.N.A./DC/MLE/3/2 No. ADM 15/A/71 N.M. Grant to
Officer-in-Charge Moyale 9-3_1"36.
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youth was a source of concern because the latter were then
enabled to inflict a great deal of damage on the Gabbra
tribe. This state of affairs naturally led to the flight
of large numbers of tribesmen into Kenya and a great deal
of trouble and anxiety between the Somalia and the Galla
occurred. This in its turn kept the British officials on
the frontier extremely busy dealing with them.^
Obviously one of the substantial problems resulting
from the Italo-Abyssinian war was the refugee question.
Since 1936 Eritreans - who had deserted the Italian forces,
crossed over into Kenya. In the same year about I4JL5 were
reported to have reached Wajir and were later joined by
about 1,000 civilians men women and children in 1937* In
order to separate them from the rest of the Somali
population the officials decided to send them to Isiolo
where they were put in a concentration camp under K.A.R,
escort. Even there, they proved to be a dilemma to the
administration; they found that it was difficult to return
them because of the harsh treatment they would be sure to
meet from the Italians and on the other hand, they could
not simply be left there because they would probably meet
p
their end at the hands of the Kenya natives or the Somalia.
The maintenance in the N.P.D. of Abyssinian refugees in
such large numbers, not only involved substantial expenditure,
but raised administrative problems of a serious nature in
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/1/2 Handing-Over Reports 1936.
2. P.R.0./C.0. 533/A-79/38066 Ik Ormsby-Gore to Sir J. Simon
5-7-1937.
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the already burdensome Somali Province of the frontier,
a fact that The East African Standard, was not slow to
point out. In its issue of 26th August 1937 it wrote
with regard to the refugees, "On the frontier they presented
a problem in a part of the Colony that bristles already
with difficult questions." It is also interesting to note
that the case of the refugees did not escape the sympathy
of the Kenya African nationalists. The Governor of Kenya
informed Ormsby-Gore, "I notice there was an indignant
letter in some of the English papers signed, amongst others,
by Jomo Kenyatta, demanding "the right of political asylum
for our black brothers" - apparently in Kenya - and
protesting against the threat to expell Abyssinian refugees
from Kenya."I But far from being able to send those
refugees back, the Kenya-Abyssinian border witnessed
further infiltration by them on the eve of the Second World
War.
Another problem which continuously occupied the mind
of the N.F.D. authorities, was the interference by the
Italians on the trans-frontier water and grazing rights
which the British tribes, both Somali and Galla, had
enjoyed under the Anglo-Abyssinian treaty of 1907. The
problem of the undelimited boundary inherited from the pre-
Italo-Ethiopian war period was once again a major factor in
the problem of the administration of the Somali and his
kindred tribes. The officials were always puzzled over
the problem of whether to follow the Gwynn line or the Maud
line. The adoption of the former would have exposed His
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/^79/38066 11^. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham
to Ormsby-Gore 17-12-1937.
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Majesty's Government to possible difficulties with the
Abyssinian Government and would also have involved
responsibility for Abyssinian occupation of Gaddaduma which
was situated south of the line. It was necessary, therefore,
for the British administration in Kenya to impress upon the
new Italian administration in Abyssinia that there had been
no occupation by Abyssinian troops of places which were
regarded as being under Kenya administration. For this
reason, the Kenya Government was always inclined to follow
the Maud line except for the area west of Malka-Murri where
the Gwynn line had, in practice, been adopted. In this
case Gaddaduma would not be counted as part of Kenya. But
the general feeling was for leaving the question aside
until the proper delimitation would be carried out.^
In the course of the War, however, it was rumoured
that the Government had contemplated an arrangement involving
territorial concessions to Italy as a solution to the urgent
need for provision of watering facilities to the British
tribes and as a gesture for a general settlement of the
dispute between Italy and Abyssinia. In the House of
Commons, Mr. Marsden asked the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs if he would give an assurance that no British
territory should be handed over to Italy as part of any
exchange arrangement arising out of the suggested peace
%
terms for the promotion of settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian
p
dispute. In reply, he was assured that there had never
1. The problem was that the Kenya administration had in most
cases used the Maud Line; while most of the maps in
Italian hands were based on the Gwynn Line.
2. P.R.O./F.O. 371/19172 Parliamentary Questions - Italo-
Ethiopian Dispute. 18-12-1935.
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been any question of the cession of British territory in
that respect."'"
Later, in June 1936, the Governor of Kenya suggested
to the Colonial Office the possible cession to Italy of
the area in the north west corner of the N.P.D. as a move
towards the solution of the watering problem for the tribes.
He again modified his plan to include the area north east
of the summit of Burrchuraa. This he thought would be of
considerable advantage to the Italians since the whole of the
Gelubba tribe, which was then on both sides of the frontier,
would have been included in the Italian sphere. The area
p
also included good grazing grounds for the Gelluba....
while the issue was being discussed, it was decided that
Glenday should go to London on April 8th and thence to Rome
where an Anglo-Italian agreement was to be negotiated
concerning the position of Britain with respect to the Italian
occupation of Abyssinia.
■3
The history of the agreement dated back to 1935*
when it first became clear that Signor Mussolini was planning
an invasion of Abyssinia; the British Government appointed
a Departmental Committee to examine what the effect on
British interests would be if the invasion were successful.
The Committee's findings became famous a year later as the
Moffey Report. This report, while stating that an Italian
1. Ibid.
2. P.R.O./P.O. 371/20391 R. Brooke-Popham to Ormsby-Gore
27-11-1937.
3. The Manchester Guardian, I9-I4.-I938. For the text of the
Agreement see The Times. 18-1|.-1938.
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conquest of Abyssinia would not be a serious threat to
British interests, made certain recommendations that in
the event of this taking place, "all the necessary measures
must be taken to protect British and Egyptian interests."
The Agreement subsequently signed at Rome on 16th April
1938 achieved this. Also, the tripartite agreement
between the United Kingdom, Egypt and Italy undertook to
co-operate for the preservation of good neighbourly
relations between Italian East Africa on the one hand and
the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland on the other hand."''
The Maffey report had also clearly stated that every effort
should be made to assure full grazing rights beyond the
frontiers of these Somali tribes under British protection,
and suggested that the boundaries of British Somaliland,
Kenya and the Sudan should be : rectified "if possible".
After attending the April talks in Rome, Glenday
was back to London where in a meeting held at the Colonial
Office on 23rd June of the same the possibility of
further cession to Italy of Kenya territory was discussed.
This was part of an overall discussion on the frontiers of
the Sudan, Kenya and Somaliland. It was stated at the
meeting that "the Secretary of State was not disposed, at
this stage to agree to jthe cession of any part of Kenya, or
press the treasury to agree to pay for the building of the
Kenya section of the Kismayu-Moyale Road as part of the
price to be paid for the permanent acquisition by Somaliland
p
of the grazing grounds beyond thoir present frontiers."
1. K.N.A./C.P. 250/2 Anglo-Italian Agreement: Copies to All
D.C's concerned. 23-14.-1938.
2. P.R.O./C.O. 822/89-46598P. Note on the Meeting Held at
the Colonial Office on Abyssinian Frontiers 23-6-1938.
The area in question included the Diff-Wajir-Moyale Road.
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In coming to this conclusion the Secretary of State had
been influenced by a number of considerations. Firstly,
the objection by Parliament and others to agreeing to the
cession of a part of a British Colony which would probably
involve the transfer with it of some five thousand British
subjects. Secondly, the fact that it would not be possible
to consult these tribesmen until after an agreement had
been reached with the Italians for the cession of their land.
s.
And finally, the doubt whether even the cession of this
area of Kenya, and the building of the road, would, in fact,
be a sufficient inducement to the Italians to agree to
the desired rectification of the Somaliland frontier. If
this were found not to be the case, the British Government
should be in a worse position than they were then, in that
they should have disclosed to the Italians the fact that they
had no absolutely insuperable objection to the cession of
the north eastern corner of Kenya, which the Italians had
coveted at the time of the cession of Jubaland.^"
In August 1938, Mr. Paskin, had on behalf of the
Colonial Secretary, confirmed the fact that the Colonial
Office was by no means agreed to the cession to Italy of
a sufficient area in the north east of Kenya to include
the Diff-Wajir-Moyale road, an area mainly inhabited by
O
Somalia. This decision was reached on the grounds of
strategic, administrative and possibly political objections.
1. P.R.O./C.O. 822/89-^6598F Note on the Meeting Held at
the Colonial Office 23-6-1938.
2. P.R.O./C.O. 822/89-14.6598E Minute by J.J. Paskin 6-8-1938.
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But,however, the Colonial Office was able to make concession
to the Italians by ceding the triangle Mandera-Eil-Mole-Eil
Wak. Paskin had then concluded, "It is, however, satisfactory
that he (the Colonial Secretary) sees no insuperable
objections to the cession of this smaller area."-*- Even
for this area Glenday was very emphatic that the
inhabitants would have to be consulted as to their wishes;
he reminded the Colonial Office that when Jubaland was
ceded to Italy there was a petition to the King from the
inhabitants of that territory. Glenday further stated
that if the inhabitants of area 'D1 - that is Mandera-Eil
p
Mole-Eil Wak - were asked in advance if they would agree
to the cession of that area to Italy, they would strongly
object. On the other hand If they would be given the
beiwttv* eir
choice living in Kenya and^bej^Italian subjects it would
be impossible to accommodate them in Kenya. However, the
issue was further delayed by the outbreak of the Second
World War and the eventual defeat of Italy and the occupation
by Britain of Abyssinia.
Despite all the muddle to which the Italo-Abyss inian
War had exposed the N.P.D. administration, the only bright
side to it as far as the Somalis were concerned was the
effects it had on their trade. Although, in the case
of Isiolo and Marsabit the effect was less marked, in Wajir
and Mandera trade had boomed as a result of the war.3
lT Ibid.
2. See Map I4..
3. Consul G. Reeoe reported in the period from April to
August 1936 that, "there are many individuals who have
profited exceedingly by the war and the high prices paid
for livestock; and the traders of Moyale arid Mandera
have also benefited considerably." (P.R.O./F.O. 371/20168
Report by Consul Reece, Mega - on events onhis District,
April-August 1936).
MRP. If. SIS ETCH SHOWIMfr MBWPEHft-EH. MOLE - E1L WBK TRlBNGlP
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In Gariasa, Somalia, especially the Aulihan and Abdallah
took conaiderable numbers of atock to Kiamayu in Italian
Somaliland. Even after the market wa8 cloaed to Somalia^
from Kenya great numbera of cattle continued to move over
the border for aale by relatione and frienda of Somalia
on the Italian aide. In Kenya, the Lamu pricea for atock
ateadily roae throughout 1936. Cattle fetched 25/- in
January, 30/- in June, and 36/- at the end of the year. The
price of ghee averaged 21/- per fraaila moat of the year
and roae to 30/- in November and December. Hides were
aelling at 12/- per fraaila.
After the Italian occupation, Colonel Settani, who
had taken over the administration of the Abyaainian country
from Nugelli, Mega and Moyale as Comissario, arranged plana
with the District Commissioner of Moyale for the re-opening
p
of the market and for trans-frontier trade. By August
1936 merchants from both sides of the frontier were reported
to be busily engaged in bringing up goods for sale to the
Italian troops and personnel and that was in addition to
the normal trade in the district. British Somali traders
were then in possession of large quantities of lira. The
lira thus obtained was said to pass to Nairobi and thence
1. This was the result of Article 3(1) of the Treaty of
Peace (covenant of the League of Nations) order 1935#
providing that no person in Kenya shall make any loan
to or for the benefit of any person resident in the
Italian territory which term included the Colonies and
dependencies of Italy. The sale of cattle which was
giving credit was stopped.
2. K.N.A./DC/MLE 3/6/2 Conf. 1936 Intelligence Reports.
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through the hands of two Indian money changers at Mombassa
named Lalji Mangalji and Kangi Ibrahim."'" Local traders
kept contact by wire with those Indians for information
on the different rates. A certain demand existed in
Nairobi and Mombassa for lira, for the purchase of Italian
goods from Italian firms. The items bought were mainly
blankets and beads.
The Italians were then anxious to prevent British
Somalis from exporting the lira; and some traders had
been forced to make considerable detours through the bush
to avoid the banda on the main tracks, before reaching British
territory. Traders who had their lira taken away from them
had been told that they could have the value in goods, such
as cloth and sugar but as the prices of these commodities
was three to five times as high in Italian Somaliland as it
was in Kenya, this was hardly an advantage. Unfortunately,
towards the end of the year, in Moyale, the Italian embargo
on the export of the lira killed Somali stock trade.
Traders were given saving bank books and credited with the
amounts due to them and promised that at some time in the
future they might be enabled to IvivaWt these amounts and
transfer them out of Italian territory. In Mandera also,
owing to the impossibility of receiving payment in currency
the stock trade with Lugh had ceased entirely.
So, apart from a temporary boom in trade, the Italo-
Ethiopian War was a real setback as far as the administration
of the N.F.D. Somali was concerned. Instead of devoting
1. K.N.A./dC/MLE 3/2 D.C. Moyale to Officer-in-Charge
N.F.D. I4.-8-1936.
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time to the solution of the problems mentioned in the last
chapter, the authorities were further absorbed by the after¬
math of the war, the refugee problem, disease, interference
with trans-frontier water rights plus the question of the
unrectified frontier. This position had by no means
improved in the next two years and the approach of the
Second World War was to add a new dimension to the
difficulties already mentioned.
On the eve of the War, the Italians concentrated
their effort on recruitment largely among the Somalia.
The D.G. Mandera stated, "I have been informed by an
Officer of the banda that they do not like the Boran as
askaris as they find them untrustworthy. Also the subject
tribes such as Burji and Kansa, being subjeots under
Ethiopian masters are unreliable... I gathered that he looked
upon the Somalia as most valuable material.""'" The recruit¬
ment of Somalia especially those who were British subjects,
was, however, subjected to severe criticism by Sylvia
Pankhurst, Editor of the New Times and Ethiopia News. In
a letter to Sir John Withspe, M.P., she remarked, "You will
see that the Italians are being allowed to use natives of
British territory, and that on a very large scale, up
proceed with their war in Abyssinia.... I trust that you will
take such action as you are abj.e both in Parliament and out,
against this outrage, which is a breach of Mr. Macdonald's
p
pledge." In the edition of the New Times and Ethiopia News
1. K.N.A./DC/MDA 3/3 conf. Intelligence Reports March 1938.
2. P.R.O./P.O. 371/23378/211957Al Enclosed in a translation
of a note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
19-14.-1939.
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of 17 June 1939, she included an Article which explained
the reasons why the Italians looked for Soma lis as recruits.
It ran,
"In addition to their bickerings and disagreement
the Italian white soldiers find it difficult to
run all over the Ethiopian mountains to fight owing
to their great altitude. They cannot go long
distances on foot because their breath fails them,
but the Ethiopian warriors can run continually day
and night...for this reason the Italian Government
has been forced to hire black mercenary soldiers
from the British Colonies of the Sudan, Uganda,
Kenya and British Somaliland who could.keep up and
fight the (nimble) Ethiopian people."
This article had actually appeared when only a few months
before the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome had
informed the British Embassy that the Royal Ministry for
Italian Africa had communicated to them that they had
confirmed the instructions already given to the Governor
General of Italian East Africa, "with a view to ensuring
that in proceeding enrolment of Somalia in Italian forces
the competent authorities should take every care to
p
ascertain that these persons are not British subjects."
Besides the issue of recruitment, the start of
World War II had also had its direct impact upon the
administration of the Somalia in the N.F.D. On the start
of the War with Germany, Mandera and Moyale were evacuated,
and by August 1939 the families and children of Government
employees were evacuated and some police posts withdrawn.
In September, the D.C*s Moyale and Mandera were telegramed
1. P.R.O./F.O. 371/23378/211957Al Italian Recruitment of
British Protected Subjects: Cuttings from New Times and
Ethiopia News. 17-6-1939.
2. P.R.O./F.O. 371/23378/211957A1 Translation of Note
Verbale from Ministry of Foreign Affairs 19-i|.-1939.
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from Nairobi to move but shortly afterwards, when it was
realized that Italy was not going to go to war with Britain,
they were ordered to resume their posts. As a result,
chaos followed and Somali property was exposed to looting
and destruction. At Wajir two hundred and seventy five
women and children were evacuated but nothing had happened.
In Garissa District it was reported that with the outbreak
of War between Italy and Abyssinia in September 1939#
Garissa Somalia "took advantage of the occupation of the
administration with emergency measures to adopt a threatening
attitude towards the River tribes."''' Generally, the
evacuation of the stations was reported to have marked a
loss of confidenco of the Government's capacity to maintain
2
authority amongst the tribes.
In June 1914-0, War with Italy was declared and Wajir,
Bura and Garissa area were the main theatres of war so
far as Kenya was concerned.^ Air raids on Wajir continued
between 13kh# 15th Qnd 27th June but only five men were
reported killed in Wajir. However, the most serious
situation arose when General Dickson decided in July that
the tribesmen could not be allowed to use the Wajir wells.
Normally about 1,000,000 head of mixed stock watered there.
It was at first thought that water and grazing would have
to be borrowed from the Central Rift Valley Province, but
since two thirds of the camel people chose to move eastwards
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD l/l/7 Annual Reports 1939.
2. K.N.A./DC/MLE 3/7/2 conf. Intelligence Reports July 1939.
3. Alys Reece, To My Wife - 50 Camels. (London, 1963), p.129.
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Instead of southwards, a serious situation was averted
and all that was needed was to alter the Somali Line"*" and
borrow some grazing from the Uaso Nyiro Boran. In Moyale,
a number of Somali villages of Mussurreh and Rer Muhammad
Dakatch were caught by the Italian banda and were forced
to move to Afmadu where they were obliged to stay several
months before they returned.
At the end of 19I+0, the Italians still occupied
Eil Yibo, Eil Sordu and Bulluk in the Marsabit District;
also Moyale, Debel, Korrondil and Bura north of Wajir.
Prom there they pushed down from Eil Wak as far as Eil
Katula but in the beginning of 19I4.I the tide turned in
Britain's favour and in one month the Italians were ejected
not only from Kenya but from a large and important part
of Somaliland.
However, looking through the documents, one finds
that Somali attitude to the British position during the war
was varied. Chiefs like Hilole Muhammad of the Aulihan
and Stambul Abdi of the Abd Wak dropped their feud as a
contribution to the War effort. On the other hand chief
Ahmad Hasan of the Muhammad Zubeir was reported to .have"! gone
to the Italians and thus became an anti-British influence.^
On the general tribal level, the feelings of the N.P.D. tribes
Somali and Galla were said to be friendly. Boran, Ajuran
1. Since I93I4. A Soraali-Galla line was drawn to separate the
two groups .in order to MmitJ their movement and to see
that the Somalia do not trespass on Galla grazing and
watering facilities. See Map II.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD l/l/8 Annual Reports 19U0-i|.6.
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and Gurreh offered to supply animals for rations'" and most
of the Somalis proved most helpful in providing information
regarding Italian movements. However, that was not true
in the case of the Muhammad Zubeir and the Marehan who
stood to gain water and grazing and hence were drawn to
give very active support to the Italians.
■
After the end of hostilities, the British administration
in the Northern Frontier renewed its efforts to deal with
the aftermath of this War. A start was made to collect
some of the rifles whioh the Italians had given to the
Murille Somalia in Mandera District, Disarmament was also
begun with the Aulihan in Jubaland 'near the British frontier
in order to decrease the raids by armed game poachers
across the border.^ Besides, the administration had to
cope with the hundreds of deserters from the Italian forces,
mainly Ajuran and Gurreh who had returned home after serving
in the Italian side.
No sooner had the War ended and the Ethippian
Government resumed control over Abyssinia than several
serious trans-frontier raids from Abyssinia by bandiats
occurred. On 21st April 191^1 these raids led to the
murder of Captain W. Keir, the D.C. of Mandera who was
helping in the recovery of some looted camels belonging to
the Gabbra looted by the Marehan and Herti Somalia from the
1. K.N.A./DC/MLE 3/7/2 Conf. Intelligence Reports 19!|.0.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/5/3 Annual Reports I9I4.O-I4.6.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD U/l/ll Secret History of the War: 1939-Mi;
War Diary of N.F.D. 1st June 191^.1 to September 19i|-l by
Gerald Reece, Officer-in-Charge, N.F.D.
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Nughelli area. The situation was made worse by the
policy of the new Abyssinian Government when the Ras had
initiated a temporary campaign against the Somalia in
Borana and thus encouraged the Boran to murder the Moslem
Somalia. The latter in their turn fled to Kenya making
the position of the administration there even more difficult.
Later this was supplemented by a series of Gelluba raids
on the Rendille which occupied most of the time of the
Officials.
In addition to the influx of deserters and the trans¬
frontier raids, the N.P.D. Somalia had suffered considerably
from the fact that the price of food and cotton cloth
had risen to nearly twice the figure that it was before
the War.^ This, together with the problems mentioned in
the previous chapters made life for the Somalia extremely
difficult. However, though the dimensions of the problem
of the development of the Somali N.P.D. was too big,
and perhaps too late to rectify, an effort was at least
made in the post-War period to remedy the position in the
five years development plan for the Colony in which the
N.P.D. was included. How far this had succeeded in winning
back the inhabitants of the neglected region will be




The Position of 'Alien' Somalia In the East Africa
Protectorate and Kenya Colony.^
Before discussing the post-war position of the N.F.D.
Somalia - it is worthwhile considering the history of the
political development of the 'Alien' Somali in the urban
centres of the Colony - in order to give a complete picture
of the position of Somalia throughout the Protectorate and
the Colony.
The term 'Alien Somalia' was applied by the British
officials in Kenya to distinguish the Northern Frontier
District Somalis from "...those Somalia who are living in
Kenya but who belong to tribes not normally resident in the
Colony. they are immigrants and descendants of immigrants
of British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, ' (including the
country formerly known as Jubaland), Ethiopia and Aden."^
The use of the word 'Alien' in this context had, however,
led to a series of troubles between the Somalis and the
British Authorities whereby the Ishaq section, who were
particularly affected by it, conducted an incessant campaign
requesting the authorities to delete the word in view of
1. This chapter is an enlarged version of a paper I
prepared in December 1971 for the Seminar on 'Colonial
Rule and Local Response in the 19th and 20th Centuries'
arranged by the institute of Commonwealth Studies,
University of London.
2. The majority of the Somali population in the East Africa
Protectorate and Kenya Colony were the local inhabitants
of the N.F.D. The so-called 'Alien'Somalis were
scattered in various towns and were far fewer in number
than those of the N.F.D.
3. R.G. Turnbull, "Alien Somalis in Kenya Colony", 1939, p.l.
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its implications for their position in the Colony. But
this was only one aspect of the clashes between them and
the administration which started ever since their settlement
in the country.
The •Alien* Soma lis - mainly Ishaq and Herti"*" were
to be found chiefly in Nairobi and Isiolo (in the Northern
Frontier District). But as cattle traders they had moved
with their stock to many other urban centres in Kenya such
as Rumuruti, Gilgil, Kitale and Eldoret. In all these
areas the problem of their settlement, stock allocations,
and later the question of their position and social status
as compared with other races in the Colony was a live
issue which kept the British authorities busy through the
whole period when Britain was in charge of the Protectorate
and the Colony. This chapter deals with two most
important areas where these Soma lis are found and where
their political activities mostly centred - Nairobi and
Isiolo.
In Nairobi, the history of their settlement dated
back to the period 1895-1900 or shortly before. According
to Colonel J. Ainsworth's Diary of April 25th 1901^ and a
report from the Governor of the Protectorate to the Colonial
Secretary in 1916,^ at the time of the construction of the
1. The Ishaq main sub-sections are Habr Awal, Habr Jaala
and Gerhajis. The Herti sub-sections are: Warsengeleh,
Dulbahanta and Mijertein. See Appendix I.
2. Rhodes House MSS/Afr./s/381 Ainsworth Diaries. Also
see Sir Vincent Glenday, "The Origin of the Somalia
with Special Relation to their Political Development in
Kenya", 1938.
3. P.R.0./C.O.333/170 Belfield to Andrew Bonar Law 13-10-1916.
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Uganda Railway in November 1899 there were both Somali
and Indian Communities in Nairobi. Further, the Commercial
development of the town in 1900 had attracted a sudden rush
of a mixed population of Indian traders, Arabs and Somalia.
It seems that from then onwards the Somali community
continued to build up to such an extent that Colonel Ainsworth
was obliged to establish the system of the headman of camps.
In April 1901 a number of Berbera and Aden Somalia who had
collected and formed a settlement near the stream outside
Nairobi were reported as being 'troublesome' and Ainsworth
had found it necessary to ask them to elect a headman."''
By 1906, these Soraalis had collected a large number of
cattle and were hence ordered, for veterinary reasons, to
keep them in the Nairobi Commonage near M'bagathi (Embakasi).
In complying with this order the Somalis seem to have
established settlement villages inside the Common.
In 1916, the map compiled by Professor Simpson to
illustrate his report on Nairobi showed that there were four
Somali villages in the township itself. The one lying to
the west of the township consisting of sixty four houses
owned by fifty seven persons, was in the proposed European
Residential area; the second of forty-four houses, in the
protective zone; the third of six houses in the better class
Asiatic Residential Area, and the fourth of twelve houses in
the area 'D' or the business quarter.^
The other substantial 'Alien' Somali settlement in
1. R.H./Mss/Afr/s/380 Ainsworth Papers.
2. Belfield, Op.cit.. p. 9; See Map 5. (pocket)
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the Colony was in Isiolo - in the Northern Frontier
District - which had a much more recent history than that
of Nairobi. When the administration of the N.F.D. was
first undertaken, the police force was largely composed
of Berbera Somalia and when the force was disbanded in
1921 it was thought necessary to settle them somewhere in
the Colony together with the ex-Somali soldiers demobilized
after World War I. A settlement was started in 1923 for
these * Aliens' who were previously scattered in three
locations, one at Isiolo township, another along the
Garba Tulla Road and the third at Kipseng. The three were
allowed to stay in Isiolo forming Campi ya Juu, Campi ya
Garbu and Bulabesa. This settlement was further increased
by the arrival of the Laikipia Somalia in 1929 at the time
of the establishment of the Isiolo boma (station).
The history of the move of the Laikipia Somalia to
Isiolo goes back to 1925 when it wa3 decided to move
"squatters" on the Laikipia European owned farms to the
unalienated land between the N*gare Ndare and the Uaso
Nyiro Rivers in the Northern Nyeri District. The Somalia
complained that the Ngare Ndare was to a great extent a
fly country, full of fever and extremely unhealthy for
their families. The Senior Commissioner had thus allowed
them to stay on the banks of the Uaso Nyiro on the unalienated
farm lands there; but before they moved, rinderpest had
broken out among their cattle. This gave the white settlers
yet another pretext to persist in their demand for the
removal of Somalia.
169
The administration was, however, unable to move them
owing to the impending inoc*ulation for rinderpest, and
meanwhile permission was given to them to enter the Masai
Reserve on the Kerio Province in order to dispose of their
cattle. In 1927 it was discovered that a considerable amount
of illicit trading with Suk for sheep was being carried out
by some Somalia which resulted in clashes with the police.
Once again, and because of this illicit trading Somali
cattle had to be inoceulated against Pleuropneumonia before
Somalia could trade at Kerio Province and Samburu District.
Owing to draught conditions prevailing between
November 1927 and June 1928, the Senior Commissioner Kerio
strongly deprecated further introduction of Somali cattle
into Suk or the neighbourhood Reserves. But despite this,
in the Conference which was held at the Government House
in June 1928 at which the Director of Agriculture and the
Chief Veterinary Officer were present, it was once again
decided that action should be taken to compel the Somalia
to take their cattle into Suk if conditions there admitted
of it or to move into Isiolo Quarantine area, where they
should be subjected to the rules governing that area."*"
While the authorities were at a loss to decide
where to settle these Somalia, the D.C. of Lamu had in
September 1929 suggested to the P.C. of Coast Province
that these Laikipia Somalia and other Somalia whom as askaris
and syces rendered loyal and valuable services to the
1. K.N.A./DC/KJA 5/1/2 A short history of the Kikuyu
Province 1911-1927-
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Government in the N.P.D. and who were afterwards a source
of anxiety and trouble, could be settled in the Island of
Kiwayu to the north of his District. The area possessed
excellent grazing, and water could be obtained by digging.
The island was uninhabited by the Dnjuii tribe except for a
Crfr trilae.
small village^to the south, and at one time it had been
grazed by Herti Somalia, "... it is hilly, wind swept and
exceptionally healthy. It would I reckon carry from
500 - 1,000 head of milk cattle. Rice, tea, sugar etc.-
the main food of Somalia is cheaper there than up country.""^
But the P.C. was not in the least enthusiastic about the
idea. In a letter to the Colonial Secretary, Nairobi,
he stated:
"The estimate of the number of stock which can
be grazed on the Island would allow of a few
Somalia grazing there but it would do little to
solve the question of how these people are to be
dealt with...there are at present thirty-five head
of Bajun cattle and2Qbout 200 goats which would
have to be moved."
The contradictory evidence of the P.C. as to the
capacity of the island, proved enough to convince the
authorities about the futility of the plan and the project
was completely dropped. The N.P.D. administration thus
decided to occupy Isiolo as the headquarters of the District
in order to solve the problem which was becoming more and
more embarrassing to the Government. The Laikipia Somalia
were thus allowed in the Quarantine Reserve after the
1. K.N.A./PC/foFD k/1/6 No. II4J4.3 S.V. Cooke to P.C. Coast
6-9-1929.
2. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 620/27 N. 17/2/3/1/10 P.C. Coast to
Colonial Secretary, Nairobi 16-12-1929.
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rejectee/.
suggestion to move them to Kiwayu Island was
The occupation of Isiolo in 1929 had thus coincided with
the arrival of the Laikipia Somalia who joined the other
Somali aections already established at Campi Ya Juu,
Campi Ya Garbu and Bulabesa.
These 'Alien' Soraalis both in Nairobi and Isiolo had
since their establishment in the above mentioned settlements
started a campaign for their social, political, and economic
security in the Protectorate and the Colony. Distinguished
*
among them were the Isha^ia (commonly known as Ishaq Shariff
Community) who had a number of claims which they were
anxious that the British administration in Kenya should
always bear in mind.
First, they argued that as their country (British
Somaliland) though nominally under British flag had been
raided by the "Mullah", they had no means of living there
and that it was therefore the duty of the Government to
find them a place to live."'" Second, they maintained that
they were the first Somalia to trade to any extent in Kenya;
and it was not until the opening of the administration in the
N.F.D. and the pacification of Jubaland that the Darod
Somalia followed. They thus felt that they should be given
priority over the Darod sections in matters concerning trade.
Third, their attachment of the word "Shariff" or "Ashraff"
■ ■ ■ i
1. Unlike the Herti, who were themselves Darod, the
Ishaqia did not side with Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan
in his 'Jihad' against the British. This fact was later
supported by M.H. Mattan, Secretary of the Ishaqia
Somali Association in a letter to the East African
Standard, on J^.th April 1938 in which he said, "We have
sided with the British Government against the Mad Mullah
of British Somaliland."
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to their community waa not without significance. Sheikh
Ishaq bin Ahmad, the founder of their clan was supposed
to have been the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad; and it
was to this claim the Ishaqia had attached the greatest
importance in order to elevate themselves above the Darod.
Moreover, this claim was adhered to in order to gain an
Asiatic status which would put them on equal terms with
Indians and the Arabs in the Colony. Finally, another
claim which had had important implications in the history
of their political development in Kenya was inherent in the
fact that as soldiers and policemen brought by explorers
like Carl Peters,"'" leading settlers like Lord Delamare and
Empire builders like Lord Lugard, they had rendered very
valuable services to the British Government. Because of
this the Somalis felt that they should be awarded special
treatment. Nor was this fact denied by some of the leading
British Officials in charge of Somali affairs. Sir Vincent
Glenday, while Acting P.C. of the N.F.D. once remarked in
connection with the Nairobi Somali "....neither must it be
forgotten that there are amongst them ex-government servants
with long and creditable service who, subject to the
consideration of general policy, are yet deserving of
p
consideration." Depending upon this, and the previous
claims, the 'Alien' Somalia were persistent in their demand
that they should be treated and classified differently not
1. See C. Peters, New Light on Dark Africa. (Ward Lock & Co.,
1891); See also Richard F. Burton, First Footsteps in
East Africa. (London, 1856).
2. K.N.A./Pc/NFD U/l/6 No. .307A2/3 Conf. P.C. Isiolo to
Colonial Secretary, Nairbbi 25-6-1930.
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only from the Africans but also from the Darod Somalia
in the other parts of the Colony. This was the root of
struggle between the Ishaqia Somalia and the British
administrators in Kenya which dominated the period 1915-1963.
The first of these clashes started with their claim
for a right of settlement in the urban oentres of the
Protectorate and the Colony. In Nairobi this demand had
inevitably clashed with the proposed scheme of racial
segregation and the advocacy of the settlers* rights.
This was particularly the case when the Nairobi authorities
contemplated the removal of the Somali villages within the
projected European leasehold area.'*" Under' the pretext of
health reasons, and depending on the fact that these Somalis
were one of the most reoent groups to move into Kenya, they
were informed that they should have to move to an area out¬
side the township somewhere near the Commonage.
Upon seeing the letter in the press from the Secretariat
addressed to the Municipal Council in which the Governor
undertook to effect the removal of their villages forthwith,
the Somalis were furious, They had immediately consulted
with their solicitors, Messrs. Shapley and Schwartze, two
Nairobi advocates known for their sympathy with minorities
in East Africa. The Somalis informed the latter that they
had held a mass meeting of Somalis at the Nagarfi Plains
on the 16th and 17th September 1916 attended by about five
hundred people. Among these were five leading Somali chiefs
all appointed by the Government - Husein Ali, Headman of
1. See Map 5.
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Ishaq Habr Awal; Hasan Hersi, Headman of Ishaq Habr Jaala;
Abu Bakr Sugule, Headman of Ishaq Habr Yunis; with one
Herti chief Adam Jama and one Ogaden Chief Hasan Yusuf.
At the meeting it was understood that all Somalia were
unhappy about the projected removal and thus carried out
certain resolutions which they handed to Messrs. Shapley
and Schwartze.1
These resolutions were embodied in Messrs. Shapley
and Schwartze's despatch to the Secretary of State for the
pColonies^ on the proposed removal of the Somali villages
by the administration of the Protectorate. Briefly, the
Somalis considered that they had an absolute moral and
equitable right to claim two things. First, compensation
for their removal; and seoond a removal to a site near
Nairobi. In addition, they were very annoyed at the fact
that they were told to move only at short notice and without
consideration of at least the position of women whose husbands
were absent engaged upon military and administrative work
as askaris and interpreters for the Government.
On the question of the site itself, the Somalis
objected to it for three reasons. First, their business
dealings necessitated their constant daily attendance in
Nairobi; and Mbpgathi being more than eightsmiles distant,
it would not be possible for them to walk in and out from
there. Second, Mbagathi was situated in a general game
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/171/703 Shapley and Schwartze to
Chief Secretary Nairobi. 2-9-1916.
2. P.R.O./C.O. 533/171/703 Shapley and Schwartze to
Andrew Bonar Law 10-10-1916.
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reserve, and, the Somalia generally possessing considerable
numbers of herds of flocks, cattle, sheep etc., they
would find such a location particularly unsuitable. Finally,
they complained that Mbagathi had no fuel supply for the
public. There was a Government forest but right of access
to it was not implied.
But perhaps a more serious cause of dissatisfaction
by the Somalia on the question of their removal from the
township, was the position of the village in the European
Residential Area (No. 1 on the map). The authorities had
particularly pressed the Somalis there to move, because the
village was on the principal road by which the European
residents of Parklands proceeded to and from Nairobi.
Moreover, it was maintained that the medical authorities
had already discovered about twenty undisclosed cases of
small-pox in the village. Not only that but the Somalis
were annoyed at the fact that although they had consented
to be moved to the Native Location, the authorities were
unable to agree on the pretext that, "It is undesirable that
Somalis should reside in this location in close proximity to
the more uncivilised African native."3"
In their insistence that they should be allowed within
the township, the Somalis put forward a proposition which
they wished their advocated to place before the Colonial
Office for consideration. The proposition was that the
Government might erect for them in the New Native Location,
houses approved by the Medical and Sanitary Authorities.
In respect of such model houses, they suggested that they
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/170 Belfield to Andrew Bonar Law
13-10-1916.
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should be given a lease say of 99 or 999 years at a rental
of about 5$. The idea being that a scheme on such lines
would have the advantage of settling the various tribes
of Somalis in such a way that it would be easy for the
Government to have administrative control over them. On
the other hand, the Somalia having a permanent site in the
country, would be increasingly likely to become useful
members of society.
But far from considering their demands, both the
Governor of the Protectorate and the Colonial Office had
categorically objected to them. H.C. Belfield had in
the first place disputed the statement that Shapley
Schwartze had been instructed by persons representing every
tribe and every section of the Somalia in the East Africa
Protectorate. For evidence, the Governor attached a
statement in his despatch to the Colonial Secretary^ by
headman Hasan Yusuf of the Darod section, which implied
there had been no co-operation with the Ishaqiaj a matter
not altogether unexpected when one considers the state of
relations between the two groups at the time.
In regard to the rejection by Somalia to the
Mbagathi site, the governor was of the opinion that the
nature of the business undertaken by these people was
almost entirely confined to stock trading, employment as
gun bearers and headmen in charge of shooting parties.
The last two were mainly employed by firms in Nairobi who
specialise in this business, and access to Mbagathi across
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/170 H.C. Belfield to Andrew Bonar Law
13-10-1916.
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the plain was a matter of no difficulty. Moreover, as
far as stock was concerned, the Government anticipated
that there would be ample grazing for stock in their new
surroundings, whereas at that time such grazing as was
available within the Nairobi Township was limited to certain
classes of animals under the East Africa Township Ordinance
of 19th May, I9OI4., Section 76. Belfield had also pointed
out that "since 1906, the greater number of their cattle
has for Veterinary reasons, been kept and grazed at the
Commonage, close to the site of the new settlement and
that under the contemplated arrangements they will be able
to exercise oloser supervision over them."
On the question of fuel supply on the proposed site
he suggested that they could, by a monthly payment of Rs. 1
for fuel licence in respect of each family, obtain a
sufficient supply from the Government Forest which was
close at hand. Turning to the question of compensation,
the Governor, holding to Ainsworth's view that their
occupancy was always looked upon as a matter subject to the
approval of the administration, haiwei concluded that the
Somalis had no claims of any description to the land which
they occupied henceforth, "they will not be entitled to any
compensation for any loss or inconvenience which they may
suffer by reason of the termination of their tenancy.""*"
Taking into consideration all the points contained
in the Governor*s lengthy despatch and having concurred
1. Ibid.
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with hia view that the Somalia there were aimply
"squatters", the Colonial Secretary gave the following
verdict to Read on the quest ion:-
"I think that the Governor makea a clear caae for
removal, and that he ahould be informed by
telegram that the propoaal i8 approved."
In another deapatoh the Colonial Secretary waa only
prepared to make one conceaaion concerning the poaition
of the familiea of Somalia abaent on Government aervice;
that they ahould be aaaiated in their removal by the
p
authorities. Apart from this the Somalia got no help;
far from it - the Colonial Secretary had accuaed Meaar8.
of
Shapley and Schwartze fcor engineering all the prote8t. It
waa assumed that the fact that the Somalia could pay the
fees to the advocates and oould also pay for elaborate
reports showed that they were very flourishing and hence
deserved no assistance from the Government.
It seems that some of them were allowed to purchase
freehold plots in the Nairobi East Township "Eastleigh" in
which individuals other than Europeans could purchase plots
and settle. But, however, the majority were removed to
Mbagathi against their wishes; and their removal was not
followed by any definite plans for their settlement at
that end. The Somalia were left to congregate inside the
Common with vast numbers of their stock and were thus
using the Commonage as a ranch.
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/170/6^71 Colonial Secretary to Read
13-10-1916.
2. P.R.O./C.O. 533/171/703 Colonial Secretary to Read
6-11-1916.
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Upon discovering the situation, the authorities
attempted to regulate their tenancy and so in 1929 they
were ordered to pay two shillings a year for a temporary
occupation licence on the Common and twenty-four shillings
a year as a rent for a boraa plot. Moreover, an area of
thirty acres was surveyed with the intention that the Somali
villages would be moved to ltj but in fact they were not
moved and although they paid the rent, the Somalia continued
to occupy their huts on the Common. On top of that, about
1931 s proposal was made that these Somalia should be
required to pay a grazing fee of fifty cents for each head
of cattle and ten cents for each sheep and goat.
At this juncture the Somalia oould no longer bear
the oppression by the Nairobi Authorities and hence on
the 1st March 1932, one of the first of the series of
Somali petitions to the Secretary of State and the Colonial
Office was started. In this petition whioh was sent
through the Governor, the Somalia stated;
"Towards the close of Queen Victoria's reign they,
at the suggestion of the Provincial Commissioner,
left various scattered grazing areas which they
occupied in and around Nairobi and collected at
this spot, being informed that it had been given
to them as a gift from the Queen."
The members of the Land Commission of 1933 were
unable to find written evidence to support the above
contention. In addition the Commission was still not
satisfied with the oral evidence and were unable to see
1. Report of the Kenya Land Commission (Nairobi, 1931+)
Part I, Chap. XVII, p. 181. ~
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for what purpose the Nairobi Commonage was originally
instituted. But the Somali view both in Nairobi and
the Republic^" points to the possibility that permission
was given to some Somalis who served with Lord Lugard in
Uganda during the Sudanese Mutiny and others who helped in
quelling rebellions within the Protectorate, to reside in
an area within or near the Common. The numbers of these
Somalis and their livestock had since so much increased
that it proved difficult to distinguish between those who
were entitled to be there and those who were not.
The recommendations of the Kenya Land Commission
regarding the Nairobi Commonage amounted to the proposition
that an area should be marked off sufficient to provide
accommodation for the Somalis who were residing there,
subject to restrictions similar to those which were
recommended for the Sudanese askaris at Kibera. Also
provision should be made to provide grazing for slaughter
oxen, transport oxen and trade cattle in transit. The
area would then be handed over to the Municipality to
administer as an integral part of the Township. But in
their determination to satisfy the European settlers*
demands, the Land Commission had further suggested that
in case the area cleared by the Somalis was not developed
as a National Park - as it was planned - its status should
be that of unalienated Crown Lands in the Highlands, in
1. I am grateful for Mr. Ismail Muhammad Ali, Director of
Public Relations, Ministry of Information, Mogadishu,
for the above information.
2. Op.cit., p. 628.
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respect of which Europeans should have a privileged position.
Facilities for stock-raising in it 3hould not be granted
to non-Europeans unless very strong grounds existed. In
this case the Commission did not see that the Somalia,
apart from askaris of the Uganda Rifles had any special
claim such as would justify an exception being made.
They therefore recommended that Somali cattle should not be
allowed to graze there. The Somali was thus limited to
area 'D* where no privilege of race existed, or the ' C1
area, where the Commission suggested that the definition
of the term "native" in respect of such areas should be
widened to include the Somali, the Nubian or Sudanese.
The situation remained like that, and there was no
further evidence of any practical steps being made to
regulate Somali settlement in Nairobi, apart from the
increasing pressure by the authorities to disperse the
Somali population as much as possible - and to no specified
whereabouts. Up to the post-war period, the problem
of over-stocking among the Somali cattle in the Common
was a current issue. A comparative study of the number of
stock kefit by the Soma lis since 1931 showed a marked
increase. In 1931, the number of cattle kept by the
twelve authorized families of ex-askaris was about 2,000.
In 191±2 it was 1,8OI4. while the number actually recommended
by the Game Committee was only 2I4.O.
1. See Report of the Kenya Land Commission , p. 182.
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It was obvious that the Nairobi Authorities had
failed to solve the problem of Somali settlement and stock
allocation for a long time after the Land Commission's
Report. The District Commissioner, Nairobi had remarked,
ten years afterwards, that:
"Although action has been taken to remove unlawful
residents it is clearly necessary that far greater
supervision must be given to this settlement than
has been possible in the past and that the cattle
which these families may possess in the^Commonage
must be strictly limited by branding."
But, however, the branding method which had helped
greatly to solve the problem in Eldoret, was found very
difficult to bnact in Nairobi. The Eldoret by-laws
orovided for, the branding of authorized cattle and the
power to seize unauthorised cattle and impound them. If
the pound fees were not paid within days find the Veterinary
permit was not produced to authorise the removal of stock
from the pound to some specified place, the cattle might be
sold and proceeds handed over to the cattle owner. In
Eldoret this was possible because the Veterinary Officer was
unable, on account of quarantine restrictions to grant
permits for the removal of the cattle from the Municipality;
and, as a consequence all impounded cattle were sold. In
Nairobi the situation was different as the Veterinary could
not legitimately refuse to issue removal permits. An
alternative suggestion was to interest European farmers
particularly in Thika District to receive Somali cattle
on their farms subject to the payment of grazing fees; but
1. K.N. A./PC/C. P. \\./\\./2 Central Province Annual Reports,
i'M.
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the authorities were convinced that the result would be
merely shifting but not solving the problem.
The post war period had thus witnessed great
agitation by the 'Alien* Somali communities who were utterly
disappointed as to the attitude of the Administration
towards their problems. As late as 191+6, the Somalia
were once again informed that they had no right to be in
Mbsgathi area as by then the Government had definitely
decided to develop it into a National Game Park. On
December i+th the D. C. Nairobi visited Mbagathi and held a
baraza with the Somalia, where he conveyed to them the final
decision of the Government. The procedure for their
removal, as explained by the D.C. was that the Government
would set up a board,
"upon which the Somalia would be represented to
value all the stock which will be removed and handed
over to the meat control; the area is in quarantine
for pleuropneumonia and that Government would
compensate the owners by paying out to them the
difference between the price paid by the Meat..
Control and the valuation made by the board."
When the Somalia did not dispense their goats by the
required date, the Warden rounded up a hundred and ten
and had them removed to the Meat Marketing Board. Also
against the District Commissioner's wishes a large police
force including three Europeans was sent to Mgagathi.
At this juncture the Nairobi Somalia had joined with their
kin in other oarts of the Colony in a series of petitions
to His Majesty the King against the harsh and inequitable
1. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 1+/1+/2 Central Province Annual Report
191+7.
lQk
treatment which they had received at the hand of the
Kenya Government. However, this did not help the
situation and the Government continued their policy of
pushing them out of the area, until 1968, when, after the
major "Shifta" incursions they were moved out from
Mbagathi without compensation for their plots or livestock.
In comparison with the position of the Nairobi
Somalia, those in Isiolo did not meet with better treatment
from the Colonial Administration of the time. As in
Nairobi, the problem of 'Alien* Somali settlement and
stock allocation dominated the period since the establishment
of the Boma in 1929 up to the end of British rule in Kenya.
They had been constantly moved from pillar to post through
no fault of their own. No sooner had the Isiolo, Garba
Tulla and Laikipia Somalia been allowed to build houses
in the township than it was discovered that the area
occupied by them was five miles outside the boundary of
the Northern Frontier Province and inside the Meru Reserve.
Moreover, the Somalia who possessed large numbers of stock
were naturally encroaching upon grazing of the Meru tribe
and the latter were no doubt indignant about the matter.
Negotiations for the inclusion of the five miles
in the Northern Frontier Province failed; and those
Somalia who had built houses were informed that they would
have to move as soon as the new site had been chosen. On
21st January 1°30, a Sites Board was held to investigate
the possibility in the Quarantine Reserve to accommodate
1. See East African Standard, Press cuttings attached to
PC/NFD IJ./1/6.
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the rest of the Somali groups. They made their recommend¬
ations but no decision was taken in the matter. But,
however, the tendency to move them from one location to
another and the clear absence of any definite plans for
their well-being had provoked the Somalia into action and
the administration was faced with inoessant protests and
lists of grievances.
The Kenya Land Commission of 1^33» had equally failed
to solve the problem of the settlement of Somalia in Isiolo.
In fact, its dealings and attitude towards the 'Alien'
Somalia were largely prejudiced by a comment made by the
D.C. of Isiolo at a District Commissioner's meeting of
the N.P.D. in August 1929 when he was speaking of the
probable consequences of gazetting a Somali Reserve. The
minute read:-
"...Kenya is regarded by the Northern Somali as an
Eldorado, and that there could be a further
infiltration from Northern Somaliland, and that
within ten or fifteen years the problem would have
reappeared in a graver form; the area set apart
for the Somali would have proved insufficient and
the Somalia, having obtained political rights and
power, would then again demand consideration of
their claims."
The Commission, therefore, did not commit itself to
any specific policy as far as the settlement of the Somalia
was concerned. Instead they followed the same policy as
in their dealings with the Nairobi Somalia. It was
suggested that any Somali might apply, on equal terms with
other races, for a lease of land where no special privilege
1. Report of the Kenya Land Commission, pp. 223~U*
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of race existed, i.e. a 'D' area. In respect of 'C' areas,
which were areas in which "natives" had prior rights, the
Somalia were given the same privilege. In fact an area
of 700 sq. miles available in the *0' area in Isiolo was
allotted to them; but it was an area which the Somalia
considered extremely unsuitable and unhealthy.
Six years after the Commissions Report the latter
area was oonsidered by the Administration, who recommended
that it could be developed on a Commonage basis where
occupation and grazing rights should be granted and fees
charged. In 19ij.0» Mr. Edwards_,a pasture Research Officer^
carried out a survey of this area and advised that its
carrying capacity was lj.,712 cattle."1" Further, D.O. O'Hagen,
D.C. of Isiolo had in handing over the District to
J.C. Howes warned that, before the proposal to develop the
area as a Commonage could be put into effect, and if the
Somalia were to be confined to that area, it would be
necessary first to eject all other Somalia - i.e. some
133 families who had come to the area previously on various
pretexts and who were ranching on Crown Land. Secondly,
the amount of stock owned by all Somalis to whom the
p
Government had some obligation must be limited. Following
this, a preliminary classification had been made of class
'A' Somalis (214.3 families) being ex-government servants and
1. K.N.A./DC/ISO 2/2 D.O. O'Hagen to J.C. Howes 10-^-19^1.
2. Ibid.
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residents and residents of Rumuruti, Garbs Tulla and Wajir
who were brought there by the government; and class 'B'
Somalis who had no real claim to reside at Isiolo and had
come there during the last ten years. The problem of
evicting the latter proved to be the most embarrassing
problem in the history of the Province's administration.
In addition to the question of class *B', the
authorities had in 191^.9 once again faced the problem of
removing even the class 'A* Soraalis because of the projected
rebuilding of the Isiolo Government Boma and its raising
to the status of a township. The Governor of the Colony
ruled that the 'Alien' Somali population should be ordered
to quit the Meru Reserve and move across the river into
the N.F.D. They were given a period of ten years to
make the move and families with a good record to whom the
Government was under some kind of obligation were promised
the sum of £50 to help them in the move."*" Just before the
Governor made his pronouncement, the D.C. with the help of
Farah Ishaq, a Somali interpreter from Mandera, made a
complete list of all the houseowners in Caropi Ya Juu,
Carapi Ya Garbu and Bulabesa to prepare for the removal of
those Somalis.
However, Somali elders who were taken to see the site
raised as many objections as possible. Despite the
authorities obvious disregard of their views on the area,
Intelligence Reports did however justify their complaints.
The District Commissioner of Mandere had in 1914-3 pointed
1. K.N.A./PC/foFD 1/1/9 Annual Reports 19lj.7-50.
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out that:-
"A journey to the Somali leasehold area established
the fact that the rivers certainly lacked water.
A visit paid by the Water Bailiff to Isiolo revealed
a sorry state of affairs in this connection. It
seems clear that the rivers in the Somali leasehold
area will never, with the exception of the Uaso Nyiro
and the Isiolo stream flow in the dry weather again.
Even the Uaso Nyiro had only twenty ( cusecs)
in it instead of guaranteed and the Isiolo River
is no longer worthy of that name since it fails to
struggle a mile or two below the villages. The
machinery for controlling the indiscriminate use of
water in the Upper reaches of these rivers appear
to be inadequate to protect the right of the
inhabitants of the lower reaches, and the steady
trespass of the Somali stock southwards into the ,
Meru and Nyeri Districts, is partly due to this."
The above comment on the projected 'Alien' Somali
le&d to
settlement did not any changes of plans by the
administration. In I960, after more than twenty years of
doubt and indecision, the authorities decided on the area
and the plans for the rehabilitation of the Isiolo Native
Leasehold Area were compiled and approved, and finance was
provided. The scheme was on the point of being implemented
in 1961 but both the Ishaq and Herti were still opposed to
it. What happened was that the cattle owners were made to
move outside the Township in case they possessed more than
the number allowed, but in most cases the Somalis would
leave the right amount with their families and friends in
the boma and move into the leasehold area with the rest of
the cattle. In this way, the leasehold area was just
another location for the Somalis which did not altogether
help to clear them outside the township as the administration
would have liked. In fact the situation remained until
1. K.N.A ./bC/MDA 3/1/2 Intelligence Reports 1914-3.
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well after Independence; and it was with the emergence
of the "Shifta" or freedom fighters movement that the
Somalia themselves quitted the township, frightened by
the police who"were searching for "shifta" bands.
So, like their kin in Nairobi, the 'Alien' Somalia
in Isiolo were equally disappointed with the British
Somali policy in Kenya Colony, a policy which was marked by
indifference and indecision. The main problem was, however,
inherent in the fact that there was no proper system of
repatriation apparently existing, either in Kenya Police or
K.A.R., for discharged soldiers at that time; and these
Somalia had for the most part had no desire to return to
British or Italian Somaliland. Staying at Isiolo and
Nairobi, they were regarded by the British officials as
"unattractive, artful, untruthful, semi-sophisticated and
lazy and not an asset to the Colony."''' On the other hand
the Somalia were unable to reconcile this attitude with the
fact that, on account of their bravery and superior
intelligence and the services they had rendered to the
British Government, they were entitled to a far better
treatment. The P.C. of Isiolo had himself remarked that,
"no people with such a record are likely to be submissive
p
or easily managed and the Isiolo Somalia are no exception."
Besides the problem of settlement and the allocation
of stock, the 'Alien' Somalia had another grievance against
the British administration in Kenya which had an important
1. K.N.A./PC/NED 2/k/l Clive to Cornwall Isiolo Handing-
Over Reports 1932.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/10 Annual Reports 1951-5^.
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bearing In their political development in the Colony. This
was the issue of their general position and status in
comparison to the other groups in Kenya - mainly the
Asians and the Africans, According to the Native Hut and
Poll Tax Ordinance of 1910, the Somalia were considered as
"natives". The Ordinance read as follows:
"Native means any native of Africa not being of
European or Asiatic race., or origin, and includes
any Swahili or Somali."
As was previously stated, the Somalia proved of
great help to the administration as soldiers and policemen
and with their intelligence they created a specially godd
impression among the leading settlers (like Delamare) and
businessmen. This attitude resulted in a desire probably
promoted by the Somalia themselves, to give certain of them
p
a status above that of the "native" Bantu. As a result
of this the Chief Native Commissioner had investigated
the possibility of excluding the Somali from the definition
of the above Ordinance so as to give him the position of
Non-Native. He informed the P.C. Naivasha that:-
"The Sheikh U1 Islam has informed us that according
to Arab literature etc. the Somali descendants of
Isaak and Darod are of Asiatic origin and are -
accepted as such by the best Arab Author it ies.
Consequently, in 1919 what was known as the Somali
Exemption Ordinance No. 17» came into being. Its full
1. K.N.A./PC/GRSSA l/lO V.G. Glenday (Memo.) Somali
Ordinance-History of the Somali Status and its Legal
Aspect, n.d. ^
2. V.G. Glenday, "The Origin of Somali with Special Relation
to their Political Development in Kenya", 1938.
3. Attached to J. Barton, "An accourit on the Origins of the
Galla and Somali tribes", K.N.A. Native Tribes and their
Customs. Vol. IV, part 2. The above 3s dated lij.-6-1919.
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title was:
"An Ordinance to provide for the exclusion of
certain Somalia from the definition of Native
as it appears in the Native Hut and Poll Tax ,
Ordinance of 1910 and in certain other Ordinances."
But this Ordinance did not last long^ being repealed
by the section 22 General Revision Ordinance 1|/1927» because
of the difficulty of defining the term "certain Somalia".
The latter Ordinance was itself finally incorporated in the
interpretation and General Clause Ordinance Cap. 2 Revised
Laws of Kenya which read as follows:-
"Native shall mean a native of Africa not of
European or Asiatic Origin but shall not include
a Somali or Swahili."
Although the Somalia were thus given the right to
call themselves "non-natives" this had, however, by no
means meant that they were given "non-native" status. The
Ishaq Somalia had ever since embarked on an incessant
campaign to get full "non-native" status and to pay the
same tax required from the Indians and the Arabs. In order
repudiated H,e,r
to achieve that end they had even further
Coy\v\ectlcns with
the Darod Somalia and adhered to the term
"Ishaq Shariff Community" in regard to themselves, the
be i*^
implication imps that they were Arabs and not Somalia.
The history of 'Alien' Somali agitation for the
payment of Non-native Poll Tax of Shs. 30 instead of
Shs. 20 (the latter being the amount due for Somali Non-
native Poll Tax) started towards the end of 1936. The




cause of this agitation was that as a result of certain
readjustments made in taxation, personal fees became
cheaper and the Non-native Poll tax required of the Arabs
and Somalia was reduced from Shs. 30 to Shs. 20 per annum.
This reduction was brought about following on a survey of
the number of Somali exemptions and half payments which
had been permitted during the previous years. The
authorities were of the opinion that the result of the
survey had indicated that Shs. 30 was incommensurate
with the means of the 'Alien' Somalis and that Shs. 20 was
a more equitable rate. Somali Poll Tax was accordingly
fixed to Shs. 20 per annum by the Non-native Poll Tax
Ordinance No. 50, 1936.
In reaction to this, the Ishaqia consistently refused
to pay the Shs. 20 tax on the ground that the Government
was attempting to degrade them to the status of "natives",
in 1937 they presented a petition to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies through the Governor asking that they
should be regarded as Asiatics and to have Asiatic
privileges and obligations. They maintained that during
the last twenty years the community had repeatedly and
persistently made representations to the local Imperial
Governments to the effect that they were neither foreigners
nor aliens, nor natives of Kenya Colony but either by
reason of birth or domicile, British subjects of Asiatic
origin.* But these representations had met with no success.
1. P.R.0./C.0. 533/[|.80/38086/l5 Petition: British Ishak
Community sg. by Abdi Ahmad, Secretary of British
Ishak Community 10-llj.-1937 •
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They further argued that they had purchased land
and immovable property in Nairobi and elsewhere in the
Colony; and that in Nairobi they had lived in the Asiatic
Non-Native Township known as Eastleigh, in the permanent
buildings belonging to themselves and built on freehold
plots with 99 year leases. None of them lived in any
location set aside for "natives" in Nairobi suoh as Pangani
or Pumwani."*" Secondly, they were not subjected to the
Law of Native Registration Certificate and were not required
to carry the "Kipande"; instead they had passports.
Thirdly, they were no more Somalia by reason of their long
residence in Aden or other parts of British Somaliland
than Indians or Europeans could be called African because
they had lived for generations in various parts of Africa.
Nevertheless, they argued, that they had all along been
conveniently included in the category of Somalia for lack
of careful investigation by the authorities concerned,
and treated variously as aliens, foreigners and "natives"
of Kenya Colony; and all sorts of laws inapplicable to
them, had been applied lately on the subject of their
nationality contrary to other laws of the Colony.
For all the above reasons, the Ishaq Somalia insisted
that they should be given the Asiatic Status and hence they
had to pay Shs. 30 in order to be considered on the same
footings a3 the Indians. By February 1938 several Ishaq
1. Note here, the Somalia had previously declared their
willingness to stay in the New Native Location when
the authorities pressed them to move to Mbagathi.
See p. 175 this chapter.
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Somalis were already in g^a)l serving a sentence of civil
imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the
Non-Native Poll Tax. During the period April 1937 to
May 1938, the Ishaqia Community of Isiolo were frequently
visited by their kin from Nairobi. Intelligence Reports
pointed to the possibility that "these visitors endeavoured
to induce the Isiolo Ishaq to pay Shs. 30 as Non-Native Poll
Tax instead of Shs. 20.
It was not only through frequent visits but also by
letters to the press and continued petitions that the
Ishaqia both in Isiolo and Nairobi voiced their grievances
against the administration. But to their greatest dismay,
and despite all these efforts, the Ishaq were told in May
1938 that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had seen
no change in the Somali status. This did not stop them
from further attempts. Par from it; they made a second
attempt in August 1938 by sending a petition to His Majesty
the King. The Secretary of State for the Colonies was
however unable to advise His Majesty to take any action.
As before, the ndws of the rejection of their petition was
P
reported to have been received with incredulity, the
Ishaq were still continuing to refuse the payment of the
required tax.
The point of view of the administration with regard
to the objection to granting these Somalia the Asiatic
1. K.N.A./DC/MLE 3/8/2 Intelligence Reports 1937.
2. R.G. Turnbull, "Alien Somalia in Kenya Colony", 1939.
p. 10.
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Status, was amply dealt with by Sir Richard Turnbull, the
P.O. of Northern Province in a despatch to the Commissioner
of Inland Revenue. Turnbull was of the opinion that the
Ishaq had engineered this matter in order to gain some
shadowy political end. He maintained that the object
of this political agitation was three fold. First, to
gain special rations and special privileges in prisons.
Second, to escape from provisions of the township and
Municipal regulations governing Africans; and third, to
steal a march on the other Somali sections in East Africa,
primarily the Darod Somalia with whom they were continually
quarrelling. In short, he was openly against the grant
of Asiatic Status to the Ishaq.
In addition, the fulfilment of these political aims
by the Government would have meant greater repercussions
inside and outside the Colony. Internally, the British
officials were worried that giving the Ishaq a position
politically superior to the Darod, would have meant the
loss of the latter to the Ishaq. The Darod would then
forget the enmity with the Ishaq and join them rather than
to accept a subordinate position. Externally, apart from
effects on the Ishaq communities in Tanganyika, Uganda and
Zanzibar, Kittermaster^ had since 1930 warned o|r the
1. K.N.A,/Pc/GRSSA l/lO R.G. Turnbull to Commissioner of
Inland Revenue - Nairobi 19-12-1952. Turnbull had
also anticipated that the Ishaq, if granted the Asiatic
Status would then ask for an Ishaq member in the
Legislative Council to watch over their interests. In
the same despatch he decided that the N.F.D. Somalia
should pay the N.F.D. Poll Tax as a middle course between
the Native and Non-Native approach.
2. Then Governor of British Somaliland Protectorate.
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i decision in favour
the Somali was placed on the same footing as the Indian,
the whole administration of the British Somaliland
Protectorate would become involved. "To give them a
status in Kenya so different from what they must have here"
he argued, "would tend greatly to embarrass the
administration of this Protectorate.""*"
factors, the authorities both in Nairobi and London had
definitely decided against a move in favour of the
Somalia. The result of this was that Somali feeling was
running high on the eve of the War; and the realisation
by the Ishaq that they had been let down by the British
had materialized in considerable anti^British feeling among
them, Not only that but they had also managed to join hands
with the other Ishaq Communities in Uganda and Tanganyika,
where in the quarterly meeting of the three groups in
Nairobi on July 11th 1939, the leaders were asked to swear
an oath of allegiance towards each other. But, however,
the outbreak of the War produced a newer subject for
discussion among the Somalia and there was then little
mention of the agitation up to the end of 1939. This was
also made possible by the absence of the ringleaders of
the anti-tax movement such as Musa Ahmad and Abdi Isa -
both serving a sentence under the provisions of the Non-
Native Poll Tax in the Lamu prison.
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533A02 No. 16295/188 Kittermaster to
Lord Passfield 10-9-1930.
He warned that if
Taking into consideration all the above mentioned
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The outbreak of the War had, on the other hand,
necessitated a change in the tax policy. It was found
that in order to obtain an increased contribution towards
the cost of war, a new personal tax based on income and
with a War surcharge should take the place of the Non-Native
Poll Tax.1 It was then suggested that a tax of Shs. 60
should be charged from all the male Non-Natives but it was
realised that the full rate of Shs. 60 could not be paid
by the poorer classes of Indians, Arabs or Somalis and the
collectors were given wide powers to reduce the rate of tax
to a level which they considered the individual was capable
of paying. Moreover, the possibility of a flat rate of
tax was utterly opposed, lest the Ishaq Community would
grasp the opportunity and again claim Asiatic Status.
Thus the Somali tax was raised by ten shillings only, making
the amount required by them Shs. 30. Yet as long as this
amount was fifteen shillings short of the new sum due from
the Indians, the Somalis still resisted it with equal vigour.
In communicating this to Gerald Reece, the D.C. of
Isiolo remarked:
"One would have thought that the Ishaq would have
welcomed this as a method of saving their faces
and avoiding further civil imprisonment, but I was
told by Maalim Awaleh Guled (Habr Yunis), (Ahmad
Warsama (Habr Awal), and Osman Madar (Habr Awal)
that they would insist on paying Shs. I4.5 in order
to be regarded as Asians."2
In fact from then onwards, the post-war period was
marked by a more vigorous demand by the Somalis for Asiatic
1. P.R.0./C.0. 5^4-/62 Kenya Administrative Report 1914.6.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD k/7/2 D.C. Isiolo to Gerald Reece
16-1-1914-0.
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Status, by a heightening of their political feelings and
an increased movement between the Isiolo and Nairobi in
defiance of the Outlying District Ordinance of 193lj. which
was essentially meant to curb Somali contacts in order to
weaken political activities.
Another feature of the post war period, was the
attempt by the Ishaq to extend the agitation to the
different Departments of the Government. In 1914-7* the
United Somali Association"'" protested to the Acting Labour
Commissioner about the position of ten Somalis employed
at J4.OI East African Command Workshop, with regard to their
rates of pay. According to information provided by the
latter Association, in April 1914-7# twenty Somalis were
engaged in the East African Command Workships at Shs. 1/50
per hour in the Asiatic rate.^ In mid April they were
informed that from then onwards they would only receive
Cts. -/50 per hour. In other words, the Government had
decided that the Somalis should get the rate paid to the
'natives'. As a result ten Somalis were reported to have
resigned but those who did not were allowed to receive the
old rate of 1/50. Prom then onwards any newly employed
Somalis would be asked to pay the new rate of -/50.^
1. Formed by the Amalgamation of the Darod and the Ishaqia
Associations. At this stage they were more of pressure
groups than nationalist parties.
2. This shows the inconsistency in applying the "native" and
"non-native" status towards Somalis. Although Somalis
were paying a special rate of "non-native" tax different
from the Asians; here they were paid the same rate as
the Indians up to April 1914.7.
3. K.N.A./Labour 9/127 Lins. 2/I/I4. Vol. V. M.P. Bynns
(Acting Labour Commissioner) to Mechanical Engineer-
East African Command 18-6-1914-7.
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At this point, the United Somali Association did not
sh(y.ae
hesitate to wage a protest, and in a letter to the Command
Secretariat at Nairobi they expressed their dislike for the
idea that for the matter of wages the Somali employees of
the Military were grouped as Africans. Further the
Secretary of the Association pointed out, "Our country of
abode had always been Somaliland which has no geographical
link to the territory owned by the local Africans...as such
the inclusion of our Community by the Military Authorities
with Africans for the matter of wages is entirely
unjustified and unreasonable.""1" However, their case did
not altogether escape the sympathy of some of those in
charge. Colonel C. Topbman and the Brigadier Chief Engineer
were of the opinion that, "Somalia should be classed on the
p
same level as Asians in regard to rates of pay." This
was because the cost of living had increased remarkably
since the War and that the maintenance of families, clothing
and food had accordingly increased. But their appeal was
naturally dismissed by the Government as it would have given
the Somalia the pretext to claim Asiatic status.
After a considerable period of discussion, the
Military Authorities managed to get a mid course solution
O *
based on the advice of R.G. Turnbull,a» >«iA%ieulighfcw<»fi
authority on Somali affairs. He pointed out to those in
charge that:
1. K.N.A./Lab 9/127 Muhammad Farah to Command Secretary
7-11-1911.7.
2. K.N.A./Lab 9/127 No. BM/5IJ4.O/2/LE note by C. Tophman
13-12-191*7.
3. R.G. Turnbull was then Liaison Officer, Headquarters,
East African Command.
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"The Ishaq Somali Community is small but
politically conscious to an almost pathological
degree. For many years they have been contending
that they are not Somalia, but that they are
Asians and are entitled to full Asian status both
legally and politically. This contention is not
accepted by the Government... complaints made by
these people are more often than not to be regarded
as moves in a political game, they should not,
therefore, be taken as their face value...With
regard to rates of pay for artisans, there can be
no question but that the average Somali is more
intelligent and potentially more higjhly skilled
than the average East African Native. It would
embarrass the Government if, for any purpose, these
people should be classified as Asians; there
would however be no political objection to their ,
receiving special rates of pay as Somali tradesmen."
Accordingly, the Military Authorities decided in
October 1914-9# to create a special pay segment for Somalia.
It was agreed that a monthly rate of Shs. 100 to Shs. 200
should be charged according to skill. The result was,
therefore, that the Somali artisans were placed in a special
class between the African and the Asian. This had no
doubt brought to an end any hope that the Ishaqia might
have contemplated of winning a decision in their favour;
and thus, like the struggle for a right of settlement
and land ownership in the Colony, the dream of an Asiatic
Status came to a disappointing end.
In addition to the above grievances, the Ishaq
Somalia were since 193J+, the year when the Outlying District
Ordinance was enforced, utterly dissatisfied with the
attempt of the administration to restrict their movements
inside and outside the N.F.D. In a letter to the East
1. K.N.A./Lab. 9/127 R.G. Turnbull to Deputy Command -
Secretariat 2-I4.-I9I4.8.
2. K.N.A./Lab. 9/Lins. Conf. E.M. Hyde-Clarke to
C. Bathurst-Barrister 2-12-1914-9.
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African Standard* of April l+th 1938 M.H. Mattan had, on
behalf of the Iahaq Shariff Community, indicated that they
were not allowed to go out to the Northern Frontier Province
for trading purposes."1" In another despatch to Gerald Reece,
the P.O. of N.F.D., Mattan added:-
"Our real brothers and visitors who come to Isiolo
are not allowed to stay with us until they obtain
an Outlying District Permit which authorises them
a few days stay, we very earnestly request Your
Honour to allow our own Community to enter
Isiolo freely as the other towns of the closed
Districts such as Narok, until they go back or
else request Your Honour a permit for trading in
the Northern Frontier Province which is entirely
under Your Honour's free wish."
Mattan went on to list other grievances which
included a complaint that In the event of the death of one
of the Somali residents, order was always given for the
destruction of his buildings, so as not to allow the next
of kin to take it over. Also no Somali was allowed to
own two shops in different places, even if he was able to
carry on with the business of the two shops. Finally, on
behalf of the Community, Mattan requested the P.C.,
"to delete the word 'Alien Somali* from the Outlying
District Permit which is issued to the residents of
Meru, Kipsing and Isiolo because as you know we are
pure British subjects and therefore we strongly
request your honour to abolish-this word altogether
and to use "British Isaak"." *
Examining the whole episode of the relationship
between the so called 'Alien* Somalis and the British
Administration in Kenya, one is tempted to arrive at certain
1.M.H. Mattan, "Shariff Is-Hak Community Grievance", East
African Standard I|.-JL|.-1938.




conclusions. First, it was obvious that the officials
had to put into practice certain restrictive measures in
order to limit the constant movement of Somalis - if only
for administrative convenience. But the administration's
obvious limitation and greatest weakness was its inability
to follow a clear line of policy towards solving the
impending problems. Far from it, the policy followed was
e.
always based on attitudes rather than actual study and
investigation of the questions involved. The institution
of vague promises and counter promises, as was obvious in
the questions of settlement and Asiatic status, and the
indecision of the authorities was obviously beyond the
endurance of any people, let alone the turbulent, intelligent
and politically conscious Ishaqia Somalia. Sir Vincent Glenday
had himself admitted that theiar^attempts had failed because
the,problem had been tackled piecemeal."*" As far back as
1925 be pointed out to the Government the danger of
evading the determination of a clear policy towards these
Somalis. He never ceased to suggest that a clear policy
as regards the paying of their taxes and, more especially,
a clear policy as to the control of their migration and
settlement in the Colony should be determined. He had
emphatically stated:-
"I venture very respectfully to suggest that had
those being faced then we should not have found
ourselves so deeply implicated by the migration
of numberless Somali."2
As Glenday himself, further observed, the weakest
1. K.N.A./PC/GRSSA 1/10 Status of Alien Somalis (Memo)
by V.G. Glenday n.d.
2. Ibid.
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point of the administration lay in the fact that they
were unable to decide the status of the Somali"'" was he
a "native" or "non-native"? In some Laws of the Colony
he was the one and in the rest he was the other. In faot,
the Somali was considered a "native" in the following
Ordinances
Stock and Produce Theft Ordinance Cap. 78
Native Registration Ordinance Cap. 127
Native Authority Ordinance Cap. 129
Resident Native Ordinance Cap. 132
Native Foodstuffs Ordinance Cap. I35
Native Arms Ordinance Cap. I37
Employment of Native Ordinance Cap. I39
Game Ordinance Cap. 161
Arms Ordinance Cap. 8/1925.
And "non-native" in so far as the following were
concerned:-
Native Estate Administration Ordinance Cap. 15
Native Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance Cap. 5
Native Exemption Ordinance Cap.128
Native Pass Rules Cap.138
Native Liquor Ordinance Cap. 3&/10
Native Tribunal Ordinance Cap. 39/30
In criticism of the above Glenday had remarked,
"It is interesting to note that a Somali is a
Native under the Native Authority Ordinance but
not under its Corollary the Native Tribunal
Ordinance.
As a result of this lack of policy which was the
natural outcome of the failure to understand their problems;
plus the inconsistency between the policies and suggestions
of those on the spot and the Government, the long standing
1. In the introduction the importance of determining the
origin of the Somali is dealt with. This chapter
illustrates the difficulties which stood in the face
of a practical Somali policy in view of the inability
of the administration to decide whether to consider the
Somali an African or an Asian.
2. Ibid.
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enmity between the Darod and the Ishaq was gradually
coming to an end. This was obvious when the Ishaqia
and Darod Associations were amalgamated into the United
Somali Association which began as a pressure group emerging
later as an open nationalist party in support of Somali
Secession from Kenya and the joining of the Somali
Republic - as we shall see in Chapter VI.
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Chapter V
The Post-War Social and Economic Position of the
N.F.D. Somalia
The position of the local N.F.D. Somalis considered
in the first three chapters, and that of the so called
•Alien' Somalis discussed in the last chapter points to the
fact that both had suffered from neglect and maladministration
throughout the period from the commencement of the British
administration up to the Second World War. This chapter
traces the position of the N*F.D. Somali in relation to
the projected Five-Year Development plan for the area,
which hinted at possibilities of economic and social progress.
From the establishment of the first N.F.D. Government
post in 1910 until World War II, the N.F.D. was regarded
mainly as a convenient buffer between Abyssinia, the settled
areas and the native Reserves of Kenya which neither
required nor merited development, except for policing.
Previous attempts by officials on the spot to effect any
change, as observed in the previous chapters, did not result
in any positive measures being introduced.
The reasons given for the lack of development in
this predominantly Somali-inhabited area were twofold
Firstly, the country was considered unprofitable, and it
was thought that the population was too small to merit
attention while there was so much to be done in the more
densely inhabited areas of the Colony. Secondly, it was
believed that the desert nature of the territory and the
nomadic habits of the people rendered impracticable any
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close form of 'native' administration.''' These reasons
proved utterly unconvincing to the Soma lis, and indeed it
enhanced their claim for cession to join 'Greater Somalia',
as will be discussed in the next chapter.
However, it was at this stage, and when a post-war
development plan for the Colony was drawn up, that the
administration was obliged to reconsider the position of the
Somalis and the other pastoral tribes of the frontier area.
It was then realised that, "unless adequate attention is
given to the N.P.D. it will become a menace - or at least a
p
serious nuisance - to the southern half of Kenya." In
addition, the new attitude regarding the position of the
N.P.D. Somal resulted from its being no longer the policy of
His Majesty's Government in the Colonial Dependencies to
measure the help given to native people entirely by the
amount of money coming out of their territory.^ Even
British Somaliland, which was formerly neglected in much
the same way as the N.P.D. of Kenya, was then receiving
generous assistance from the War Office and the Colonial Office.
The result was that considerable progress was made in the
development of social and other services for the betterment
of the Somalis there.
In the N.P.D., although the Somalis for the past
thirteen years had by direct taxation contributed about
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/1/3 Conf. Handing-Over Report (Post-War





£100,000 to the revenue of the Colony, in return they
were given little more than a certain amount of protection
and law and order. It had always been the policy to
abandon rather than to protect the Somali-inhabited
districts, as was the case in I9I4.O. The results of this
policy of indifference upon the Somalis were of no small
significance. The defective British Somali policy which
left the boundary between Ethiopia and Kenya undemarcated,
coupled with the inability of the administration to see that
the Somalis could water their stock freely in Abyssinian
territory under the 1907 treaty, had marked effects on the
attitude of the Somalia in the frontier to the existing
Colonial administration.
The authors of the Post-War Five-Year Development
Plan for the N.F.D., had by then realised, after nearly
thirty years of faulty administration that something had to
be done to improve the social and economic welfare of the
Somalis in this neglected portion of Kenya, if those people
were to become an asset to the Colony. The needs of the
N.F.D. Somalis, both economic and social, centred around
two important aspects. Firstly, as pastoral people the
problem of the provision of adequate water-supply, the
grazing and marketing of their stock must take precedence
over everything. Visitors and experts who reported
periodically on the N.F.D., had constantly stressed the
fact that owing to the problems of overstocking and soil
erosion, the country between the Highlands of Kenya and
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Cape Guardafui was being seriously harmed."1" This had
inevitably been a factor in the serious problem of the
continuous Somali emigration to the southern half of Kenya.
To remedy this situation, it was obviously necessary to
improve conditions in the desert areas inhabited by thB
Somalia so that they could live in their own territory. And
the provision of adequate water supplies, if brought about,
0u
would have provided^sound solution to the Somali question,
not only economically but also politically.
Secondly, together with the economic question, the
improvement of the social position of the Somalia was a
pressing one. It was also necessary for the sake of the
development of the Somalia that the questions of health,
and above all, education should be reconsidered. In the
Post-War Five-Year Plan it was confirmed that until the
Second World War there was not a single proper school in
the whole of the N.F.D. for the education of Somali children.
The result was that, since there were practically no men
in the territory who were literate, it was found impossible
to make a proper start with any of the activities of the
more detailed administration or social development.
Moreover, as long as no facilities for education were
provided in the N.F.D., the Somalia naturally tended to
move southward to the other urban centres of the Colony, and,
being unemployable, caused a lot of difficulties to the
authorities.
1. This was also the case with some other territories in the
Colony. The Kamba country had also suffered from
devastation of the soil as a result of over-cultivation
and over-grazing. (See History of East Africa. Vol. II,
PP. 255-56).
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It was obvious, then, that the administration should
concentrate on the provision of enough water supplies for
Somali stock, the marketing of the stock, and begin
educating the Somali children. A start was made with the
question of water facilities and the control of pasture,
these being the most urgently needed at the time. The
difficulty was that the N.F.D. itself holds little water,
rainfall is generally low, and the grass and vegetation
brought on by the rains soon withers and dies, scorched by
a hot 3un. Thus the main problem facing the administration
was the immensity of the area and the aridity of the country.
No doubt, in an area where the great majority of the people
were nomads, who spent their lives searching for water and
grazing, the protection of pasturing and watering of the
stock presented daily work and anxiety.
The position in the N.P.D. until the 19i|.0,3 was that
owing to the scarcity of water supplies, all the country for
miles around the few permanent well-systems and rivers was
rapidly approaching complete devastation. Although from
1929 onwards A. Beeby-Thompson, a hydraulic engineer with
considerable experience in the Sudan, had directed the
attention of the administration to the deplorable conditions
in the watering system in the N.P.D.,"'" pointing out, however,
that the prospects of finding a sub-soil water in the N.P.D.
were 'distinctly hopeful', the problem of Somali watering
did not receive the necessary attention. The situation
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 5/1/11 Report on Water Prospects of
N.P.D. of Kenya. A Beeby Thompson 1929.
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remained that in Moyale District, apart from the township
water supply and small permanent supplies at a few places
such as Gurar, Debel and Bura, all the good wells were north
of the Ethiopian border; and although the tribes on the
British side had rights, by the treaty of 1907*.to use this
water supply freely, their doing so usually involved some
sort of persecution or ^escortiot^ by Abyssinian soldiers.
In Mandera District the only water supply was the Daua
River; and at Eil Wak in Wajir District tribes depended
almost entirely on the wells of the Wajir Oasis and the
Uaso Nyiro. The Isiolo and Garissa Districts depended
mainly on the Uaso Nyiro and the Tana River. In the dry
season all the animals in the N.F.D. had to be concentrated
near the three big rivers and tbe very few permanent wells,
the result being naturally the complete destruction of all
the grazing in the area.
In 19ij.3, therefore, the administration was moved to
consider the problem pf watering and overstocking, a
solution for which was long overdue. A joint survey of the
N.P.D. was made by D.G. Edwards, Senior Agricultural and
Pasture Research Officer of the Kenya Agricultural
Department, and by Dr. P. Dixey, a distinguished Geologist
and water engineer (who was then Director of Water Development
in Northern Rhodesia). The start of the survey was
considered by the Provincial Commissioner for the N.P.D.
as "the most important event of the year...(it) resulted
not only in reports and recommendations of great value but
also [in] the realization by many of the more sensible
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tribesmen that something must be done by them and without
delay to preserve the grazing of their own country.
The main impressions, observations and opinions of
Mr. Edwards regarding the problem were embodied in his
reports and recorded in the main body of the Post-War
Five-Year Plan. The following quotations from the latter
would help to expose the problem:-
"The outstanding impression gained from a comprehensive
view of the better vegetation of the Northern
Frontier District is that of localised extremely
heavy utilisation ooupled with extensive areas
which are almost untouched. This state of affairs
is, in the main, obviously the result of scarcity
of water supplies."
More important still, Mr. Edwards pointed out that,
"There is no evidence to suggest that the region
in general is incapable of supporting successfully
the human and stock population which it at present
contains if-suitable distribution could be
attained." *
His recommendation for remedying the situation was
that together with better distribution of water supplies,
it was essential that any improvement in that direction
should be based upon a clearly defined plan of grazing
control. "The basis of this plan" he maintained, "should
be irrigation from the permanent watering centres and
complete protection of the areas surrounding them during
the rains." This was supposed, after a number of seasons,
to improve and promote the recovery of the vegetation. It
was also noted that the services of a full time pasture
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/8 Annual Reports i9i4.O-l4.6-
2.. See the Five-Year Development-Plan for the N.F.D. PC/NFD
2/1/3 Handing-Over Reports I9I4.8-5O.
3. Ibid.
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officer backed by a research organization were essential
for the success of the scheme. Also, a considerable
force of native guards particularly in the early stages
of the implementation of the project was necessary.
However, as an essential condition to the working
of the above scheme, the author was of the opinion that it
had to be accompanied by the stabilization of native
w
occupation, by the control of immigration from outside
the territory, and the pacification of the northern frontier.
Once more the importance of political stability for any
social or economic development in the N.P.D. was stressed,
in order for results to be obtained. In conclusion,
Mr. Edwards emphasized that the problem of restoring the
vegetation of the devastated areas, and of preventing
further destruction in this very extensive part of East
Africa, was one which demanded resolute action; "unless
decisive steps can be taken towards its solution, and that
without undue delay, a much greater problem of native
rehabilitation will undoubtedly arise."
In conjunction with his colleague, Dr. Dixey's Report
also made observations and recommendations on the problem
of water supply which were of no small significance for the
future administration of the Somali in the northern
territory of the Colony. He stated:-
"The problem of water supply is intimately bound
up with that of grazing. As matters stand, in
many places where there is permanent water, there
is no grazing within reach, and where there is
grazing, there is no water. Numerous new water
points, both temporary and permanent, are required
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in order to serve the unused or little-used grazing
areas, and to rest the exhausted grazing-areas
around all the permanent water points."
Dr. Dixey*s important scheme for the improvement of
water supplies consisted essentially in the construction of
tanks and boreholes, and indicated generally thnt permanent
supplies of water would have to be obtained by drilling.
Also, in view of the great depth of ground water, he
suggested the use of pumping plant for raising water.
As was obvious, the observations and the recommendations
of both Mr. Edwards and Dr. Dixey were complementary in view
of the inter-relation between the problems of water supplies
and grazing. The outcome of their research had convinced
the officials in charge of Somali affairs that these schemes
if implemented would have far-reaching effects on the
economic welfare of the Somalia. When the Executive
Committee of the Water Resources Authority did not whole¬
heartedly approve of the expenditure of a large sum of
money on what they believed a "worthless desert",
Gerald Reece vigorously protested:-
"I need mw& scarcely add that if this territory
is to be saved, and if East Africa is not to be
faced with a serious problem in connection with
landless and unemployable Somalia, then the Dixey
Scheme must be proceeded with vigorously, promptly
and wholeheartedly... it must be attempted not
only in order that our people may be protected
from starvation in future, but also because the
establishment of economic and well organized units
on the land in the N.P.D. is the only known form of
protection against the south-westwards movement 2
of Somali tribes from oountries outside the border."
1. Ibid.
2. K.N.A./PC/llFD 2/1/3 G. Reece to R.G. Turnbull 19^8;
Reece had since 193U- taken a keen interest in this aspect.
He wrote elsewhere that what really mattered to the
Somalia was "the stock...the grazing and the water which
are the great and the only real consideration...to achieve
any measure of administrating this country one must
therefore continually bear in mind and consider this...I am
prepared to confess that it has taken me £ number of years
to learn.it." (PC/GRSSA 8/5/1 Pub. 2L/2/17 Extract from
G. Reece's Handing-Over Rfepbrt l^Ijj.
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In 1950, however, the Dixey Scheme was approved in
principle and a grant of £l;85,000 was made from the
Colonial Development and Welfare Fund for the development of
water supply in the N.F.D. But, unfortunately, when the
Scheme was initially carried out, it was found that the
main suggestion embodied in the Dixey recommendations in
I9I4.3 which pointed to the provision of the necessary water
from boreholes, was unworkable. The experience and high
cost of successive drilling had subsequently shown that
reliance chiefly on surface water was more economical.^
The first work which was undertaken was a pilot scheme of
drilling bore-holes in the Samburu District between 1951-52.
It was this experimental work which brought about the
decision to rely mostly, in future, on surface works, and
shallow bores and wells, and also to carry on work by
direct labour. The scheme was originally due to'close
down in 195k>^ an<i as this meant that there was then less
than three years left, work was carried on in four Districts
at once - Isiolo, Garissa, Wajir and Moyale.
In Wajir it was reported that great interest was
shown by the tribes in the digging of water pans, Four
new pans were completed, and two others cleared out and
enlarged.^ In 1953t J.M. Elliot, the D.C. of Wajir also
reported that the two most successful operations carried out
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 5/2/5 Howard Humphreys & Sons, "A report
on the Northern Frontier Province Water Conservation
Scheme (Dixey Scheme)" 1950-55-
2. Later on the time was extended. Work was carried on
one district at a time.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/5/3 Wajir Annual Reports 19I4.O-5O.
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by the Dixey scheme engineers had resulted in the
construction of the Afyat Dam and in the completion of a
permanent well system at Giriftu. But a year later
Elliot himself reported that although the Dixey Soheme was
a success in constructing dams, pans and tanks in the
Degodia territory, the result of well-digging in the
initial stages were most disappointing. A largevnumber of
test wells were sunk in various parts of the Wajir District
but had to be abandoned - with the exception of the Giriftu
and El-Beu group of wells. Wells dug on the Uaso Nyiro
near Habaswein were reported by the Dixey Scheme Resident
Engineer to have been a failure."'" In addition, owing to
the shortage of staff and material little progress had been
made in Moyale, Mandera and Garissa Districts by the time
the scheme had terminated. The N.F.D. Somalia, far from
being impressed by the overall result of the scheme,
pointed out that apart from one or two wells, the British
administration had failed equally in the Post-War period
to provide a satisfactory solution to watering problems in
the N.F.D.2
As far as grazing problems were concerned the results
seemed better, although the Somalia themselves deny that
there was any benefit gained from this. In 19lj.9, a three-
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD l/5/ll Wajir Annual Reports 1950-65.
2. This conclusion was arrived at as a result of my
questionnaire in the Garissa District. Also the
disappointment of the N.F.D. Somalia with the outcome
of the Dixey scheme was obvious later on, when A.A.Lord,
the areas' Representative at the Legislative Council,
raised the question of the needs in the area for more
water for animals, for boreholes, dams and the expansion
of the Uaso Nyiro. (See Legco, Debates Vol. LXXXVII,
11-5 to 21-7-61).
year grazing control and water development scheme for each
District was approved by the African Land Utilization and
Settlement Board, and considerable progress was reported.
There was then a force of fifteen grazing guards in each
district. In addition to assisting the tribal police in
the prevention of trespass by members of one tribe on the
grazing preserves of another, it was their duty to assist
the elders to keep the stock away from the pastures in the
vicinity of the permanent waters after the rain. Substantial
progress was made towards a clearer definition of tribal
grazing areas and the more systematic control of the use
of dry and wet season pastures. In Mandera District an
order was made under the Special District Ordinance
excluding the Gurreh from grazing in the Murille country."'"
However, as was expected, the introduction of grazing
control measures was utterly opposed by the 'Alien* Soma lis
in Isiolo. They maintained that since the Government had
settled them in the Leasehold Area against their wishes,
it was wrong that they should be made to pay fees and brand
their stock as control measures. The principal reason behind
the objection to the proposal was that by branding stock
the Government would call a halt to the illegal cattle-trading
between the Leasehold Area, the Samburu and Mukogodo
Reserves, and the Meru Reserve. But despite the 'Alien'
Sorcalis' protest, the proposals put forward by Mr. Edwards
and Dr. Dixey concerning the regulation of grazing seemed
at least for a while to be workable.
1. K.N.A,/PC/NPD 1/1/9 Annual Reports 19^7-50.
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Yet, the provision of water supplies (even though
only to a very limited extent) and the implementation of
grazing rules were not the only factors in the lives of
the essentially pastoral Somalia in the N.F.D. One of
the many grievances put forward by the Somalia in the
pre-war period had been on the issue of stock marketing;
and the authors of the Post-War Development Plan for the
area did not leave the question untouched.
As far back as 1931 efforts were being made to
regulate trade between the N.F.D. Somalia and the Coast
Province. Trading posts were established at Mkowe (on the
mainland opposite Lamu Island). The P.O. of the-Coast
Province, Mr. Montgomery, endeavoured to persuade the Lamu
and Somali traders to send their stock by sea to Zanzibar
and thereby capture the meat market of that town from the
station operating at Kismayu. The firm of Messrs.
Cowasjee Dinshaw & Brothers was induced to run a ship, the
S.S. "Ayamonte", on approximately fortnightly trips up and
O
down the Coast. Unfortunately, the arrangement failed
owing to the fact that a consignment of Lamu oattle arriving
at Zanzibar was infected with rinderpest. Moreover, the
P.C. of the N.F.D., Mr. Stone, was of the opinion that no
attempt should be made to divert the Somali trade into any
particular channels. He submitted that cattle from the
N.F.D. should be allowed to proceed to Mombasa overland
1. The Italians had two ships plying between Kismayu and
Zanzibar, and the meat supplies of Zanzibar were almost
wholly in their hands.
2. K.N.A./C.'P. 37J4./II4. Movement of Somali Stock
P.C., Coast, to Chief Native Commissioner 13-10-1931.
218
from Garissa, Bura, etc. and should not be forced to go
td Lamu for export elsewhere. But it was found that
Somali stock arriving at Mombasa market by the land route
was in the poorest possible condition and thus could not
compete with the local supply. Naturally, local
authorities in Mombasa complained that the influx of Somali
cattle from the N.P.D. had completely spoilt their local
market.
In addition to the inability of the administration to
provide the right outlet for Somali cattle, it was
occasionally admitted that the Somalia, together with other
pastoral tribes in the area, had never been granted the
benefits of a veterinary service."'' Their stock population
had not been estimated with any approximate degree of
accuracy. Much illness, including major diseases such as
rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia existed, "uncontrolled or
controlled only to a limited extent by district administrative
officers, who cannot be expected to possess the necessary
technical knowledge or to have available the time required
for this purpose."^ As a result Somali cattle had always
suffered from diseases and there was a complete embargo on
export outside the Province. In addition to the problem
of routes and disease, Somali trade had also suffered from
the opposition from European farmers in the Rumuruti and
Laikipia areas, who themselves ranched native cattle and
1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/1+05 17009 Report of Tour and




who feared competition.-'' For these factors, Somali cattle
which was then estimated at approximately 800,000 head
and which could have been an item of no small importance
in the economy of the Colony, had suffered severely.
In the Post-War Five-Year Plan, the problem -of
Somali stock marketing was given a fair treatment.because
of the continuous criticism by experts that the N.F.D. was
not in fact a 'worthless desert* and that it could easily
have justified its existence by the export of cattle. It
was realized, though very late, that not only the greater
export of cattle would increase the purchasing power of
the people and raise the standard of living in the N.F.D.,
but that there was a need for meat in Kenya. It*was
definitely ascertained that in the Central Province meat
was needed, to ensure a better and more balanced diet for
the "natives"; "A good deal of the money which is paid
by the Kikuyu and others for our meat should be returned
to them in exchange for their grain which is required here
to make a better balanced diet for the pastoral nomads of
this territory."
In an attempt to pursue a better marketing policy a
stock Inspector had been posted permanently to the N.F.D.,
and he had made a good start in the Garissa District with
inoculations for rinderpest. A senior Research Officer
had also started a Veterinary Survey of the whole territory
and consideration was given to the marketing of sheep and
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/1/3 Handing-Over Reports 1'48-1950.
2. Ibid.
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goats. Camels were not, however, considered economic
beasts in the area.
But, on the other hand, the proposition put forward
by Mr. Daubrey, Director of Veterinary Services, and adhered
to by almost all the D.C's in the Province, which amounted
to the maintenance after the War of the machinery of the
livestock Control for the marketing of cattle, was far from
being welcomed by the Somalia. They had certain grievances
against these organizations during the War because they found
that prices paid locally by the Livestock Control*were
based upon those obtaining at the places where the animals
were required. This was unfair because in wartime the
demand for mutton necessitated the bringing in of sheep
from remote places like Mandera, and the tribesmen who
brought them had to bear not only their proportion of the
overhead expenses of the Supply Board, but also a proportion
of the oost of the heavy losses and freight charges involved
in transporting the animals over suoh long distances.
Once more the Somalia were burdened, to their
detriment, with the formation of two marketing organizations
in the post-war period, the Kenya Meat Commission (K.M.C.),
and later the African Livestock Marketing Organization
(A.L.M.O.), as government-controlled organizations for the
marketing of livestock. These two, naturally under pressure
from European stock-owning interests^did their best to
hid der
bvAaoktwuLi the movement of Somali cattle down country,
doubtless by raising once more the bogey of disease."'"
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 8/1/2 No. ADM 15/71/1477 C.F. Atkins,
Meeting of D.C's at Isiolo 30-9-1944*
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Moreover, it had taken the Meat Commission in some cases
a number of years to reach certain districts. In Mandera,
for example, the D.C., P.M. Gordon reported that the
Commission did not appear in the District for two years.
But even more important, the Somalia had bitterly complained
that the Meat Commission bought sheep and goats for an
average of about 20% below the price paid by the Kikuyu
and Meru butchers for some stock bought from them."'" The
'Alien' Somalia in Isiolo had suffered even more, and were
becoming poorer because stock trade had then passed into
O
the hands of the Meat Commission and the local tribesmen.
The situation was made even worse by the declaration of
the Emergency, which excluded the Kikuyu traders from
coming to the District and hence helped the Meat Commission
to tighten its grip on the Somalia.
The attitude of the Somalia to the A.L.M.O. which
was based in Isiolo, was by no means better than that shown
towards the K.M.C., especially by the 'Alien* Somalia who
conducted an endless agitation to permit the sale of stock
by private arrangements, or at 'open' auctions. This
point was later stressed by Somali representatives from
the N.F.D. in the Kenya Legislative Council. Ahmad Farah
stated in his first speeoh to the House on 6 May 1959,
"I want the Government to realise that the eoonomy
and the livelihood of the people are greatly
dependent on the sale of their stock and to pay
for their taxes etc., but anything that can be
done to make the restrictions on movement as small
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/I/I4. Desmond O'Hagen to R.G. Turnbull
Handing-Over Report 1951.
2. K.N.A./PQ/NFD Z/l/k R.G. Turnbull to J.W. Cusack
(H.O.R.) 1953.
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as possible will be greatly appreciated."1
Once more on the 10th May, Ahmad Farah repeated and
declared the attitude of the N.F.D. Somalia regarding
A.L.M.0.:-
"The African Livestock Marketing Organization
(A.L.M.O.) is unpopular as a Government monopoly.
It is appreciated that veterinary control of
stock movement is necessary to prevent disease
spreading, but why cannot people take their
stock from the Northern Province to the Central
Province to sell there under veterinary supervision
to any buyer that offers? Why is the A.L.M.O.
the middlemen? Why must Garissa sellers sell to
the Kenya Meat Commission middle-man and not to
direct purchasers?"
The same questions were asked and doubts cast by
his colleague AIL Aden Lord of the North Province East
Constituency in July 1961. Lord emphatically stressed
J
that the people in the N.F.D. had lost confidence in
A.L.M.O. and wanted free marketing and public auction
for their stock.^ But despite the repeated protests by
Somali members, the Government's policy and attitude to
the control of stock marketing through K.M.C. and A.L.M.O.
remained unchanged. They strictly believed that the
A.L.M.O. buying had given, and would continue to give, the
sellers a better price than they would otherwise get.^"
As a result, the Somalis remained completely dissatisfied
with the Government's solution to the marketing problem,
to almost the same degree as they were with the solutions
to the problems of water supply and grazing.
1. Kenya Legislative Council Debates: Official Reports,
Vol. LXXX, Part I, 21st April to 22nd May 1959'. pp. 507-8.
2. Ibid. Vol. LXXXV, 12th April to 22nd June I960.
3. Ibid. Vol. LXXXVII, Part II, 11-5 to 21-7-1961.
i|. East African Standard. 2-2-1960.
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Apart from the economic problems, the post-war period
had also necessitated solutions to the problems of the
social and general welfare of the Somalia in the N.P.D. In
the field of medical and health conditions, the N.P.D. had
equally suffered from years of neglect. This was due to
the mistaken notion that because the inhabitants of the
area lived in a desert they suffered hardly any diseases.
The Post-War Development Plan for the N.P.D. considered
the health aspect of the Province. It revealed that as a
result of a tour made by Dr. Paterson, then Director of
Medical Services, in 191+1, and by subsequent research that
there was in fact a great deal of disease, and what had
happened before was simply that, owing to the lack of proper
medical facilities the people did not come into Government
stations for treatment.1' Dr. Heisch, the Medical Officer
in charge began a survey in 191+2 and found a high' incidence
p
of disease especially on the Uaso Nyiro, Isiolo and Garissa.
At Moyale there was dysentry, typhoid, and relapsing fever.
There was also typhoid fever in the Mandera District. In
short, it was also realized - as with the other problems,
too late - that the Somalia were by no means healthy, and
that they were in desperate need of much more medical
attention.
A new hospital was then built in Wajir and small
hospitals built of permanent materials were erected at
Marsabit and Mandera. A semi-permanent building was
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/1/3 Handing-Over Reports 191+8-50.
2. K.N.A. /DC/MDA 3/1 Conf. Intelligence Reports 191+2.
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started at Moyale and another at Garissa. In Isiolo, a
temporary structure of sunbaked brick with an attached
roof had been built. Realizing how little medical help
the Somalia had acquired, the authors of the Post-War Plan
had recommended the enlarging of the existing medical
facilities in the Province and the setting up of more in
the various districts of the N.F.D. It was also"
recommended by all the D.C's, with the approval of the
Medical Officer in charge, that sixteen dispensaries should
be erected in the area. But to add to the existing
problems, the absence of literate tribesmen in the N.P.D.
because of the lack of schools made the recruitment of
hospital workers from local people an impossibility. The
difficulty arising out of this was obvious, in that other
Africans would probably find it very difficult to work
in a remote, undeveloped and climatically discouraging
territory.
But despite the recommendations embodied in the Post-
War Five-Year Plan, the problem of finding a solution to
the health question in the N.F.D. remained during the
following years. This was obvious from the continual
complaints put forward by the N.F.D. representatives in
the Legislative Council Debates. Ahmad Parah had in 1959
directed the attention of the Minister of Health to the
question of medical needs for the people of the Northern
Province. He stated that they had only one medical officer
in the whole Province which consisted of six Districts and
was inhabited by a population of approximately 500,000.
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He remarked, "With this in mind it is not surprising to
see here how we were forgotten people."^ He cited a living
example of a regrettable tragedy which had happened to a
loyal Somali chief of the Garissa District. While the
latter was travelling on official duty, he was suddenly
involved in a motoring accident about thirty miles from
the Garissa Township. As there was no medical officer
in Garissa, the patient had to be taken from the town all
the way to Thika where he died. Hence, the member asked
for an increase in the number of doctors, transport, and
dispensaries, and for the provision of mobile medical
units in the most remote areas. The same plea was repeated
in speeches by Ahmad Farah himself, by Ali Aden Lord in
1961 and by Abd ar-Rashid Khalif in 1962 but according to
Somali informants on the spot nothing positive resulted.
So far as the questions of water supply, grazing,
stock marketing and provision of medicsl facilities for the
N.F.D. Somalia were concerned, the Somalia were very
disappointed with the outcome of the Post-War Development
plan. Moreover, the promise by the Governor of the Colony,
Sir Philip Mitchell, that the war efforts of the tribesmen
of the N.F.D. were to be followed by substantial works -
including the expenditure of £500,000 on water supplies,
extensive improvement in medical and educational services
p
and trade facilities, - proved a dream that never came true.
It was in the field of education that Somalia *
1. Leg Co. Reports, Vol. LXXX, 26th May to 19th June 1959
29-5-1959.
2. East African Standard. (Newspaper Cuttings) "The Governor^
visit to N.F.D. and Turkana" 28-2-19U7. '
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disappointment was greatest and, too, much more justifiable.
The position of the education of Somali children in the
1920's previously discussed in the third chapter of the
thesis, did not see any positive change up to the period
of the war. With the exception of the B.C.M.S. Mission
school at Marsabit which started in 1931 with three European
supervisors, followed by the start of the Isiolo Veterinary
Training Centre which was meant to enable the pupils to take
statistics of ghee (Somali butter) production in 1933»"*" no
systematic Government education was given in the whole
area, before the 1914-0's.
It was not until 191+2 that Gerald Reece, the Officer-
in-Charge of the N.P.D., was able to report that
consideration was being given to the question of education.
Mr. Lacey, the then Director of Education, visited Isiolo
and Wajir and made certain recommendations which were not
adopted for some time later. Then Mr. Chaundy (the
education officer from Kapengura) also visited Isiolo,
Wajir and Garissa. As a result of his recommendations It
was then decided to start experimental schools. Temporary
bandas were put up at Balambala - on the Tana River - for
the Riverine Bantu tribes, and at Isiolo for the 'Alien'
Somalia children. At the Isiolo one, however, no progress
was possible because the Education Department could not
find a teacher. The Somalia were not educated and the
Africans and Arabs were presumably reluctant to work in the
1. This was closed in 1931+ and the children were returned
to their homes.
2. K.N.A ,/PC/NFD 1/1/8 G. Reece Annual Reports 191+0-1+6.
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N.P.D. and among the arrogant Somalia. In addition to this,
the Standing Finance Committee was always reluctant to spend
on Somali education. They rejected the proposal by the
former Director of Education for the building of a school
at Wajir at the cost of £l+,000. And when a change was
made and the money was voted for the erection of the school
in 191+5* Public Works Department were unable to build it
owing to other commitments.^
The authors of the Five-Year Development Plan for the
N.F.D. had, as with other aspects of the advancement of the
Somali, realized after nearly thirty-five years of
administration that something should be done for Somali
children, as some definite progress in connection with
education was long overdue. It was also realized that
little progress could be made with local self-government
until there were a certain number of local tribesmen who
were literate. There was a desperate need for clerks
for office work, tax clerks for the Chiefs, literate
p
interpreters, and foremen for a variety of tasks. The
thi'ee Local Native Councils that had been started had to be
managed by outsiders owing to the lack of educated local
tribesmen.
Since exactly the same education problem existed in
British Somaliland, and where the authorities there had
already made a good start under the guidance of an officer
from the Kenya Education Department, it was proposed to
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/8 Annual Reports 191+0-1+6.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/1/8 Banding-Over Reports 191|.8-50.
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adopt the same scheme as that of Somaliland in the N.F.D.
Brigadier Fisher, the Military Governor of British
Somaliland, wrote in his Annual Report for I9I4.3:-
"The result of this neglect of education, is now
most embarrassing to the administration, which
must depend, even in the subordinate ranks of
its service, on assistance imported very
expensively from outside. We are impeded at every
turn by the lack of trained and educated,Somalis
in all branches of Government activity."
The neglect of education in British Somaliland could,
to some extent, be justified by the continuous opposition
from the religious sheikhs there; but the case of the N.F.D.
was completely different. Both the Somalia and the officials
in charge of affairs in the N.F.D. had increasingly expressed
a deep desire for learning among the inhabitants in the area,
and were anxious that the Somalia should obtain the benefits
of education like the rest of the Colony.^
The proposals embodied in the Five-Year Plan for the
N.F.D. maintained that it was preferable to concentrate,
to begin with, on Wajir, being a suitable place as a
principal education centre in the N.F.D. Also, judging
by the experience in Somaliland, it was suggested that
attention should be given to boys who were likely subsequently
to become civil servants or to follow some other vocation for
which there was an urgent need in the territory, thus
enabling them to learn the work of policemen, clerks,
veterinary, medical, or agricultural assistants, teachers,
artisans, and mechanics etc. On the other hand, it was
1. Quoted in PC/NFD 2/1/8 Handing-Over Reports 1914-0-50.
2. See Chapter III where the education problem was
discussed in the pre-war period.
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planned to have schools for boys at all other district
headquarters where they would be taught the elements of
suitable introductory subjects with a veterinary or
agricultural bias. Moreover, the tendency of the Soma lis
to move to the urban centres in the colony was realized,
and provision was made for their education in the available
schools in the towns where they usually settled.
But the future educational plan for the N.F.D.
did not in fact copy the British Somaliland example which
in the main centred round the subsidizing of the Quranic
schools maintained by the Sheikhs and Mallims. In the
N.P.D., these schools, which constituted the only form of
education for the Somalis up to the World War II, were
criticised because they provided only a very scanty
education for the boys. The pupils were merely taught
verses from the Quran, whioh they had to learn by heart
without even knowing what they actually meant. This
situation was, however a natural outcome of the fact that
rsc Ytd
the N.P.D., as previously a&weuoeiftd, was for a long time a
closed district. Consequently, no contact was made between
the Somalis and their religious sheikhs in the N.P.D. on one
side, and those in bigger centres in the Somalilands or the
Moslem coast of Kenya on the other. At least contact
between the Somalia and the Ribat al-Riyadha"^ (Mosque College)
1. Ribat al-Riyadha or the Mosque College of Lamu was started
in 1310/1892 by Habib Salih Jamalil Lail of the famous
religious family of the A1 Ba-Alawi hadrarai Sheriffs
residents in Lamu township and islands in the North East
Corner of Kenya. Por the history of the College and its
founders see (l) Peter Lienhardt, "The Mosque College of
Lamu and its Social Background", Tanganyika Notes and
Records. Vol. 53, October 1959, pp. 228-2L2. (2) Mahassin
A.G.H. El-Safi, "Some Contributions - of Swahili Poetry to
the Understanding of the History of the North Coast of
Kenya", unpublished Seminar Paper. (Department of History
University College, Nairobi), April 1970, pp.lO-lij..
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at Lamu on the Kenya Coast could have improved the
educational prospects of the Somali boys, and could have
prepared them for a more sound system of education in the
future. In view of all these factors, the type of Islamic
education provided by the bush schools in the N.F.D. was
generally very poor. For this reason it was decided - since
it was impossible to supervise these schools, and since it
would probably be unwise for political reasons to interfere
with them - to leave them alone.
In I9I4.6, a government African Primary School was
started in Isiolo for fifty sons of the Ishaq and Herti
Somalis who lived there. It was put under the able
headmastership of Sheriff Khullatein, who was on secondment
from the Eduoation Department of Zanzibar, Rapid progress
was reported in the school by the end of the year and
several boys were studying English together with religious
instruction."'' In 191^7 another school for Somalis was started
in Garissa to accommodate forty boys, and work was started
on building a school at Wajir which was completed in October
of the same year. The school which had thirty boys, ten
of whom were resident, was also supervised by Shariff
Khullatein. His emphasis on religious observance and
good manners amongst the pupils had been realised and praised
by the Somalis.
The building of Government schools continued in the
subsequent years. In Garba Tulla a Local Native Council
School banda was completed in 1914.8. In 19l4-9» the Wajir
Primary School had both Standards I and II, and so did the
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/8 Annual Reports I9I4.O-I4.6.
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Garissa school. In Islolo the Government Primary School
was supervised by Muhammad Salira, assisted by Abdallah Aden
and Muhammad Mahmoud. But the problem of obtaining teachers
for these schools had always been difficult. This was clear
when Sheriff Khullatein had to go on leave in 1950* a*id no
similar teacher was found to replace him at the Wajir school;
and "rather than risk lowering the prestige of th6 school
which has been very high with the tribesmen since its
inception in 19l;8 therefore it was decided to close the school
for the remaining two terms,""'' The difficulty was that
Somali teachers proved unreliable, and, as school in the
Coast Province had been expanding rapidly, it had been very
difficult to obtain good Arab teachers from that Province.
The question of obtaining teachers from other parts proved
equally difficult because the Somalia generally despised
p
Kikuyu teachers and presumably other African tribes too.
In addition it seemed that the Ministry of Education was
reluctant to pay monthly wages to teachers.-^ For all
these reasons the problem of finding good teaohers for the
newly started Somali schools was a serious one.
Besides the above limitations, the officials on the
spot in the N.F.D. were anxious to introduce different
educational measures in the area which by no means helped
to satisfy the hungry needs of the Somalis. In his Handing-
Over report to R.G. Turnbull, the D.C. O'Hagen maintained
that what the Somalis needed at the beginning stage was not
1. K.N.A./PC/HP® 1/1/9 Annual Reports 191)7-50.'
2. K.N. A ,/PC/NFD 1/1/10 R.G. Turnbull 19-5-1951;.
3. K.N.A./PC/GRSSA 8/li)./2 D.C. Wajir to P.C. Northern
Province 18-1).-1963.
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a large number of schools but a few, efficiently equipped
ones."*" This was, in a practical outlook, except that
the reason he gave for it was unacceptable as far as the
Somalia were concerned. He maintained, "It is mopt important
that we should not educate the tribespeople in such a way
that they will no longer be able to live their traditional
lives in the hard conditions maintaining in this Province."
This he further explained would tempt the educated Somalia
to live in towns where there would be no work for them and
would no longer be accustomed to the traditional diet.
On the other hand, O'Hagen was of the opinion that
whilst the policy elsewhere in the Province was only to
educate above Standard IV that number of boys who could be
absorbed into useful employment with the Government or
trade, the policy in the Leasehold area should be to educate
all the children of 'Alien' Somalia so that they could seek
useful employment down country and not lead a life of sitting
in the coffee shops of Isiolo. But this policy of
favouritism towards the turbulent 'Alien'Somali seemed
short-lived. R.G. Turnbull reported in 1952 that the
Government African School at Isiolo had to be closed for an
indefinite period, the reason being that the Master Muhammad
Salim had been found to have "most unorthodox extra-mural
diversions."^ He was accordingly dismissed.
While the N.P.D. Somalia both local and 'Alien* were
struggling to win a place in the educational possibilities
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/1/1+. O'Hagen to R.G. Turnbull June 1951 •
2. Ibid.
3. K.N.A,/PC/NPD l/l/lO R.G. Turnbull Annual Reports
1951-51+.
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offered in the Colony, their kin in the other urban centres,
especially Nairobi, reverted to self-help in order to gain
some sort of education. In 195^, the Eastleigh Somalia
started a school to provide the basic needs of education.
Celebrating its first anniversary in September 1955*
R.G. Turnbull, then chief Secretary, maintained that though
the school did not conform to Government standards, it was
solving a grave social problem. He further described it as
the first example of self-help and real application to the
task in hand that he had seen.'1' Turnbull paid special
tribute to Dr. Yusuf Ali Eraj, a Nairobi medical practitioner
and a Pakistani, who had played an instrumental part in the
O
establishment of the school by collecting the money needed.
By the close of the fifties, the Somali call for more
education was achieving new dimensions, with the growing
wave of nationalism in the Somali world. With the concept
of "Greater Somalia in their minds, and having seen and
heard that education in Somalia was much more advanced, the
Somalia did not hesitate to press for more education.
Moreover, in Kenya itself, the Somalia were already aware
that the Bantu tribes were so much ahead of them in this
field that they had for a long time been able to group
themselves into ftprmidable political parties, where they
were able to make their voices and grievances heard.
1. East African Standard, "Somalia Appeal for Greater School
lid7^ 19-9-1955.
2. Later iti 1957 the Government the Naivasha Primary School
for the Nairobi Somalia with Standard V and VI. It was
later developed into a secondary school.
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Unfortunately for the Somalia, the battle for
education, as in the issues of economy and other fields of
social welfare, did not lead to any positive results.
Shariff Khullatein, with all his experience in Somali
education in the N.F.D., and as a nominated membep of the
Legislative Council for the area, in 1958 pleaded for the
Somali case. He told the House, "We started schools there
about twelve years ago but, since then, we had only one
1 ^
intermediate school." Ahmad Farah who succeeded him as a
member, repeated the same appeal in 1959. A year later
their points of view were enhanced by Mr. Coutts, the
Acting Governor, who visited the N.F.D. after eighteen years.
V
Coutts remarked that
"No longer interested merely in a subsistence way
of life, the people of Kenya's Northern Province
were looking to the future andptaking an interest
in the problem of education."
In 1961, Ali Aden Lord, the first elected member for the
Council to represent the N.F.D. once more echoed his
colleague's demand for education, and stated,
"We badly need more primary schools in places like
El-Wak, Ramu, Lashanis, Bura, Tarbaj, Habaswein,
Ijara, Sakha, Merti and all trading centres, and
my people are ready to help in this work....We need
also intermediate schools in every district and of
course we must have one secondary school in the whole
Province. We also need a trade school and adult
education.
The situation was by no means better in the following year
1. Legco. Debates, Vol. LXXVI, Part I, 15 April to i; June
1958. p. 632.
2. East African Standard, "Nomadic Tribes of Northern
Province turn to Education" 2-2-1960 p.5.
3. Legco, Vol. LXXXVII, Part I, 11-5 to 21-7-1961.
pp. 571-72.
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as was obvious from Abd ar-Rashid Khalif*s words to the
Council,
"The people of the N.P.D. have been left behind
in the dark ages and they are living in ignorance
and disease till today. That is because of the
isolation and neglect of the Government of Kenya
and the Ministry of Education in the past..."
Thus, it was obvious that on the eve of Independence
the N.P.D. Somalia were far from satisfied about their
economic and social position in the Colony. Although the
Post-War Five-Year Development Plan was full of criticism
for past policies and also full of suggestions for remedying
the situation, the central Government in Nairobi seemed very
slow to carry out any plans for the immediate development
of the area. The result was that the call for "Greater
Somalia" which originated in Mogadishu had found fertile
ground among the dissatisfied Somalia of the N.P.D. and
not only had the wave of Nationalism which swept through
the Colony after the War left its marks upon the Somalia,
but also the existing state of affairs, resulting from
lack of political, economic and social cohesion with the
rest of the country, helped to enrich the call for
secession from Kenya and the joining of the newly formed
Somali Republic in the 1960's.
1. Legco., Vol. LXXXXIX, 8-5 to 27-7-1962 p. 1387.
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Chapter VI
Islam. Politics, and the Rise of Nationalism among
the Kenya Somalia
As related in the previous chapter the Kenya Somalia
were, until the post-war period, suffering from neglect and
ignorance. Owing to this, the "Greater Somalia" concept
which flourished in Mogadishu found a ready appeal among
them. However, besides the social and economic grievances,
the Kenya Somali nationalism had its deeper routes dating
back to the start of the British administration in-Jubaland
in the late nineteenth century. In order to understand
fully the origin of the movement it is important to trace
the factors which helped the development of the concept of
"Greater Somalia".
In almost all the Moslem countries in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, politics, Islam and the rise of
nationalism were hardly separable; as was the case with
the movements of Uthman Dan Fodio among the Fuljanis in
West Africa and that of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi in the
Sudan. Among the Somalia, Islam had also provided a
unifying force for the otherwise scattered population and
resulted in the movement of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan
in British Somaliland between 1898-1920. The latter,
while unlike the Sudanese Mahdi, did not live to establish
a theocratic state,^had, however,laid the foundation for the
concept of a united Somali nation which was then adopted by
the Somali Youth League in the post-war period.
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The sense of unity among the Somalis which emerged
in the movement of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan, was
inherent in the teaching of the distinguished class of
men of God known among the Somalis as Wadads or sheikhs.
These religious sheikhs play an important role in teaching
the young the Quran and elements of faith, solemnizing
marriage and ruling according to the Shariah, in matrimonial
disputes and inheritance, assessing damages for injury,
and generally directing the religious life of the community."'"
More important still, these religious leaders were
significant in their opposition to two of the basic elements
O
of Somali life - tribalism and blood money. In short,
those sheikhs had constantly preached the message of
brotherhood and hence initiated the concept of Islam as a
unifying force among the Somalis. This is the most
important factor in the teachings of the brotherhoods or
"Tariqas" (the way) which expresses the Sufi or mystical"!,
view of the Muslim faith. These orders contributed to
the national unity through Islam among the Somalis because
they cut across tribal and sectional rivalries in a society
where centralized political units were lacking.^ Prominent
among these tariqas were the Qadiriya, the oldest ord9r in
Islam; and the Ahmadiya, which was an offshoot of the
1. See I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland,
(London, 1963), p. 15.
2. Robert L. Hess, "The Poor Man of God - Muhammad Abdullah
Hasan" Leadership in Eastern Africa: Six Political
Biographies. (Boston, 1968), p. 72. ™
3. See I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland.
(London, 1965), pp. 63-91.
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Salihiya and the Dandarawiya.
The Somali national here,, Muhammad Abdille Hasan
was himself a disciple of Sayyid Muharrmad Salih, the founder
of the Salihiya tariqa in Mecca. The former was also
responsible for the spread of the teaching of the Salihiya
tariqa among the Somalia since 1895• His movement, as
S. Touval observed, was essentially religious and its
ultimate objection was the imposition of the Salihiya
precepts and way of life upon the population. But to attain
that objection, political means were necessary. The
political struggle inevitably had nationalist ingredients,
and the ultimate religious objection of the movement had
certain nationalistic aims as their corollaries."^" The mixed
aims of the movement were obvious when besides the religious
motivation the Sayyid himself on several occasions spoke of
grievances that the Somalia knew best, "the drought, the
rinderpest, the British military, who were exporting
animals for the war against the Mahdi - the holy man of the
p
Sudan to whom God had given victory."
In his quest to spread his religious and nationalistic
message, Muhammad Abdille Hasan did not hesitate to invite
all the Somalia in the different territories - in Ethiopia,
Italian Somaliland and Kenya (then East Africa Protectorate)
to join his movement. His emissaries and letters to the
1. S. Touval, "The Mullah", Somaliya: Antologia Storioo-
Culturale. p. 39.
2. Leo Silberman, "The "Mad" Mullah - Hero of Somali
Nationalism", History Today. Vol. X, No. 8, I960,
PP. 523-3U-
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Jubaland Somalia resulted in a number of movements to
enhance his posit ion. Ashgar, the Herti "Mullah" had
started an unsuccessful movement among the Jubaland
Somalia in 1905. An even more serious attempt to enhance
the "Mullah's" position was manifested in the revolt by
Abd ar-Rahman Mursal, an Aulihan Ogaden Somali in 1916
p
which resulted in the sack of Serenli. But as it was
stated previously, although these movements were serious
attempts to strengthen the "Mullah's" movement in the North,
the East African Somalia of Jubaland were then too widely
divided, and too much immersed in inter-tribal rivalries
to join in a mass and united movement against the British
administration. This lack of unity among the Somalia at
the end of the 1920*s had therefore prevented the growth
of a national movement which could have strengthened the
case of the "Mullah" and changed the face of Somali history.
However, it was the aftermath of the Mursal revolt
and the general situation in Jubaland in the post-War period
(which was distinguished with continued movements
exhibiting distinct Islamic flavour in the Province) that
resulted in considerable concern by the British
administrative officials as to the position of the Moslem
Somalis in that corner of the Protectorate. The Jubaland
Province was then a corner where the British administration
had suspeoted the existence of a potential Islamic movement
1. See Chapter I pp. 5^-56.
2. See Chapter I for more on Ashgar and Mursal's movements.
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which might have aimed at the shaking of British rule.
This was obvious when in September 20th 1917# a circular
letter was addressed to the Provincial Commissioners all
over the Protectorate setting forth the theories held on
the subject of the influence of Mtthammadanism, and the
Pan-African ideal of the "Ethiopian Church", on the future
of the administration of the Protectorate.
The circular warned that the participation*of
"natives" of British East Africa in the campaign in German
East Africa, whether as soldiers or as porters, had given
rise to possible feelings of dissatisfaction with British
rule. The service of these men had enabled them to
enlarge their ideas by contact with "natives" of other
African dependencies. Certain of the men who returned
would have become acquainted with the Pan-African ideal of
the Ethiopian Church, with native politics from Abyssinia
and for the first time in the history of the Protectorate,
"a conception may have arisen in the native mind of the
possibilities of a black Africa.The ciroular then
directed the attention to an important aspect
"It is in connection with a native conception of the
idea "Africa for the African" that any conjunction
of Islamic propaganda is to be regarded as a real
danger. Islam would provide a cementing factor,
and the consequent fanaticism would enormously
increase both the military and political difficulty
in dealing with such a movement. Converts are
notoriously fanatical...In Eastern Africa Islam has
tended to consider itself a political as much as a
spiritual force, and there has recently been
noticeable a tendency on the part of the natives to
call themselves members of the Mohammedan nation."




Looking through the replies of the P.0*3 of all
the Provinces concerned with the above circular, it was
noticeable that in most of them the administration was
content that at that time there was no ground for supposing
that a conception of the possibilities of a black"Africa
had arisen yet in the minds of the "natives" of the
protectorate."1" However, an exception was made of "certain
more advanced Somalia" who together with Swahilis had
attempted the conversion of some "natives" in the township
areas. Moreover it was observed that Muhammadan influence
was even more marked with the Somalia in Jubaland than
was the case with the Arab Coast. In Jubaland the Somalia
were without exception Moslems and Islam plays an important
part in the lives of the people. For this reason it was
supposed that:-
"the idea of "Africa for the African" perhaps exists
there in a subdued form, and it seems possible that
the idea would find active expression were it not
for the fact that so many different schools of
Mohammedanism are practised that there exists high
inter-tribal feeling based on religious differences.
It is, however, possible that the effect of the
opportunities of contact with other African natives
afforded by the war may produce a fusion of the
sects and introduce a more orthodox form of
religion."2
Thus, Islam and the Somalia were seen as a real danger
to the British position in the Protectorate. It was feared
that the fusion of the concept of Pan-Africanism with the
possible unity preached by the Moslem Somalia would result
in another Mahdism in East Africa. The Somalia were then




subjected to a gradual policy of alienation from the rest
of the country. First from the Galla, among whom,
"indications of some kind of a religious movement.."'1' was
already observed. Also the policies which followed, like
the advocacy of the Galla rights against those of the Somalis
and the marking of the Galla Somali line, were all steps
in that direction.
In addition to the above, the Colonial Office was
in favour of closer watch over the Somalis by means of
travelling Commissioners moving with and amongst them.
This was found essential, because otherwise new ideas might
have taken shape in the minds of both the Moslem and pagan
tribes in their vicinity without the Government being aware
of it in good time. The Governor concluded his appeal to
the Colonial Office by saying,
"Owing to the natives unprecedented intercourse with
outside influences, it is particularly important that
we should be familiar with what is going on in the
native areas."
It was also against this anticipated political movement
among the Somalis that a closer watch was observed over the
Somalis in Jubaland and later the N.F.D. where both were
subjected to military administration in contrast to the
rest of the country.
For the same reason, religious sheikhs among the
Somalis of the N.F.D. were greatly watched and restricted.
Members of the Salihiya Tariqa in places like Gerba Tulla
1. Ibid.
2. P.R.O./c.O. 533/196 Secret Bowring to Lang [(.-11-1919.
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were for some time the target for the British officials.
The latter Tariqa was started in 1921 in Garba Tulla under
the prominent Salihi Sharif Ali. Because of his movement
between Somalia, Mecca and other centres where the Tariqa
flourished, he left his missipn under the protection of a
certain Sheikh Ahmad Aden who was actively proselytizing
among the Boran and Sakuye. The P.O. of the Northern
Frontier District had once complained that, "they preach
anti-government doctrines and smuggle ivory over to the
Italians.""1" The result was that they were threatened
with the movement of their centre from Garba Tulla to Wajir
or otherwise their mission would be closed.
In other parts of the N.F.D. similar orders were also
carefully watched. In Moyale, Sheikh Yusuf, a prominent
Degodia, a religious figure with a large following and a
tariqa was several times subjected to police action.
Sheikh Ali Abdi Nur - a Gurreh of the Darawa section - who
moved from the Lorian Swamp to Mandera and who emphatically
opposed the issue of registration certificates and the
payment of poll tax by Somalia, was the target for the
administrative officials. The man, as the D.C. reported,
"visits Mecca regularly and is considered to be an
extremely holy and influential person, was a pupil
and is regarded as the successor of the famous
Sheikh Ali Nairobi."
At the same time the N.F.D. administration got hold
of Sheikh Haji Abd ar-Rahman, the son of the late "Mad Mullah"
of Somaliland and gave him the post of Registrar bf
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/l/l Handing-Over Reports 1927.
2. K.N.A./DC/MLE 3/I4. Intelligence Reports 1-1-1928.
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Mohammadan Marriages and Divorces at Wajir, in order that
his activities and movements might be checked. He was
reported to be of "doubtful character and bad antecedents
On the decision by the Government to introduce poll tax in
the N.F.D., he was reported to have produced,
"a cousin, a follower of the late Mullah, and sent
him into the bush to preach and pray for the
failure of the Government to introduce poll tax."
The latter was ordered to leave the District and was escorted
out of it. Being offended at his cousin*s treatment, Haji
Abd ar-Rahman Mursal declared his intention of going on a
pilgrimage to Mecca obviously with the intention of not
returning. The D.C., feeling relieved, commented, "he
had removed himself from the Province and his loss need
not be regretted."-^ In addition to the accusations by
British officials against these religious sheikh', they were
later occasionally accused of spreading Italian propaganda
in the District on the eve of the War and were thus
gradually discharged.
However, despite the continuous fear by the British
<1 •
,
administrators in Kenya that the Somalia - through the
Islamic media - were going to wreck their position after
achieving a sort of unity by the fusion of the concepts of
Muhammadanism and Pan-Africanism, this did not prove to be
true when the Somalia contemplated a political movement.
When the spell of Somali nationalism spread to the Kenya
Somalia, it was by no means directly through the religious




sheikhs or the tariqas,'1' nor did it at any stage
contemplate a fusion with the other movements among the
Bantu tribes except on very rare occasions. Despite this,
the British officials had occasionally suspected a holy war
'Jihad' preached by the leaders of the existing political
parties. In fact the post-war Somali nationalism although
based on the concept of "Greater Somalia" which had its roots
in the movement of Muhammad Abdille Hasan forty-six years
ago, was essentially a political movement. Religious
sheiks and members of tariqas had whole-heartedly embraced
the concept of "Greater Somalia" which had flourished in
the post-war period but their support did not amount to a
call for a holy war. The movement was more of a Pan-Somali
than Pan-Islamic or Pan African nature.
Kenya Somali nationalism was mainly an offshoot of
the concept of "Greater Somalia" embraced by the Somali
Club (later Somali Youth League) which was formed.on the
15th of May 19k3 in Mogadishu. Its professed aim was to
unite all Somalia living in the Horn of Africa, to increase
educational facilities, to help the sick and poor and to
O
foster the Muhammadan religion. The idea behind the
1. I.M. Lewis had even stated that, "politicians and officials
are not, as a whole, in sympathy with the tariqa movements
which they view with clanship as a dividing force in
Somali Society", see I.M. Lewis, "Modern Political Movements
in Somaliland , II, Africa. Vol. XXVIII, 1958, p. 36.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/9 1914.7 Annual Report; The S.Y.L. was
greatly encouraged by Ernest Bevin's plea for a 'Greater
Somalia', a concept which he advocated after the war
(See Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, pp. 63, 67, 68, 69).
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formation of the club, although appearing at first to be
primarily philanthropic, had gradually grown to be
essentially political and nationalistic. Moreover, with
the projected aim of the unity of all Somalia dispersed in
Kenya, Ethiopia and French Somaliland, Somali nationalism
in the post-war period had obviously constituted a
challenge to the territorial integrity of both Kenya and
Ethiopia. The danger lies, as I.M. Lewis explained, in the
difference of the understanding of the meaning of.nationalism
to the Somalia on one hand and the other African states on
the other. He saw the conflict inherent in:-
"the Somali concept of culturally defined national
identity, an identity which is part of their
traditional heritage, and the rather different
concept of a territorially defined nationality,
embracing different tribal and language groups,
current in most of the other ex-colonies of Africa...
In Kenya and Ethiopia the Somali nationalists appear
as secessionists engaged in a separatist struggle
with far reaching, and ultimately menacing'implications
for the stability of other African states."
This conflict had ever since resulted in the
continuous troubles between the Kenya Somalia and the central
Government in Nairobi on one side and between the Kenya
Government and the Somali Republic on the other. In Kenya
the idea of a united Somali nation advocated by the Somali
1. I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland. Preface;
The conflict is also inherent as A.A. Mazrui explained,
in the paradoxical wedding together of the concepts of
identity and human dignity at the centre of African
nationalistic thought. He stated:-
"The relationship is perhaps something of a paradox.
After all, when a man seeks his own identity he is
seeking those qualities which distinguish him from
other men. But when he is concerned with asserting
his human dignity, he is referring to those qualities
which he shares with other men."
See A.A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Afrioana; A Study of
Ideology and Ambition. (London, 1967)» P«
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Youth League (S.Y.L.), had already by the beginning of I9I4.7
had the greatest appeal to the Somalia in the N.F.D.; and
branches of the League were started in Wajir, Mandera,
Isiolo, Garissa, Moyale and Marsabit. At first it was
supposed that only the town folk joined, they held weekly
meetings and drill parades and confined their activities
ostensibly to philanthropic works.1 But later on in the
year, membership increased rapidly amongst the tribesmen
and government employees. At this juncture, the British
officials who were constantly worried about the prospect
of a potential Islamic movement among the Somalia, feared
that the League might turn into a fanatical Muslim Society;
'Its leaders claimed divine aspirations and preached that
a 'jihad* or holy war was nigh, which would rid the
country of all the infidels."^ But, their fears dwindled
when they realized that members of Christian and pagan
African tribes such as the Amhara, Borji, and Boran were
enrolled as members.
The progress of the S.Y.L. was so rapid that the
D.C. Garissa reported that one hospital dresser from Wajir
had managed successfully to recruit, "nearly all the tribal
police, Somali Kenya police and other African government
servants were soon favourite recruits.By May the S.Y.L.
increased its membership in Garissa township alone to about
3J4.O members and funds stood at Shs. 3700 and by the end of
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/9 Annual Report 1914-7.
2. Ibid.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/7/3 Garissa Annual Reports 1914-7.
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the year it spread to the rest of the country. This
increased activity was largely due to the fact that Garissa
lies on the main road from Mogadishu to Nairobi thus
receiving much of the League*s propaganda through the weekly
mail service. Moreover, the Garissa leaders proved
skilful enough not to attempt any direct attack on the
Government headmen at that stage, but in a skilful way
they persuaded the tribesmen that in future all matters
relating to Somalia such as tribal disputes, affrays, civil
debts and bride price should come under the jurisdiction of
the chosen leaders of the League instead of the headmen.
By the end of December 19lj-7, it was reported that the
leaders were so confident in the popularity of the move
and they declared that "their aims were not only philanthropic
but were chiefly directed towards fitting their members to
take over the Government of their country at an early date."*
This political aspect of the League was further stressed by
the visit of the president of the Wajir branch in September
of the same year to Mogadishu where it was agreed that the
Kenya branches should be financially independent but should
remain under the control of Mogadishu as regards policy.
The leaders of the S.Y.L. had further found a ready
ground for the spread of their political aims by the
mounting discontent among the Somalia owing to the lack of
progress in their economic and social welfare. They
complained more vigorously against fixed barriers between
1. K.N.A,/PC/NPD 1/1/9 Annual Report
2. Ibid.
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the different tribes of the same race, the limited amount
of wells and water-pans at their disposal; and the bad
state of grazing. The P.G. remarked,
"The Somali Youth League has made political capital
out of this by propaganda to the effect that as soon
as it comes into power there will be no intertribal
boundaries but all Somalia will live together happily
and wander at will throughout the Horn of Africa."
He added,
"at the present propaganda of this kind is.calculated
to do the,greatest possible harm to the Somali
nation."
As the political aspirations of the League were
gradually being expressed, the number of recruits through¬
out the Province was growing rapidly. In 1914-7 a meeting
house was built in Mandera where membership was said to be
particularly strong among the Murulle wealthy and
sophisticated classes and the Eil-Wak Gurreh. A school
was started by the branch and was reported to be "the most
successful enterprise taken". Instruction was mainly in
literacy and English and it was admitted that some of the
younger members had genuinely benefitted from it. As with
the case of other branches, the British officials were
apprehensive of the Leagued activities; its membership
especially increased in the District. The D.C. remarked:-
"The danger, however, if the Mandera branch should
at any time become actively hostile to Government
can be appreciated when it is reflected that not
only are numerous headmen members but also many of
the Kenya Polioe who are local tribesmen and" a few of
the tribal police have joined. Many of the most
influential and more sophisticated-members of the
community have joined its ranks." *
1. Ibid.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/3/2 Annual Reports, Mandera 1914-7-
3. Ibid.
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In Isiolo, too, where the more politically conscious
"Alien' Somalis resided, the League's activities did not
escape attention. The League had exerted a real influence
in the District with branches at Merti, Muddu G'ashi and
Sericho. At these centres, the leaders were actively
involved in converting the Boran to its doctrines, and
not without some measure of success. They seemed to have
"captured the interest of a number of the more sophisticated
Boran shopkeepers and headmen with the result that the Boran
rank and file in the Sericho area began to join the League."'*'
And when the Government declared the League a political
society, the Ishaq and Herti of the District were given
the choice of either resigning their posts as Government
headmen, or severing their allegiance to the League; both
preferred the former. So, with the rising tide of national
consciousness in the Province, the Ishaq, Herti, together
with the Ogaden to the east, led by the powerful Muhammad
Zubeir section, joined hands and enhanced the position of
the S.Y.L.
By the beginning of 19l;.8, it became clear to the
Government that the League was definitely aiming at something
more than just philanthropy. Complaints by officials that
all over the N.P.D., the activities of the S.Y.L. had
"threatened to bring the normal administration of the Somali
areas to a standstill,"^ became so frequent that the P.G.
pointed out that, "an attitude of neutrality, aiming in the
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/9 Annual Reports 1914-7-
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/9 Annual Reports 191-1-8.
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direction of hostility rather than friendliness, should be
shown towards the club>" and added that he did not wish
officers to attend the club meetings, with the exception of
police officers who might be instructed to attend on duty.
The P.G. stressed the importance of gaining more information
about the League and advised the D.C's that"they could have,
within reason, as much money as they required for intelligence
purposes.
By the middle of May 191^.8 it was obvious to the
administration that the aims of the League, though still
described by League officials as being charitable and social,
had become violently politioal and that was accepted both
by the members of the League and those tribesmen who
remained aloof from it. No doubt the League's activities
had presented a real threat to the administration of the
Somali areas and to the maintenance therein of the authority
of the Government. The situation was reported to be
particularly serious in Garissa District "where normal
administrative work had been brought virtually to a stand¬
still."^ After a final warning to the Garissa branch about
their interference in the administration of the District
had been ignored, the branch was declared by the governor-
in-council to be an unlawful society and the announcement
of the proscription was made at Garissa by the P.G. on
June 6th of the same year. An inquiry under the provisions
of the Special Districts Ordinance was held into the
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 8/1/2 Minutes of D.C's Meeting - N.P.
Isiolo 15-11-19^8.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD l/L/9 Annual Reports 191^8.
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activities of its leaders and under the provision of
section 16 of the Ordinance, orders were given for their
exile at Laiktung in Turkana District. Another group of
Somali youngsters referred to by the P»C. as "corner-boy-
type", who announced that they would continue to adhere
to the League, were subsequently sentenced to eighteen
months hard labour.^
In spite of the action taken at Garissa, the League
continued to wield a powerful influence in Isiolo, Wajir
and Mandera but by the 20th of July all these branches were
declared by order of the Governor-in-Council to be
unlawful societies. The leaders of the League were
accused as being men of no standing in the tribes*"but were
opportunists, who under the cloak of running a social and
cultural organisation, were lining their own pockets and
O
acquiring positions of power."
The accusations against the convicted leaders and the
League as a whole were based on the following points - firstly,
that the Leage had intended the setting up of unlawful
'courts'. In these 'courts' fines were to be levied for
offences such as referring a dispute to a government headman;
or acting as a guide to the tribal police. Secondly, unlawful
drilling organized by the members of the League who had had
service in the Kenya police or K.A.R. Thirdly, the spread
of a legend that members of the League were immune from




Fourthly, encouragement by the members to defy the
Government headmen and tribal elders. Finally, it was
alleged that the means used by the League leaders to
achieve their ends included promises by the S.Y.L» that no
taxes would be paid or tribal or grazing control measures
imposed under the projected League's administration. The
League was also supposed to have assured the tribesmen
that the British Government was shortly to leave the whole
of the N.F.D. and that it would be replaced by S.Y.L.
Government. The latter would be strong both in itself and
as a result of an alliance which had been made between it
Ethiopia and Russia. The P.O.'s remark to the last point
is worth noting. He stated, "In this connection it is of
interest to note that the salute of the club was the clenched
fist - but of the right hand.""*" This proves how the
attitude of the British officials had changed towards
explaining the idealogical aspect of the League and what
was once thought to be a fanatical Muslim society had then
changed into a potential communist party.
Besides the above listed accusations, the conscription
of the S.Y.L. in the N.F.D. was also due to the fact that
in I9I4.8 representatives of the S.Y.L., actively operating
in the N.F.D.,-participated at a Pan-Somali conference held
in Mogadishu composed from delegates drawn from every Somali
P
occupied zone in the Horn of Africa. The conference
1. Ibid.
2. See The Issue of the Northern Frontier District: A Report
on Events Leading to the Severance of Diplomatic Relations
between the Somali Republic and the United Kingdom,
(Somali Republic Publication, May 1963), pp. I3-U+.
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submitted a joint Memorandum to the Pour-Power Commission
of Investigation on Ex-Italian Somaliland with this request:-
"...We do not pretend that we can stand on our
own feet at the moment, but ask the United Nations
Trusteeship Council to decide questions relating
to the formation, boundaries, and administration
of a Somali Trust Territory to be known as Somalia;
this territory to consist of all areas at present
predominantly populated by Somalia."
As a result of this and the other factors related, the
S.Y.L. was proscribed by the British administration in Kenya
from I9I4.8 till I960. The twelve years which intervened
did not witness a vigorous campaign to relieve the League's
detainees but that was mainly due to the prevailing events.
Recent writers on Somali Nationalism tended to explain the
apparent failure of the attempts to revive the S.Y.L. to the
fact that "the organisation did not have deep roots, and...
that the arrested leaders had attenpted to use the organization
for personal ends."'*' But looking through the documents
dealing with administration at the time, it is difficult to
support Touval's statement without criticism.
It was obvious that since the proscription of the
League, a very tight watch was exercised over the League's
activities, and despite this, underground work was carried
on.^ In 1951# the P.C. still reported that the S.Y.L.
"is the only properly organized Somali nationalist movement
at present in existenoe."^ and the apparent inactivity of
1. Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism: International Politics
and the Drive for Unity in The Horn of Africa. (Harvard,
1963), p. 11;9.
2. See K.N.A./PC/NFD l/l/9 Annual Reports 1951*
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD l/l/lO Annual Reports 1951-5l|-.
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the League was later explained to be the result of the
general disruption of communications with Somalia since the
handing over to Italian trusteeship. This made it
increasingly difficult for League sympathizers in the N.P.D.
townships to keep in touch with the heads of the movement
in Mogadishu. But despite this, attempts by faithful
members were not altogether absent. In Garissa District,
a shop was opened under the League's patronage at Biscaya.
The shop served as "a useful centre for the dissemination
of the League's propaganda - inevitably anti-British - and
as a popular meeting place for the League's fathers."* In
1957 the P.G. noted serious attempts to revive the S.Y.L.
In Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera and Wajir. In Garissa, a
secret movement called 'Horset* believed to be the 'aotion*
group of the S.Y.L. was discovered by the end of the year
O
and was closely watched. At Isiolo, youngsters were
refused permission to start a club to be called the Somali
Young Association, on the grounds that it might be a revival
of the S.Y.L. At Mandera, reports of the formation of
what was called the Darod Greater Somalia Association by
Haji Muhammad Husein in 1958 also point to the incessant
efforts to revive the League's activities. Hence, the
fact that the S.Y.L. did not openly survive the 19U-8
proscription was therefore the result of continued Government
suppression rather than the desire by the Somalis to give up
its ideals altogether.
1. Ibid.
2. K.N.A,/PC/NFD 1/1/11 Annual Reports 1955-57
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At this juncture it is worth examining the dimensions
of Somali nationalism embodied in the ideals of the S.Y.L.
in respect of internal and external factors: the external
factor being the incidence of the Arab attack on the Jews
of Palestine in 1914-8; and the internal being the Mau Mau
movement in the other half of the Colony. Both were
interesting factors in connection with the position of
Somalis between the Arab and the African Worlds.
In a secret minute on the activities of the Somali
Youth League in the Northern Province of Kenya, R.G. Turnbull
remarked:-
"It is noteworthy that already there has been a talk
locally of disturbances in this territory being
organized to coincide with a start of a big attack
on the Jews by the Arabs in Palestine. The idea
at the back of this (which has obviously been
inspired from outside) is clearly not only that in
both places there would be simultaneously a Jihad
or holy war but that the attention of the British
Government and our resources would,at such a time
be diverted from the Somalilands."
This was, however, by no means an indication that
the N.F.D. Somalis had any direct connection with Arab
nationalism either in Kenya or abroad. Par from it,
relations between the Arabs and Somalia seemed to be cool
if not hostile. In the N.P.D., the D. C. Wajir had in 1914-8
reported strained relations between the Arabs and the
Somalia of the district, and observed that hostility to the
p
Arabs was "one of the Somali Youth League creed." The
state of relations between both reached its peak at the
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1A/9 Top Secret, Annex 'A',
R.G. Turnbull I9I4.8.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/5/3 Wajir Annual Reports 1914-8.
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close of the Idul Fitr celebrations of that year when a
prominent Arab, Umar ba-Sabra, was badly assaulted by
four Muhammad Zubeir youths. Nor was Arab-Somali relations
any better in Ex-Italian Somaliland itself. This was
clear from an article on the "Future of Somaliland" where
Abdallah Isa, Secretary General of the S.Y.L., Mogadishu,
adequately replied to an article on "African Spotlight is on
Somaliland" in which the latter stated, "Xenophobia is
present here in the universal hatred by the Somalia of the
Arab Community." The Secretary General's reply to this
allegation ran as follows:-
"Ever since the Italian occupation of Somalia the
Arabs here meddled in politics and associated
their interests with that of the Italian rulers.
They have by their persecutions and active aidpto
the Italians made themselves very unpopular."
This perhaps explains why, although both the Somalia
and Arabs in Kenya had similar secessionist claims, no
direct joint action between the two people could be traced.
As far as the attitude of the Kenya Somalia to the
African nationalism was concerned, the picture was somewhat
different. Although Somali nationalists had never looked
forward to the day when they would be regarded as part of
Kenya, they were, however, not without sympathy with the
Kikuyu, the Embu or the Meru rebels. R.G. Turnbull and
almost all of N.F.D. administrators continuously stressed
the point that it was uplikely that the Somalia would act
positively .for any. movement down-country. Turnbull once
argued:-
1. East African Standard. 28-I-19I4.8.
2. Ibid.
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"With regard to the question of co-operation the
S.Y.L. and K.A.U. or similar bodies it is not
thought that the League oould take any effective
part in disturbances or strikes in the Colony;
the League looks to Somalia for its instructions
and any instructions created in the N.P.D. would
be timed to coincide with trouble in Somalia rather
than in Kenya."2
Despite this, evidence of Somali sympathy and
interest in the Mau Mau movement was not altogether
lacking. This sympathy was a natural outcome of the Somalia
respect for power, dignity and fighting for freedom. In
fact Mau Mau had filled the Somali with respect for the
Kikuyu whereas before a feeling of contempt, racial and also
inherent in the clash between pastoral and agricultural
groups, was obvious.
During the Emergency, the P.O. Northern Frontier
reported that keen interest was taken particularly by
by
Somalia in the use ttr the Kikuyuf of violent methods in
attempts to gain their political ends, "a dangerous seed
had been sown in the Somali mind."^ In 195^4- the P.O.
reported that the Mau Mau activities in the Meru District
resulted in Isiolo being brought into the anti Mau Mau
campaign. Fugitive Mau Mau groups entered various parts
1. The foundation of Kenya African Union (19144-) marked the
emergence of the African in the full stage of Kenya's
politics. It came as a result of the nomination of ,
E.W. Mathu, the son of a Kikuyu medicine" and an e
of Balliol College, Oxford, as the first nominated African
in the Legislative Council. On his nomination there was
no countryside political organization. Some leading
Kikuyu Nationalists (among whom was Harry Thuku) felt
that he could not act without some supporting body;
therefore, the Kenya African Study Union later K.A.U. was
formed, (see, History of East Africa, Vol. II, p. 33;
and Harry Thuku: An Autobiography, p. 65.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/9 Top Secret, Annex 'A* R.G. Turnbull
1948.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/10 Annual Reports 1951-5k•
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of the Iaiolo Leasehold area mixing with the 'Alien1
Somali population and "rumours of smuggling fire-arras by
N.P.D. tribes,"^" were prevalent. In 1955 the P.O. again
stated,
"The Mau Mau movement whioh probably embraced most
of Isiolo, Meru (and which was followed with
sympathetic interest by many Somalia) gradually lost
its power and attraction"...
but he went on to state,
"In July information was received that an alien Somali
of the Herti section, Mohammad Farah Shauri was
harbouring a Mau Mau gang. Unfortunately the gang
was not contacted, but sufficient evidence was
obtained to bring a case against Mohamed Farah Shaur p
in court: he was sentenced to a years imprisonment."
In another source he was also fined Shs. 1000.^
It is important to note here that Muhammad Farah was himself
the former Vice-presidant of the S.Y.L. in the District
and therefore his act was of no small importance considering
the attitude of the S.Y.L. to Kenya African nationalism.
In the later years, at least a few of the Somalia were
prepared to show more than just sympathy to the Kenya
African oause. Some of the members of the Somali National
Association actually joined KAU as members.^" This was
obvious from the photograph (Plate XVIII) in Harry Thuku:
An Autobiography. In the plate the pictures of two Somalia
were included among the KAU group. One Muhammad Hasan (the
1. Ibid.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/11 Annual Reports 1955.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/I|./3 Isiolo Handing-Over Reports
1914.1-56.
I).. The Somali National Association was formed by the
merging of the Ishaqia Association and the United
Somali Association.
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last one on the first row from the right), and the other -
Ahmad Warsama (third from the right on the top row).''" The
Somali National Association had further joined the Kalenjin
Political Alliance Masai United front, Kenya African People's
Party, Coast African Political Union to form the Kenya
O
African Democratic Union in I960 in opposition to KANU.
But perhaps it could be argued that the Somali National
Association - which was the result of joining together two
of the organisations outside the N.P.D., the Ishaqia
Association and the United Somali Association, must not be
taken to represent the N.F.D. Somalis attitude. It is
worth noting here that although the Somalis all over Kenya
supported the secessionist movement and hence the idea of
Greater Somalia; the degree of adhesion to it differed
greatly between the local N.P.D. Somalis and the so-called
'Alien* Somalis especially those in urban centres. It was
due to this that members of the latter group, though still
few in number, had occasionally joined the Kenya African
parties.
However, besides the issue of the connection between
Somali nationalism and that of the Arabs or Africans, the
period since the proscription of the Somali Youth League in
19i|.8 to I960 had gradually witnessed the clarification and
the growth of the concept of 'Greater Somalia*. Despite the
co-operation of some of the 'Alien* Somali characters with
1. I am grateful for Mr. Muhammad Yusuf, the President
of the Somali Independent Union, for the information
and the names.
2. The Times. 27-6-1960.
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the Kenya parties, in the N.F.D., political leaders were
continuously anxious to maintain a different identity for
the N.P.D. until such time that it would join with Greater
Somalia. When the issue of the representation of the N.P.D.
in the Legislative Council was at stake, the Somali chiefs
and elders of all areas in the N.P.D. declined to show any
interest in the proposition that the N.P.D. should share
with the Rift Valley Province a single elected member of
the Legislative Council. They preferred to continue to be
represented through official channels until such a time as
they would be able to elect one or more members for the
Province as a separate entity.1
To their detriment, when the British administration
had agreed to allow the N.P.D. a representative, it was an
Arab and not a Somali that was nominated. He was
Sheriff Kullatein, a former headmaster in the District. His
nomination was naturally followed by a vigorous Somali
campaign to oust him which was backed by public opinion in
Somalia. The issue of the Somali News of February 1962
had particularly criticized this as one of the weaknesses
of the British administration in the N.P.D. The Paper
commented,
"In 1958 Arab was nominated by the Colonialists
to represent the N.P.D., in the Kenya Legislative
Council (Legco), of all Somalia in the Province
and in Kenya an Arab to represent the interests
of Somalia? what a shamej. The people of the
N.P.D. were never satisfied with^the nomination
which was against their choice."
However, it was not until 1959 their efforts materialized
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/11 Annual Reports 1955.
2. Somali News, 9-2-1962.
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in the choice of a Somali, Ahmad Farah, to represent them
at the Council.
Yet with the approach of the 1960*3, Kenya Somali
nationalism witnessed a new stimulus which tended to
dissociate it completely from any interests within the
Colony and connect direotly with Somalia. This was the
unification and the independence of the former British
Somaliland Protectorate and Italian Somaliland forming the
Somali Republic. The Kenya Somalia then felt that the
time had arrived when they in their turn should secede and
join the two Somalilands as a step for the achievement of
the Greater Somalia aspiration. Consequently, former
grievances, economio and social, were brought to the fore¬
front to strengthen the case for secession.
The reappearance of nationalist sentiments among the
Somalia nomads prompted a number of petitions to the British
authorities, requesting that the Somali-inhabited territory
be detached from Kenya and be incorporated in the Somali
Republic.1 The promise by the Governor of the Colony,
Sir Patrick Rennison, that
"the present Kenya Government could have no part in
ceding the Somali Districts of this Province to
Somalia, but would be prepared to assist in the
achievement of this object once independence in
Kenya was a reality,"
was interpreted to mean that Union with Somalia was not
just around the corner as the Somalia evidently thought.
It was at this stage that requests were received from the
young Somalia to start a political party. This resulted
1. Touval, p. 150.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/3/3 Mandera Annual Reports 1960.
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in the formation of the Northern Province Peoples'
Progressive Party (NPPPP) in Wajir as its headquarters.
It was an essentially secessionist party which had its
branches all over the N.P.D. in Wajir, Handera, Garissa,
Isiolo and Moyale.
In August I960, leaders of a delegation of twelve
Somalia arrived in Nairobi in the hope of holding an
interview with the Governor. They stated that their
visit was mainly for the purpose of requesting that the
Province be allowed to break away and join the Somali
republic before February 1961 when elections were due to be
held throughout the Colony under the Lancaster House
Constitution. The delegates once more repeated the
grievances of the restriction of movement out of the N.F.D.
They complained that "it was easier for a Sudanese or an
Ethiopian to visit Nairobi than for a Kenyan who has the
misfortune to live in the Northern Province." Other
grievances against the administration included the division
of people in communal bases and the interference in
politics. The delegates also complained that "there is
p
not enough appreciation of Islamic religious laws."
Speaking on the N.F.D. question at the Nairobi
Airport, on his way to Rome, the Somali Prime Minister,
Abd ar-Rashid Ali Sharmarke, called for a referendum among
1. The Times. 20-8-1960.
2. Ibid.: It is important to note in this respect that the
N.F.D. did not get a qadhi before 19Ij.5 when Sheikh
Abdallah bin Ali Al-Muawia was appointed for the
Province. Before, the Moslem tribes of the frontier
had to depend on local religious sheikh to deal with
religious affairs.
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the Somalia of Kenya's Northern Province to decide their
future. He said that, "Somalia did not want to annex
any territory but it was hoped that a Greater Somali®
would be formed by *peaceful and legal means*,""1"
In consequence of the movements of the NPPPP and the
backing of the leaders of the Somali Republic for the
secessionist issue, the N.P.D. Somalis registration for
forthcoming elections was never overwhelming and at the end
of the year under pressure from Isiolo and Wajir leaders
*
p
the boycott of registration in all distriots was complete.
The leaders managed to impress upon all the Somalis that if
they registered it would be an open admission that the
Somali districts of the frontier were contented to remain
under the independent African Kenya. The situation was such
that the P.G. was certain that, "A referendum on the issue
taken in I960 would have produced a solid "yes" (to
secession)."^ By then, a considerable amount of what was
termed as "Kenyaphobia" was prevailing among the Somalis.
Apart from the NPPPP, other political parties were
formed among the northern tribes. The Northern Frontier
Democratic Party (NPDP) whose headquarters was at Garissa
was the first party to function there under the leadership
of Yusuf Haji Abdi - a trader in Garissa township. It was
followed by the NPPPP who opened a branch by November I960
led by Nur Abdille (Aulihan), Khalif Nur (Aulihan), and
Digo Maalim Stambul (Abd Wak).^" At the beginning the NPDP
1. The Times. lLi-11-1960.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/3/3 Mandera Annual Reports I960.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/5 Wajir Annual Report I960.
i|. The son of the prominent chief Sultan Stambul Abdi.
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was opposed to the NPPPP's call for immediate secession and
aimed at a reasonable period under British administration,
during which time the people might be taught how to govern
themselves and stressed that the improvement of educational
and medical services and water resources should come first.
Their support was mainly from the Abdallah section of the
Ogaden but they were unable to attract the Ordma and the
Riverine tribes. The latter preferred to form their own
party named the Northern Province Peoples National Union
(NPPNU). The Abd Wak and Aulihan also asked for a separate
party to be registered as the Northern Frontier Somali
Association; but before its registration the leaders decided
to join hands with the NPPPP in Isiolo.
Together with the increase in political feeling and
political parties, the year 1961 witnesses a vigorous
activity on the side of Somali nationalists owing to the
release of Jomo Kenyatta. This indicated the immminence
of a 'Black Government' in Kenya, and thus the desire by
the Somalis to secede was enhanced. The Kenyatta release
had also facilitated solidarity among the different Somali
groups and parties. The Dally Nation announced that the
Somali National Association had decided to throw in its
weight with the radical NPPPP in supporting the secession
of the Northern Frontier Province. Mr. M.A. Guled of the
Association telegrammed the Governor urging secession and
assuring that any decision reached at the Constitutional
talks was not necessarily considered binding on the Somalia
266
in Kenya."'" Support for the N.P.D. cause did not only come
from the urban Somalia but also from the Orma who had
previously opposed the joining of the Isiolo Boran in the
NPPPP. The Orma had then decided to "align themselves
with the Somalis and come out openly against any form of
liaison with KANU." At a general meeting in October all
office bearers, who were Riverines and very pro-KANU," were
voted out of office by Orma elements led by the chairman of
the Executive Committee, himself an Orma."^
Besides the release of Kenyatta, the Somalis were
further moved by an important statement by the Governor
of the Colony, Sir Patrick Renison, at the opening of the
Constitutional talks at the Government House, Nairobi,
on which he gave a number of broad hints on the likely
development needed before full independence could be
achieved. Referring to the future of the Northern Province
and the growing movement among the Somalis living there
for secession he promised that the representatives of the
Northern Frontier people would be given an opportunity
during the current talks to make their views known,
4
Following the Governor's speech, Ali Aden Lord had
on behalf of the Somalis declared their point 6$ view:-
"With the removal of British rule the inhabitants
of the Northern Province feared, at least, neglect,
bad administration and disregard of thoir rights as
citizens under an African Government, and worst,
oppression, servitude, brutality, civil war and
other evils which had become manifest in the Congo.
1. Daily Nation, 9-9-1961 p.3.
2. K.N.A./PC/GRSSA 27/9 Garissa Annual Report 1961.
3. Ibid.
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If the rights of the Kenya Somalis were ignored,
they were prepared-,to take their case to the
United Nations."
Meanwhile, delegates to the Kenya Constitutional
Conference had on September 11th agreed, under the pressure
of the rising tide of the demand for secession, to allow a
delegation from the Northern Frontier Province to enter
• *
the conference on the 12th so that their views could be
heard. The delegates arrived but the attitude of the
African leaders to the whole issue had by no means made their
case easier. The KADU leader, Ronald Ngala announced that
it was his view:-
"that the northern territories were an integral
part of Kenya and demand foresee ess ion, as such
should not be listened to."
Leaving the Constitutional Conference on the same day,
the Somalis looked more furious and vigorous in their demand
to secede due to being disappointed by the Kenya Africanfs
attitude. The twenty-one^ angry N.F.D. chiefs and political
leaders representatives of the NPPPP, NFDP, NPPNU and
NPUA left the talks swearing that if the Province were not
allowed to join the United Somali Republic, "there would be
bloodshed and another Congo in Kenya.These views were
shared by many of the Borana and the Rendille from the
rest of the NFP.
1. The Times, 5-9-1961. His views were later supported by
A.H. Farah in a letter to the Daily Nation on 11-9-1961.
2. Kenyatta, who was on a visit to Ethiopia had emphasized
Ngala*s view and declared that "the Northern Frontier
Province is part of Kenya." and so he discussed it only
in the general context of Kenya. (The Times, 20-11-1961).
3. The Times put the number as twenty-six.
Daily Nation. 13-9-1961.
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It is worth noting here that the word 'Somali'
came to include a wider section of the pastoral tibres in
the north than it usually did before the wave of national
feeling spread in the area. The Rendille had so much
identified themselves with the Soraalis that they not only
adhered to the secession issue but they were instrumental
in the events which followed - as would be clear in the
next chapter.
The Borana, on the other hand, were divided in their
attitude to secession. The Muslim Borana supported it
while the others preferred staying in Kenya, The Muslim
view represented by ohief Guyo Jahairi maintained that,
"if we do not get secession there will be bloodshed."^" Out
of the twenty-four delegates to the Government House talks,
two Boranas said that they did not want to secede from Kenya,
Chief Gufu Sono, from Moyale, and Hasan Shera of the
Northern Province People's Party wanted a Provincial
autonomy. And only one Borana Chief Golgalo Godana of the
Northern Province United Association wanted to remain in
Kenya without any conditions.
While the N.P.D. Somelis were struggling at home to
see their case won, the Somali Republic had in its turn
conducted unofficial talks in London and the representative
of the Republic had onoe more warned that:-
"A serious situation is likely to arise among the
Kenya Somalia unless the Province is allowed to
opt on its future before Kenya wins self-Governraent."
Dailv Nation. 13-9-1961.
2. Dailv Nation. lij.-9-196l.
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The talks had also touched upon the possibility of Somalia
entering the projected East African Federation; but it was
reported that Somali circles in London insisted that this
would have to be dependent on a "satisfactory solution"
for the Kenya Somalia.^"
However, with the rising tide of national feelings
among the Kenya Somalia, the British press was active
collecting information and reflecting the point of view of
the Somalia in the N.F.D. The N.F.D. authorities announced
the arrival in Wajir of a reporter from The Observer who
came to meet the politioal leaders and was met by a number
of demonstrations by the tribes obviously emphasizing their
stand against any decision which would leave them in Kenya.
Also back in London The Times had, after consistently
following the development of National feeling among the
N.F.D. Somalia, ventured to offer its opinion in the
question which amounted to this:-
"In the long run, the only hope of peace though it
would be accompanied by much grumbling, lies in the
cession to Somalia of those areas now inhabited
by Somalia, and the retention of the rest of the
N.F.D. within Kenya. Whatever solution is adopted
it will have to bepadopted soon. The Soma lis are
getting restive."
Despite the Somalia demand for the secession of the
whole of the N.F.D., and the partial secession indicated
by The Times, and other N.F.D. non-Somali tribes, as the
events went on there was no sign of giving up neither by
the British nor the Kenya African leaders, and the issue of
1. Ibid.
2. The Times. 13-11-1961.'
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Somali nationalism was held in the balance. Things were
certainly more complicated by the announcement made by
the Somali Prime Minister, Dr. Abd ar-Rashid Ali Sharmarke,
that three agreements were already concluded with.Russia.
One of these was cultural, one dealt with trade and the
third with economic co-operation, notably involving a long
term agricultural and industrial credit of 1+0 m. roules
(approx. £11+,500,000). This certainly had done some
damage to the cause of Somali nationalism.^"
It is against this and the strong tide of anti-Somali
feeling among the Kenya African parties that the next
crucial steps in the development of Somali Nationalism in
Kenya had to be viewed.
1. The growing Russian interest in Somali affairs was feared
by Kenyans who considered that Somalia was being looked
at by Russia as a stepping-stone to Eastern Africa,
(see L.D. Doob, Resolving Conflict in Africa, (New Haven
and London, 1970), p. 78Appraisal by a Kenyan: John J.
Okumu).
Later, leading Pan-Africanists were increasingly
apprehensive of the Somali-Russian manoeuvres and warned
against the danger of intrusion in African affairs.
Kwame Nkrumah expressed his fears on the prevailing
tendency of African States to seek a third party
intervention. Probably having the issue of Somali-
Russian manoeuvres in his mind he stated, in an article
written in 1962:
"I have said that I understand the difficulties of
these (African) States which are drawing away from the
African Community back into that of Europe...Imperialism
does not change its nature; it only changes its front..."
(V.B. Thompson, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-
Africanism , (London, 1969), p. 189 quoting Kwame Nkrumah,
'Africa fight3 the Common Market', Labour Monthly,
London, September 1962, p. 1+21).
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Chapter VII
The Failure to Attain Unity
Somali secessionist aims, as advanced in the last
chapter, assumed more vigour in the spring of 1962. This
*
was because of the opportunity given to the delegation
from the N.P.D. to attend the Constitutional Conference
1
at Lancaster House. A week before the start of the
Conference, the Somali Republic was once more very emphatic
on the issue of secession. The Somali Embassy in London
issued a statement emphasizing the demand of the Somali
people in Kenya to secede and become united with the Somali
Republic.^ With the official backing of the Somali Republic
and the six districts of the N.P.D., the Somali delegates
to the Lancaster House Conference did not hesitate to put
their claims openly, clearly and emphatically before the
Conference.
The delegates^ reminded the Colonial Secretary that
the N.P.D. was proclaimed a "closed District" in 3.926 and
a "special District" in 193i|. and that the territory continued
1. Towards the end of 1961, the Seoretary of State for
Colonial Affairs, Mr. Reginald Maudling, visited Kenya in
preparation for the Constitutional Conference due to begin
in London in 1962. He agreed with All Aden Lord, the
representative of the N.P.D. at the Legislative House, to
accept an N.P.D. delegation to the Conference.
2. The Times. 7-2-1962.
3. The delegates were:- Abd ar-Rashid Khalif (representing
the NPPPP because Ali Aden Lord died just before the
start of the Conference); Yusuf Haji Abdi (NPDP);
A. Kholkhole, Ahmad Farah, Haji Galama Dido Sheikh
Muhammad with N. Lawson and M.A. Murgian as Legal
Advisers.
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to be subject to these Ordinances, the practical effect of
which was that the movement of persons to and from the
N.P.D. had been closely restricted. This clearly
illustrated a recognition of the separate identity of the
territory. This recognition also emerged from legal
provisions which ensure that Somalia were not amenable to
process in the African Native Courts and in matters of
personal law were subject to their own code and courts. It
was a fact, the delegates concluded, that "no more than the
most tenuous links have been forged between the N.P.D. and
Kenya. This is no matter of chance, they added, when one
takes into account the total absence of affinity with Kenya.
As Drysdale has rightly observed by admitting to the
Conference an official delegation from the N.P.D., all of
whom were pro-secessionist, the British Government appeared
to give tacit acknowledgement that there was a case to
answer. But, on the other hand, the Kenya African leaders
were by no means prepared to give any consideration or
concession to the Somali claim for secession. Their views
were once more assured by Tom Mboya - KANU's General
Secretary - who had on many occasions said 'no secession*.
Mboya accused the Somali Republic of encouraging N.P.D.
secessionists and arousing fears against Kenya. He said
that such conduct was inconsistent with the Somalia*
profession of Pan-Africanism and African unity, at the last
Pamfeca Conference in Addis Ababaj and an interference in
1. The Issue of the Northern Frontier District, pp. 15-16.
2. John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, (London, 19614.), p. 106.
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Kenya's domestic affairs."'" On another occasion, he repeated,
addressing the Foreign Press Association in London, that
"there are a large number of territorial claims and counter¬
claims in that area, which we do not feel it would be
advisable for anyone to open up as it could lead to very
p
great complications." Paradoxically enough, Muhammad
Ibrahim Eagal, leader of the Somali Republic's delegation
to the Lanoaster House talks and the Minister for.Education,
argued the Somali case on the same lines, the profession of
African unity. He stated in answer to Tom Mboya's claims
"This manoeuvre of Mr. Mboya will not deter us
from our goal of creating a greater Somalia which
we feel is a step towards Afrioan Unity." 3
Amidst these conflicts the KANU delegates offered
Somali Secessionists a portfolio in the Kenya Government
which amounted to the appointment of a Northern Frontier
District Minister who would head a new Ministry to deal
with the Province. The offer was not only rejected by the
Somalia, who declared that "unless we are recognized the
right to secede from Kenya at the end of the interim period
during which the British keep control of Kenya, Kami's offer
is completely pointless;"^ but it was also refused by KADU,
In an attempt to break the deadlock, the Secretary of
State for Colonial Affairs informed the Conference that
Her Majesty's Government had given very careful consideration
to the views which had been put forward by the Somali
1. Daily Nation. 13-3-1962.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
It-. Daily Nation, 214.-3-1962.
2 7^4-
delegation and by KANU and KADU. As a result, "They had come
to the conclusion that an investigation should be undertaken
in order to ascertain public opinion in the area regarding.
its future..."'*' The announcement was followed later, on
the same day, by another special session with the Colonial
Secretary and the N.P.D. delegates. At this meeting
Haudling considered a draft conclusion to the section of
the Constitutional Conference dealing with the N.P.D. The
conclusion, which was then included in a Report on the
Conference, read as follows
"...an investigation should be undertaken in order
to ascertain public opinion in the area regarding
its future...This Commission should be appointed as
soon as practicable so that its report could be
available and a decision on its findings taken by
Her Majesty^s Government before the new Constitution
for Kenya was brought into operation..."
Finding later that the underlined words were too
binding for Britain, the Colonial Secretary had actually
omitted them from the final communique, but thanks to the
protest by the Somali Government - they were reinstated.
As a result of this the Somali delegates and the
Somali people generally were optimistic about the whole
outcome of the Lancaster House talks. The attitude of the
Somali delegates was revealed by Abd ar-Rashid Khalif on
the 10th April on his arrival at Nairobi Airport, when he
reaffirmed that he and the Somali delegates were satisfied
with the outcome of the London talks, as the result of
which Reginald Maudling had announced the setting up of a
1. Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, (London,
1^2) (Cmnd. 1700), ?ol.VXI, p. 875-
2. The Issue of the N.F.D. p.l'">.
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Commission to investigate the secession claims. He further
stated:-
"We are confident that when the Commission had
examined the various claims it must decide that
the people are 100 per cent behind the plan
for union with Somalia."
However, Khalif himself would have preferred a
referendum under United Nations auspices so that the people
P
might be able to exercise self-determination. But never-
theless he and his colleagues agreed to the setting up of
the Commission.
In the N.P.D. itself local opinion seemed to be equally
satisfied with the outcome of the talks at that juncture.
In Mandera, Muhammad Sheikh, the NPPPP delegate from the
District to the Lancaster talks, was received with
enthusiasm by the Mandera Somalia and the audience "seemed
pleased with his report on proceedings in London.In
Garissa the D.C. reported," the return of the delegates
from the London Conference in a mood of confident assurance
and general good will has brought about a general feeling
of good will and hearty co-operation."^" In Wajir a
meeting was held by Abd ar-Rashid Khalif and attended by
all parties. The general tone of the meeting was said
to be, "very optimistic on the outcome of the London talks.
1. Daily Nation, 11-1|.-1962.
2. This he stated in a letter addressed to Sir Patrick Renison,
the Governor of Kenya. (see p. 18 The Issue of the N.F.D.)
3. K.N.A./PC/GRSSA 8/13 ADM/15/3/I/37 Mandera Monthly
Reports, April 1962.
14.. K.N.A./PC/GRSSA 2U/20/III/111 Garissa District
Intelligence 22-5-(2.
5. K.N.A./PC/GRSSA 8/II4. ADM. I5/3/HIA3 Wajir' Monthly
Reports April, 1962.
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Meanwhile, the efforts of the delegation from the
Somali Republic present during the London talks materialized
in the publication of a book, The Somali Peninsula: A New
Light on Imperial Motives. The publicity given to this
work resulted in wide support from the members of-.both
Houses of Parliament and the British press to the Somali
cause. Prominent among those was Lord Lytton, who in
his maiden speech to the Lords on 15th May 1962, brought
the question of the unity of the Somalia in Kenya and the
Republic to the House. He stated that the Somalia are:-
"a different people of European structure and
although coloured, different from the people who
are negroes....I would suggest that none of this
northern area, peopled by tribes of Hamitic stock,,
should be handed over to a Bantu administration."
The Ethiopians, with their share in the divided
nation were not slow to attack Lytton's speech. The
Ethiopian Herald alleged, "Lord Lytton, an old Colonial
hard in this part of Africa, should not be taken
seriously.In retaliation the Somali Government accused
the Ethiopians of hindering the progress of events in the
direction of a solution of the Kenya N.F.D. Moreover,
the Somali Government complained that with the apparent
indifference of the British authorities arms and ammunition
were being smuggled into part of the N.P.D. from across
the Ethiopian frontier for the purpose of causing civil
strife during the Commission's forthcoming visit.^
1. Parliamentary Debates: Lords 1^61-62. Vol. 2J4.O, 15-5-1^62.
2. The Times. 22-5-1^2.
3. The Times. 18-^-1962.
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With such a tense atmosphere in which mutual
accusations were interchanged, the Kenya Somalia relations
appeared more hopeful with the visit of two distinguished
African leaders, Jomo Kenyatta, President of KANU and
Ronald Ngala, president of KADU. The two leaders were
invited by the Somali Republic in July and August
respectively and both received a cordial welcome from the
Somali Government and people. In a welcoming speech to the
KANU president, the Somali Prime Minister said, "The Somali
people were proud to welcome a man who for forty years had
done more than any other for the freedom of Africa.""'" He
also stated:-
"I think during the past many years the aim of
colonialists or imperialists has been to divide
our people. Everyone realised that, and, I think,
it is our duty to get together, to create a new
Africa, not the old Africa of divisions, with
different Foreign Powers governing us, but,Africa
governed by African people."
Carrying on the same theme of "Pan-Africanism" the
President of the Somali Republic, Aden Abdallah Uthman,
had remarked in his speech for Kenyatta:-
"We have learned that the outmoded concept of
territorial integrity must vanish from our
habitual thinking because its roots are embedded
in colonialism, and it is incompatible with Pan-
Africanism. "3
Yet, despite this and Kenyatta's hearty concurrence
with the Pan-African aspirations of the Somali leaders, his
visit had in no way shown a change in his attitude to the
1. Dally Nation. 27-7-1^2.
The Somali Republic and African Unity, (Somali Government
Official publication, 20681/22^^2), p. 5»
3. Ibid.. p. 7.
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issue of Somali secession from Kenya. Far from it, on his
departure speeoh at Mogadishu Airport he had confirmed
what he had uttered on many previous occasions
"We and especially KANU, feel, and we have put it
clearly before the Somali Government, that we regard
the N.F.D. as part of Kenya. We also regard
Somalia who live in the N.F.D. and elsewhere in
Kenya as our brothers. They are part and parcel
of Kenya and we^will like them to live in Kenya in
that fashion."
However, one concession the African leaders were ready
to make in order to reach a satisfactory solution was in the
direction of the proposed East African Federation. Kenyatta
saw a way out in it, if after the independence of Kenya
negotiations were entered into between the interested
territories. Ronald Ngala, who visited Somalia a few
days after on August 11th was welcomed at Mogadishu Airport
by the Prime Minister. Touching on the question of
Federation the Prime Minister had this to say in his
welcoming speech
"It has been said that the problem of Somalia living
outside the Republic's present frontiers can be
solved by a federation of these territories. We
believe this to be true because we have no desire
for territorial aggrandisement. We wish only to
form one Federal Unit of a reunited Somali people
within the framework of a wider political Federation
of East and Central Africa."
In reply, Ngala confirmed the Prime Minister's views
and agreed that this would enable the question of
independence and federation of East African territories to
be discussed. He added:-
1. The Issue of the N.F.D... p. 25*
2. The Somali Republic and African Unity, p. 13»
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"If Somalia agrees to the idea, she will be helping
us not only to deal with our constitution and hasten
our independence but Somalia will be helping the
hastening of the federation on which so many other
problems are dependent."
No sooner had that been said than the situation in
Kenya began to indicate a new direction as to the handling
of the Somali secession issue. In August it was announced
that in addition to the N.P.D. Commission, two other
Commissions would proceed to the N.F.D. - a Regional
Boundaries Commission and a Constituencies Delimitation
Commission. The former was formed in accordance-with the
Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference 1962 (Cmnd.
1700) in order "To divide Kenya into six Regions and the
Nairobi Area for the purpose of giving effect to the
Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962, and
p
in particular to Appendix II of that Report."
The proposed visit of the two Commissions whose sole
function was to recommend the delimitation of Regional
and Electoral boundaries for Kenya's new self-governing
constitution was seen by the Somalis as a breach of promise
by the British. The Somalis were holding on to the fact
that the Colonial Secretary had promised the N.P.D.
delegates that the future of the N.P.D. would be decided
by the British Government after public opinion had been
ascertained by an independent Commission. Reports by the
D.C's in the various N.P.D. Districts revealed clearly
that the Somalis were very apprehensive of the outcome of
1. Ibid., p. 13.
2. Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission, (London,
1962) Cmnd. 1899, Vol. X, p. 1.
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these Commissions. In Mandera the NPPPP had arranged
meetings at Rhamu on the 15th, at Asharpi on the 16th and
at Eil-Wak on the 18th September in which the official
party line to be adopted towards the N.P.D. Commission was
explained and doubts about the actual movements of both
the Constituencies Delimitations Commission and the Boundary
Commission were reflected.^"
The N.P.D. representatives immediately submitted a
memorandum to the Governor of Kenya protesting that if the
Regional Boundaries and Constituencies Delimitation
Commissions took evidence from the inhabitants of the N.P.D.,
"they can only conclude that the N.P.D. is now considered
party to Kenya's new constitutional framework and'that this
was contrary to the undertaking that there would be no
change in the status or administration of the N.P.D. until
a decision on its future had been taken."2 In addition, the
N.P.D. representatives warned that if the purpose of these
two Commissions was to drag the N.F.D. within Kenya
boundaries in future, the response of the Somalis there would
be the complete boycott of the Kenya general elections.
Meanwhile, the Dally Nation of 3rd September came out
with the official statement from the Government regarding
the terms of reference of the two Commissions
"It should be made dear that the presence of the
Regional Boundaries and Constituencies Delimitations
Commissions in Kenya in advance of the N.P.D.
Commission does not reflect any change of policy on
the part of Her Majesty's Government, and does not
1. K.N.A,/PC/GRSSA 8/13 ADM/I5/3/I/I4.6 Mandera Monthly
Reports - August and September 1962.
2. The Issue of the N.F.D.. p. 30.
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in any way fetter the operation of the N.P.D.
Commission in its specific function of ascertaining
public opinion in the area."
Despite this the Soma lis were still doubtful and hence
Abd ar-Rashid Khalif, with his legal adviser, flew to
London to meet the Colonial Secretary. But to his
disappointment and that of all the Somalia, the Colonial
Secretary preferred not to see him and the former returned
after being duly warned by the officials of the Colonial
Office to avoid arousing the feeling of the N.P.D. Somalia.
Shortly after, serious rioting was reported to have
broken out in Isiolo, in the N.P.D. The cause of the riot
was a clash between the NPPPP supporters and a group of Meru
and Turkana who were present at a rally organized by KANU
to preach the doctrines of anti-secession. On Sunday
27th August, the next day of the rioting, fresh fighting
broke out in the N.P.D. when groups of Somalia and Turkana
clashed at Campi ya Sheikh, three miles from Isiolo, the
scene of violence on the previous day. The night curfew
imposed on Sunday was continued on the following day. The
total number of casualties was seventeen injured and two
dead including a Somali girl. The area was not brought
back to normal before tear gas, two platoons of the General
2
Service Unit from Nakuru and police from Meru were used.
The incident did not pass without a strong protest
by Abd ar-Rashid Khalif, the M.L.C. for the area, who sent
a telegram to the Governor of Kenya blaming the Provincial
1. Daily Nation, 3-9-1962.
2. Somali News. 31-8-1962.
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administration for the clash. The incident according to
Somalia, was made possible by the invasion of KANU members
who were residents outside the Province. Their arrival
was strongly objected to by the inhabitants who protested
to the Local Authorities; but their protest was apparently
ignored. Khalif remonstrated, "Responsibility for the
incidents rests solely on the Provincial Administration.
Prior appeals by the elders and political leaders to the
authorities not to allow meetings of hostile elements in
Isiolo were futile.""*"
The effects of the Isiolo riots were instrumental
in the change of attitude of the Government towards the
sending of the Constituencies and Boundary Commissions to
the N.P.D. inevitably because of the danger inherent in
the situation there. The visits of the two Commissions
while not altogether cancelled, were however postponed. The
explanation given in the Report of the Regional Boundaries
Commission avoided altogether the mention of the Isiolo
riots as a factor in the decision of the Government, and
attributed it to the following factors
"Owing to difficulties in completing arrangements
for the appointment of that Commission (N.P.D.
Commission) it was not found possible to appoint
it by the time we had completed our visits
throughout the rest of Kenya and we decided-that
we ought not to visit the Six Northern Frontier
districts presently administered from Isiolo until
the Northern Frontier District Commission had been
appointed and had at least commenced its work on
the ground....We did not wish to embarrass the
Government of Kenya by visiting the area when
tribal feelings were running high....Secondly,
1. Ibid.
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because we had good grounds for believing that
our presence at that time might well have given
some to think that Her Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom and in Kenya had chosen to disregard
the undertaking given at the London Constitutional
Conference,-,and would have sparked off inter-tribal
clashes..."
On October 5^h the Secretary of State for the
Colonies formally appointed the N.P.D. Commission of two
members - G.C. Onyiuke, a Nigerian, and Major-General M.P.
Bogert, a Canadian. Their terms of reference weres-
"To ascertain, and report on, public opinion in
the Northern Frontier District (comprising the
Districts of Isiolo, Garissa, Mandera, Marsabit,
Moyale and Wajir) regarding arrangements to be
made for the future of the area in the light of
the likely?course of Constitutional development
in Kenya."
According to an official Somali Government Publication
the terms of reference, already a modification of the original
undertaking which made no reference to the likely course of
Kenya's constitutional development, were again modified if
not rendered entirely useless by a confidential memorandum
handed to the N.F.D. Commission on December 10th. And
this Memorandum only came to light after the Commission
had published its report on December 2lst.
The Commission proceeded to the various districts of
the N.F.D. in October using the public gatherings "barazas"
as media to ascertain the opinion of the people. In
Garissa District nine barazas were held; six primarily
for the Somalia and three for the Riverine (Bantu) tribes.-^
1. Report on the Regional Boundaries Commission, p. 2.
2. Report of the Northern Frontier District Commission, p. 1.
3. Report of the N.F.D. Commission, p. 12.
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In Wajir, where with few exceptions the population was
Somali or half-Somali four barazas were held by the
Commission. In Handera three barazas were held in the town¬
ship itself and at Rhamu and Eil-Wak. At Moyale, four
barazas were held. At Marsabit which was the largest area
visited, eleven barazas were held. In Isiolo four barazas
were held for Muslim Boran and 'Alien* Somalia, finally,
in Nairobi, the Commission had also given consideration to
the fact that "there might be certain people such as
political leaders with a following in the N.P.D. who could
throw light on public opinion there but who, for some good
reason, might not be able to appear before us while we
were there.""''
On the whole, opinion on the N.P.D. pointed from the
start to a majority in favour of Somali opinion. In Garissa
all the Somalis?who were almost entirely Abdallah, Abd Wak
and Aulihan who comprised two thirds of the population there
were definitely for secession backed by the NPPPP and the
NPDP. The others were represented by the NPPNL and the
United Ogaden Somali Association (UOSA). The former
supported Somali opinion while the other tended to lean
towards Kenya opinion. The Riverine tribes were on the whole
for Kenya opinion. In Wajir all were unanimously for
Somali opinion. In Mandera - like Wajir - all were unanimously
for the NPPPP policy of secession from Kenya. In Moyale
opinion was mixed; the Ajuran were strongly for Somali
opinion while the other Galla elements were against it.
1. Ibid.. p. 17.
2. Ibid. . p. II4.5 K.N.A./PC/GRSSA 8/13 October 1962 Report.
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In Isiolo, where the 'Alien* Somalia were a majority in
the township, support for the Somali opinion was over¬
whelming and even outside the township the Muslim Borana
adhered to the Somali cause. In Marsabit the Commission
itself admitted that the Rendille had "all strongly supported
the Somali opinion.." but the Commission did not accept their
opinion as given, the reason being that in view of differences
between them and the Somalia it was strange that they should
want to join the Somali Republic. The Commission were
naturally unjustified in their act and were heavily
criticized by the Somalia for distorting the picture.
In conclusion the N.P.D. Commission reported that
they found the area supporting Somali opinion was the
biggest in total population and size and its people were all
in agreement on this matter. However, they differed -
according to the report - on the means and steps by which
the secession was to be effected. The opinion expressed
verbally to the Commission was based on the premise that
there could be no question of secession before Kenya
achieved independence. On the other hand, Somali opinion
as expressed in the written Memorandum by almost all
supporters of the Somali view was somewhat different. The
Memorandum requested that union of the N.P.D. with the Somali
Republic should take place contemporaneously with.the
granting of Kenya's independence, that the establishment! of
a legislative assembly for the N.P.D. should take place
before and not after Kenya's independence, and that the
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secession of the N.P.D. from Kenya should take place
immediately.^
The Somalis were on the whole very critical of the
Commission's Report which, they commented, "had done its
utmost to conceal the true strength of the opinion for
secession." Drawing their own conclusions from the
Commission's findings they stated:-
"The Conclusion which must necessarily be drawn
from the Commission's own account of its
investigations are that, of the six districts,
five are clearly, by an overwhelming preponderance
of opinion, in favour of the Somali view: these
are the Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Moyale and Isiolo
districts."^
In Marsabit District where again the majority
favoured the Somali opinion the Commission was accused of
"discounting the Rendille and the Gelubba, for reasons
which do not bear any reasonable examination, when these
people in fact comprise the majority of the population.
Based on the data collected by the Commission itself, the
Somalia concluded that "a recent census suggests that 87*76^
of the total population of the N.P.D. declared for secession
Hence, the Somalis were of the opinion that the Commission
had actually distorted the facts of the situation. Moreover
Abd ar-Rashid Khalif had vigorously protested against the
Commission's meeting of KANU and KADU in Nairobi after its
tour in the N.F.D. had terminated.^
1. Report of the N.F.D. Commission, p. 18.
2. The Issue of the N.F.D.. p. 39.
3. Ibid.
1+. Ibid.
5. The Times. 16-11-1962.
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The situation was further worsened by the commencing
of the work of the Regional Boundaries Commission on
November 9th. The latter, after touring the N.P.D. drew
up a report which was met with equally severe criticism
from the Soraalis. They established that there was no
evidence that, in the preparation of its report, the Boundary
Commission had before it or took any account of the Report
of the N.P.D. Commission. This was because the Boundaries
Commission began its tour on the 22nd October at the time
when the report of the N.P.D. Commission was still under
composition. The Somalis were furious at the outcome of
the latter Commission and its conclusions were not in any
way to their credit. The Commission reported after meeting
representatives of the Somalis in the N.P.D.
"We would have considered it right to create a
region consisting of the areas almost exclusively
occupied by the Somali and kindred people, namely,
the Mandera District; that part of the Moyale
District lying East of the western boundaries of
the existing constituency No. Ijlj., the Wajir District;
and that part of the Garissa District lying East
of a line drawn three miles to the north and east of
Tana River... including the Garissa township area."l
Being limited by their terms of reference which
restricted them to dividing Kenya into six regions, they
therefore preferred a middle-course solution and stated:-
"After anxious consideration we have included the
area concerned (NPP) in the Coast Region; one of
the considerations which led us to this decision
was that if at all some time in the future this
area should cease to be part of Kenya its excision
from the Coast Region would not adversely affect
the viability of that Region or seriously upset the
pattern laid down for Kenya as a whole."
1. Daily Nation. 21-12-1962.
2. Daily Nation. 21-12-1962.
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While a hint of secession could be seen from this,
the Colonial Secretary, Nigel Pisher had himself ruled out
any possibility of this being brought to light - when on
behalf of the Kenya Council of Ministers, he requested that
the N.F.D. should be split into three parts attaching to
the new Coast, Eastern and the Rift Valley Regions.^" Amidst
these exchanges, the African leaders had once more
ascertained their stand on the issue in their fiery speeches
at a meeting of the Northern Province United Association.
James Giohuru, Minister of Finance said:-
"The Somalia are free to leave Kenya if they want.
But they are not allowed to take part of Kenya with
them. There will be no changes in our boundaries.
If Somalia wants war, we are ready for it and
Ethiopia is ready to back us if Somalia is
aggressive."
Tom Mboya, Minister of Labour, added that the
Government was resolved that, "If an inch of Kenya is taken
by Somalia, the people of this country will shed blood to
get it back."-^
The Somali Government, deploring these ardent state¬
ments by Kenya Government members, handed a note to Her
Britannic Majesty's Government and requested au assurance
that the statements made by the Kenyan responsible Ministers
would not reflect the views of the Government of Kenya and
would in no way influence the decision of Her Majesty's
Government in connection with the wish of the Somali people
in the N.F.D. Further, between December 3-5 the Prime
Minister, Dr. Abd ar-Rashid Ali Sharmarke, and a delegation
1. Ibid.
2. The Times. 17-12-1962. -
3. Ibid.
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from the Somali Republic had talks in London with Prime
Minister Macmillan and with the British Foreign Secretary
Lord Home. Sharmarke emphasized that any denial by the
British Government of the right of the people of the N.F.D.
to self determination would be regarded by the Somali
Government as "an unfriendly act" which would affect
relations between the two countries."1"
By the end of 1962, it was obvious that Soifcali opinion
was growing extremely vigorous on the issue of secession
while Kenya's opinion was equally against it. After the
publication of the N.F.D. and Regional Boundaries Reports
on December 12st, a delegation from the N.F.D. led by
Abd ar-Rashid Khalid visited the Somali Republic and a
special session was arranged to debate the issue. A motion
of moral and material support for the N.F.D. was passed.
In January, 1963, Somali feeling continued to run
high and the British Government was once more handed a note
urging that the N.F.D. be granted the right of self-
determination. The Somali Government had also warned the
British authorities that "It is prepared to accept as its
own duty the assumption of Sovereignty over the territory
and people in question."^ A few days later, and on their
return from the Republic, the N.F.D. delegates addressed
a letter to the Governor, Mr. MacDonald, protesting that
the assurance given to them on August 10th 1962 by the
Kenya Government that nothing in the Regional Boundaries
1. Somali News, 9-12-1962; The Issue of the N.F.D. . p. .
2. Issue of the N.F.D., p. I4.8.
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Report would prejudice the British Government's decision
on the findings of the N.P.D. Commission, had not been
honoured. They further requested that the Government of
Kenya should see that there would be no change in the status
or the administration of the N.P.D. before a "final decision
on our future" by Her Majesty's Government; and secondly,
*
that a final decision would be reached before Kenya's
forthcoming elections."'"
A series of notes and memoranda were exchanged between
the British and Somali Governments during the whole of
January as the latter was growing increasingly restive about
the developments of events. Prime Minister Macmillan had,
however, assured the Somalis that they would definitely be
consulted before a deoision on the N.P.D. was taken; but
on the other hand he made it clear that the elections in
Kenya were to precede the internal self-Government
constitution and once more an assurance was given that like
the recommendations of the Constituencies and Boundaries
Commission it "will not prejudice the final settlement of
the N.P.D. question". The reply was certainly unacceptable
to the Somali Government who could not see that, "a
postponement of elections in the Northern Prontier District
will in any way prejudice Kenya's Constitutional progress
„ 3
towards independence."
Amidst these E|iplomatic exchanges the situation on the
1. Ibid.. p. 48.
2. See Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, pp. I3O-I38.
3. The Issue of the N.F.D.. p. 55*
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Kenya frontier was going from bad to worse. About sixty
men of the Kenya Riot Squad were reported to have been
flown 230 miles from Nairobi to Garissa by the R.A.F. on
20th February when rioting broke out in the area.'1' Twenty-
four people were injured in fighting between Somalia and
Riverine tribesmen at a Kenya African Democratic Union's
meeting. The fight spread to the Garissa township, after
which a curfew was imposed and armed police patrolled the
area.
At the same time a serious indication of the
deterioration in British-Somali relations as a result of
Somali concern over a British military exercise on the
Kenya-Somalia border, was imminent, Abd al-Qadir Musa,
the Somali Republic's Vice-Consul in Kenya announced in
Nairobi on the 25th February that his Government was
seriously perturbed at the implications of large scale
O
military exercises due to begin in that area. The British
troops involved were estimated to number about L(.,200,
including detachments from Aden and an R.A.F. Canberra
Squadron from Cyprus. The Somali Vice-Consul went on to
say that "the British Government could not have chosen a
more significant and provocative time and place to carry
out military manoeuvres. Military manoeuvres are always
used as a cover for other more sinister motives...If the
British Government will not carry out its pledges to
respect the will of the people of the N.F.D., it must
1. The Times. 21-2-1963.
2. Ibid.
292
presumably suppress it with force.
Moreover, a further indication in the deterioration
of relations followed the announcement by the Government of
Somalia that it intended taking the matter of the N.P.D. -
the majority of the inhabitants of which wish to Secede
from Kenya and join Somalia - to the international Court
in view of Britain's delay in announcing the future of the
area. Simultaneously, it was announced that the Somali
Ambassador to Britain was being recalled for urgent
consultations; and the Somali Parliament was being recalled
for a special session to discuss the problem of the N.P.D.
A motion revising relations with Great Britain "if the latter
acts against the express wishes of the people of N.F.D.
to reunite with their Motherland."-'
Unfortunately, the uncreasing efforts by the Somali
people both in the N.P.D. and Somalia and those of the
Somali Government, did not meet with any success. Duncan
Sandys, the Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, announced
in Nairobi on March 8th that Kenya elections would be held
between May 18th and 26th after which the country would
immediately beoome self-governing. More important still
he stated that the predominantly Somali populated area of
the N.P.D. should not secede but become Kenya's seventh
region. His decision, he stated, was based on the fact
that "the recently published report of the Commission showed
that there was an element in the District which wanted to
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3• The Issue of the N.F.D., p. 65.
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secede and be united with the Republic of Somalia. It
equally showed that there was another important element
which equally strongly wanted to remain a part of Kenya."
He added,
"We not only the British Government but both
parties here in Kenya, understand the desire of
Somali people to express their own identities
particularly when you get a people of one race
living in a country with another race. But
Kenya is a country which depends for its future
on being able to recognize people of different
races and prove it is capable of providing a
home where people of different races can live
honourably and amicably together."
The announcement, which was undoubtedly regarded
by the Somalia as the climax of humiliation and disregard
of the Somali case by the British, was naturally met
with unanimous support from the Kenya leaders. Both
Jomo Kenyatta, leader of KANU, and Ronald Ngala, leader
of KADU, expressed their happiness at the outcome of the
five and a half hours' talk with Sandys which resulted
in the announcement of the inclusion of the N.F.D.
within Kenya, "We have finally got the constitution we
p
and our opponents fought for."
On the other hand, Somali feeling was as expected,
immensely hurt by the announcement. On the spot the
Colonial Secretary's decision over the N.F.D. was reported
to have provoked, "immense indignation against the
Governmentwhich erupted into violence at Mandera on the
1. The Times. 9-3-1963.
2. The Times. 9-3-1963.
3. K.N.A./PC/GRSSA 8/I3 ADM. I5/3/II/52 Mandera Monthly
Reports March, 1963.
2%
10th at Eil-Wak on the ll+th and at Rhamu on the 17th. Meetings
held by the NPPPP resulted in continuous violence. In
Marsabit, violence necessitated the imposition of a curfew
for about a week. At Moyale a great number of Somalia
were arrested in connection with a demonstration. And at
Isiolo reports that the Union Jack was torn down in a
demonstration were circulated.^
In the Somali Republio reaction was equally vehement.
Besides demonstrations, speeches etc. the Somali Parliament
had on the night of March l^th supported by seventy four
votes to fourteen the Government's decision to break off
diplomatic relations with Britain. The British ambassador
there had been officially informed that the Somali Republic
p
had broken off diplomatic relations with Britain. The
Prime Minister announced that his Government had decided on
a breach because of Britain's policy over the N.P.D. of
Kenya. Moreover, and perhaps as a reaction and a
provocative measure, it was announced in Mogadishu in the
same day that the president of the Assembly - Jama Abdallah
o
Galib - and a group of members would leave for Moscow-^ the
following Monday at the invitation of the Soviet Government.
The invitation, though explained by the Somali Republic as
being a long-standing one and had no connection with the
current emergency, could only be understood to mean a
definite move in retaliation for British behaviour. The
1. The Times. 11-3-1963.
2. Somali News. I8-3-I963.
3. The Times. 13-3-1963.
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Soviet-Somali manoeuvres, as observed before, was no doubt
a factor in the declaration of the N.P.D. as a seventh
region in Kenya.^
In Britain itself the Sandys statement did not pas3
unnoticed. M.A. Bottomley (Middlesbrough East, Lab.) told
the Commons that:-
"It will be most unfortunate if the Government
leaves the situation where it is, to be settled
between Kenya and Somalia at the time when Kenya
becomes independent. This will be a very heavy
burden on two developing countries, and I would
have thought the last thing we wanted to do was to
make it difficult for them to look after their
internal affairs."
*
The Observer also had something to say about the
question. Admitting that the Kenya Somalia had a right to
choose their own future and that they differ from the other
Kenyans not just tribally but in every way, it had however
pointed to the fact that the obstacle to justice in this
case was the chauvinistic refusal of the Kenyan leaders
to part with a large slice of Kenya on the map. - It further
stated, "this attitude of the Kenyan leaders is a serious
consideration for the British Government... If London were
unilaterally to offer the Somalis the right of secession,
this would provoke a major crisis with the African parties
and undo the hard-won constitutional progress of recent
months. Yet the problem must be faced if Britain is not
to leave a local "Korea" on African hands at independence.
Unfortunately, none of these pleas was instrumental
in bringing any change in British policy in the area. Back
1. See Chapter VI, pp.
2. The Times. 13-3-1963.
3. The Observer, 17-3-1963.
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in the N.F.D. the Somali leaders challenged both the
British and Kenya Governments at the close of the'two days'
meeting at Wajir on the 20-22 March by resolving not to take
part in the General Elections and by rejecting the offer of
a separate region instead of secession. The Organizer of
the meeting, Abd ar-Rashid Khalif, the Legislative Council
member for the area, had in a message to Nairobi disclosed
the decision of the meeting, which was attended by sixty
political leaders, chiefs and tribal elders of the N.P.D.
The meeting had unanimously decided - First, to oppose the
partitioning of the Northern Frontier District Councils, the
Legislative Council, African courts and Muslim religious
courts. Secondly, to call for the resignation of chiefs
from African District Councils, the Legislature Council,
African Courts and Muslim religious courts. Thirdly, to
refuse to take part in discussions with Mr. Malcolm MacDonald,
the Governor, unless Britain was to change her decision. And
finally to send a delegation to Somalia to put forward
demands to its Government.
On March 214-th thirty-three N.P.D. Chiefs were reported
to have resigned their Government posts in protest. They
delivered a letter of resignation to John Golds, the D.C.,
at the end of a meeting. This step was met with enthusiasm
in Somalia, presumably since, as they were elected by
popular votes, the chiefs were responsible for the N.P.D.
and thus there was a feeling that the resignation of the
chiefs would eventually cause the collapse of the
1. The Times. 23-3-1963.
so\
SosalisdemonstratinginKe ya'sNortherni-ToatierDist ictinsupporofthech fsw oresigned inprotestagainsttheBritishQorarnaent'srefus ltallowthdist ict:jointheS sr.liRepubl c
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administration.1 In addition to this, the chiefs refused
to meet the Governor of the Colony on his arrival at Wajir
on an unexpected visit. The latter confined his talks
with the Provincial and District Commissioners.
Things were, however, made worse by the fact that
Alex Kholkhole,^ the Vice-President of the NPPPP had been
placed under a Restriction Order by the Government and
removed from the N.P.D. Being in the forefront of the
N.P.D. secessionist movement, his deportation from his
homeland was, seen in Somalia as a tribute to the success of
his efforts. In the N.P.D. itself reaction to his
deportation was vigorous. In Isiolo large crowds of Somali
men and women demonstrated in sympathy with the exiled
Kholkhole. In Nairobi and Mombasa Somalia wa|^ikAprotest
as a result of the Government's decision to restrict
Go
Kholkhole fib Kwale district in the Coast Province.
Not only the Somalia but even African leaders and
their parties were critical of the Government's move against
the NPPPP Vice-President. Both the Secretary-General of
the African Peoples Party, M.D. Odinga, and his Vice-President,
Wawire were against the act. Announcing that the APP
intended to send a delegation to the N.P.D., Odinga stated:-
1. Somali News. 29-3-1963.
2. A Rendille aged about thirty, a Primary sohool teacher
who had his education at the B.C.M.S. Mission at Marsabit
later joined as a partner in a trading business in the
district. In 1963 he stood for the NPPPP and'was
defeated in the by-election in the Northern Province
East Constituency caused by the death of Ali Aden Lord
for whom he deputized at the Legislative Council during
his illness. Kholkhole was one of the delegates for
the Lancaster House talks.
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"Preparation for war instead of peaceful
development should be condemned."
Odinga had further described the action against
Kholkhole as "a wrong move by the Government."^ and given
an assurance that the APP would resist any step taken
against nationalist leaders who were fighting for their
people.
KANU's attitude to the Kholkhole case was different.
They opposed the restriction without trial and M. Kibaki,
the Party1a executive officer, demanded that the Vice-
President of the NPPPP should be brought to trial as soon
as possible. When later three more N.F.D. leaders were
detained, Paul Ngei, as the deputy leader for the opposition
asked in the House of Representatives for the release of the
four politicians. He demanded that the men should be
brought to a judicial trial so that they might defend them¬
selves, the men being arrested from their homes without
having committed any criminal offence. But in answering
the allegation Kenyatta assumed that the four men had been
given money by the Somali Government so that they might
create trouble in the N.P.D. and hence they deserved the
imposed action. In retaliation to this, the President
of the Northern! Province Democratic Union remarked, "What
would surprise everybody is the fact that the present Kenya
Government follows the previous attitude adopted in the
past by the Colonialist Government in the present affair
1. Somali News. 5-I4.-I963.
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of the people of the N.F.D."'*'
After all this it was not surprising to see that the
Kenya General Elections of April 1963 were completely
boycotted by the N.F.D. Somalia. Out of the total of
41 seats in the Northern Eastern Region, 32 were boyootted.
And out of 28 seats for the Regional Assemblies in the six
p
N.F.D. Districts 2J+ were boycotted. Moreover, the end
of June, 1963# witnessed the start of a new wave of
violence in the area. As a result an African District
Commissioner was speared to death and a tribal chief
seriously wounded in the N.F.D. Dudi Waber, the D.C. was
on his way to Wajir from a tour of duty.^ The fact that the
Somalia had taken to violence as a result of the failure
of diplomatic manoeuvres was also apparent in the formation
of a new militant party in the N.F.D. called the National
Liberation Party which was determined to work for the
achievement of secession.
The Kenya African leaders then conscious of the
imminent dispute between Kenya and Somalia and the
repercussions it must have on the border did not hesitate
to raise the point in the House of Representatives at its
meeting on November 28th. The Leader of the opposition,
R.G. Ngala asked the House to urge the Government to ascertain
that the frontier line defence between Kenya and Somalia
was strengthened against casual raiders from Somalia on
Kenyan Police posts and Kenya citizens generally, and
1« Somali News. 5-7-1963.
2. Ibid. 26-4-1963; and The Times. 20-3-1963.
3. Two men accused of the incident fled to Somalia and the
Somali Government was blamed for refusing to hand them
back.
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suggested that the Prime Minister must satisfy himself
that a defence pact was made with Somalia covering such
raids. ^
At this stage it became obvious that a border
dispute between the neighbouring countries was inevitable
and it was at this juncture that the question assumed more
importance in the general African scene, though attempts
by the Somali Government to bring the issue before the
O
African States started well before this. In fact the
issue was put before the All-African Peopled Conference
at Tunis in January I960 and once more at its next meeting
in Cairo in March the following year. Dr. Abd ar-Rashid
Ali Sharmarke and the Somali delegates to the Monrovia
Conference for Heads of African States in May, 1961, brought
the question of the divided Somali nation to the notice of
the African leaders. Besides the matter of Somalia under
Ethiopia and French rule, the Kenya N.F.D. problem and its
development since the cession of Jubaland to Italy in 1925
was explained.^ The same issue was brought up by the
Somali delegation in Belgrade in September. In the following
year Dr. Sharmarke repeated his plea for the liberation of
Somalia in the N.F.D. and other territories at the Conference
1. The National Assembly? House of Representatives Official
Report. Volume I, Part I, 7-6-1963. Para. 2399-214.26.
2. For more on the African attitude see Drysdale, The
Somali Dispute, pp. II4.6—1535 at*d Lewis, The Modern
History of Somallland. pp. 195-199.
3* Kbutab wa-Tasrihat A1 Doctor Abd ar-Rashid All Sharmarke
(The Prime Minister): 1960-1961. (Mogadishu. 196?).
pp. 129, lbti, 211, 235.
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for African Heads of States in Lagos in January 1962,
requesting a referendum for the subjected people in the
three territories. In August and November of the same
year, as previously stated, President Aden Abdallah Uthman
and Sharraarke said to Kenyatta and Ngala in the name of
Pan-Africanism that the Somalia in Kenya should be allowed
to join the Somali Republic.
The Somalia were so persistent in presenting the
issue to the African world that on February 8th 1963
Muhammad Aden ^uro*, leading a delegation of political
representatives at the Afro-Asian Conference in Moshi,
Tanganyika^referred to the N.F.D. secessionist demands as
follows
"The Somali Republic has no desire for territorial
aggrandisement, there are indeed no benefits to be
derived from that, but all our people are one in
the desire that they should be united...come what may.
We hope that this conference will impress upon our
brothers from Kenya the danger of maintaining
artificial Colonial boundaries. Accordingly we
propose that the third Afro-Asian Solidarity
Conference, having taken note of the desire of the
Afro-Asian people to terminate every vestige of
colonialism in their continents...to abolish or to
adjust these frontiers to accord with the wishes
of the people."
In retaliation to the above speech, the Kenya
delegates walked out of the Conference shouting
"aggressors".
On 25th March 1963, the Prime Minister of Uganda
A. Milton Obote communicated with the Somali Prime Minister
to say how strongly he felt that African boundary questions
should only be discussed with African leaders. He was
1. Somali News, 8-2-1963; The Times, 8-2-1963.
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critical of the Somali Government's view "that it would
have been proper for Britain, as it were, to give away a
part of Kenya's present territory. This he wrote,
would have been the "kind of arbitrary imperial action
p
against which we have struggled to reach our independence."
But neither the opposition they met in Cairo in March 1961,
nor the present attitude of the Uganda leader effected any
change in the Somali persistence in continuing the campaign
in Africa for the secession of the N.P.D.
On April 19th, 1963, a mission representing the
Somali inhabitants of the N.P.D. left on a tour to a
number of west and north African countries. The mission,
led by Abd ar-Rashid Khalif,^ left Cairo on li^th April for
Nigeria to explain the claims of the N.P.D. Somalia for
independence and attachment to the neighbouring Somali
Republic. Before leaving Cairo, Khalif told the press
that the Kenya Government wanted to keep this region at all
costs because it wanted to take over the important natural
resources there, particularly an oil deposit which had
already been discovered.^" The delegates stopped at
Mogadishu on their way back from the tour, which included
Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, U.A.R.,
Sudan, Libya and Tunisia. Khalif told the authorities in
Mogadishu that all the people they had talked to had shown
1. Drysdale, p. llj.6.
2. Ibid.
3. Other members of the delegation were:- Maalim Abbas
Armin, Muhammad Ali Haji and Digo Maalim Stambul.
I4.. Somali News, I9-I4.-I963.
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their sympathy with the Somalia* insistence on self-
determination as a way to solve the N.F.D. question. He
declared also that they all agreed that justice for the
N.P.D. would be a contribution towards African unity.
The question was also brought forward by the Somali
Republic's Foreign Minister, Abdullahi Isa, before the
African Summit Conference at Addis Ababa in May 1963.
At Nairobi, on his way to the Conference, the Minister
announced that the Somali Government wanted a greater Somalia
set up within an East and Central African Federation. He
added, "we want Somalia to be united, but at the same time
we want a united Africa."2
It was this conflict between the Somali interest,
the Kenya interest and the concepts and declarations of
Pan-Africanism that was the root of the problem. The
Somalis on their side adhere^strongly to the resolutions of
the All-African People's Conferences held at Accra and
Tunis in 1958 and I960 respectively. The First All-African
Peoples' Conference held at Accra on December 5-13, came out
with the Resolution on Frontiers, Boundaries and Federation.
It ran as follows:-
3 - Whereas artificial barriers and frontiers
drawn by imperialists to divide African Peoples
operate to the detriment of Africans and should
therefore be abolished or adjusted;
Whereas frontiers which cut across ethnic groups
or divide peoples of the same stock are unnatural
and are not conducive to peaee or stability;....
Be it resolved and it is hereby resolved by the
1. Somali News. 10-5-1963.
2. Somali News, 17-5-1963.
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All-African Peoples Conference that the Conference:
(a) denounces artificial frontiers drawn by
Imperialist Powers to divide the Peoples
of Africa, particularly those which cut
across ethnic groups and divide people of
the same stock.
This was further supplemented by the resolution on
Somaliland passed by the Second All-African Conference at
Tunis on 25-30 January I960, which stated
The Conference "hails and supports the struggle of
the people of Somaliland for independence and unity in order
to give birth to a bigger Somaliland.
But despite this and the continued Somali efforts,
the Afrioa of the 60's was not in a position to lend
definite support for such a case. The African leaders
feared that acceptance of the principles of readjustment
of former colonial boundaries would inevitably encourage
separatist movements, like Katanga, and also destroy the
political stability on which the wider unity of African
States depends.3 Not even the friendliest African State
at that time was willing to react positively on the Somali
side. The Sudan with its southern-Sudanese question and
the arbitrary Ethiopian border could hardly afford to lend
support. The only move was seen in the consecutive press
propaganda in commemoration of the anniversaries of Somali
1. Quoted by Catherine Hoskyns, Case Studies on African
Diplomacy; 2 The Ethiopia - Somalia - Kenya Dispute "
1960-67. (Par es-Salam. Nairobi. Addis. 1969). p. 17*
Also see Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A short Political
guide. (New York, 1962), p. 231. "
2. Ibid.. and Hoskyns, p. 2lj.6.
3. Drysdale, p. 162.
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Independence where newspapers like Al-Ayyam and Akhir lahaa
had devoted some pages to explaining the problem of the
N.F.D. to the Sudanese readers."*" Nor was the general
feeling of the African intellectuals in any way different
from that of the political leaders. This was obvious
from the writings later on of A.O, Cukwurah who was very
critical of the Somali ethnic claims and maintained:
"Revindication of lost territories is not always
practicable, especially where they have crystallized
into new political formulae as solidified as the
ancestral unit itself."
And that of V.B. Thompson who was also of the opinion
that:
"Regroupments of Peoples according to ethnic origins,
as in the case of the Somalia or the Ewes or the
Bakongos, while admirable from the point of view of a
common language, are fraught with dangers which
could even militate against the further growth of
Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanists aim at combating
'tribalism', and such regroupments would entrench
this and probably, give rise to divisionist
tendencies."3
But the cool response inside Africa to the Somali
question did not, however, deter the Somalis from further
action. The period between August and December 1963, when
Kenya had finally achieved its Independence, was marked with
fresh attempts by the Somalis to negotiate with Kenya and
Britain in the hope of reaching a settlement. In August,
talks between Somalia and Britain started in Rome on the
future of the N.F.D.^ The British side was represented by
1. See Al-Ayyam, 17-9-1966; and Akhlr Lahsa. July 1967.
2. A.O. Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in
International Law, (Manchester, 1967)» P. lOli.
3. V.P. Thompson, Africa and Unity; The Evolution of Pan-
Africanism. (London, 1969), p. 296.
ij.. See Drysdale for details on the Rome talks, pp. I5I4.-I58.
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Mr. Peter Thomas, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and was joined by the Kenya delegation which included
Governor MacDonald, Mr. Gichuru, Minister of Finance;
Tom Mboya, Minister of Justice; J. Murumbi, Minister of
State; Peter Koinange, Minister of State for Pan-African
Affairs and Mr. Charles Njorojo, Kenya's Attorney General.
As The Times, had observed, "This foreshadows a strong front
by the Kenya Africans against any solution involving
partition.""*" The idea behind the attachment of the Kenyan
delegation to the official party was "to overcome the
difficulty of Kenya's status at a conference between sovereign
P
states." The Somali side was led by Dr. Abd ar-Rashid
Sharmarke.
From the beginning of the talks the Somalia felt that
the British Government's attitude was not only that of
avoiding its responsibility but that it tried to confine
the solution of the problem to being one of Somali-Kenyan
concern.^ Immediately after the end of the talks, Prime
Minister Sharmarke held a press conference in which he
indicated the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government
for the failure of the talks and for any consequences which
might derive from that attitude. He remarked, "The Somali
delegation regrets that the conference in which it had suoh
high hopes ended in a deadlock. The British delegation
came to the conference with no intention of settling the
1. The Times, 2I4.-8-I963.
2. Ibid.
3. Somali News, 30-8-1963.
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problem of the N.P.D. but merely to explore the position
of the Somali Republic which was in any case well known
to them.""''
The outcome of the Rome talks was, however, naturally
viewed from a different angle by the Kenya delegates.
Returning from the Conference they said that the two most
important results of the Conference were Britain's insistence
that Somalia should deal with the Kenya Government and the
fact that Kenya had indicated that it was still willing to
discuss the issue with Somalia. In short, no change had
by any means occurred in the Kenya position. The leader
of the delegation Mr. Gichuru went further to assert that
Kenya would not feel bound by any recommendation by the
Organization of African States if the Somali Government
decided to refer the matter to them. And at any rate,
the consensus of opinion in African circles pointed to the
possibility that support was generally for Kenya rather
than for the Somali Republic.
The failure of the Rome talks had further proved
that the gap between the Somali and Kenya positions was too
wide to be bridged. But paradoxically enough this did not
oonvince the Somalia of the futility of further attempts.
Par from it; twelve Somali chiefs, elders and politicians
joined the Governor, the Kenya Prime Minister and five
other Ministers for talks in Nairobi, in September. The
gesture was actually made by the Kenya side in the hope
that the Somalia might agree to renounce their demands for
1. Ibid.
2. The Times. 30-8-1963.
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secession in exchange for some "internal" safeguards. As
on other occasions, the Nairobi talks ended in failure with
each side adhering more than ever to his position.
With the failure of efforts to bridge the gap between
the two, the beginning of the 60*s witnessed a new phase
in Kenya-Somalia relations. The violence which had
already started all over the disputed territory made the
prospect of trouble in the North Eastern Region of Kenya,
53*000 sq. miles of desert inhabited mainly by the
secessionist Somalia, real and dangerous. This naturally
presented a critical situation for the newly independent
Kenya and further a dilemma for the Organization of African
Unity. Britain had slowly washed her hands of direct
responsibility and left the burden to be taken by the two
newly independent African States. No wonder a border
dispute and bloodshed were imminent; but the question still
remains to whose benefit and for what reasons British
policy on the issue was to be explained.
Perhaps the reason, as Gerald Reece, then the
Provincial Commissioner of the N.P.D., explained in a
talk to some Rotarians in Nairobi, was inherent in the
fact that the N.P.D. was considered a natural buffer.
He said the main reason why they bothered about a small
collection of people, who lived in what was too often
described as 'a worthless desert* was that "it was a most
useful buffer".^" In 19i|.0 when they were very short of
1. K.N.A./PC/NFD II4./I Press Cuttings East African Standard,
6-9-19l|.6. Reece himself had on many occasions openly
advocated the support of the Somali case. He once stated,
"We hope that all Somalis who are now divided between four
different Nations will form one unit and in due course
become independent..." (lbid.).
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troops in Kenya they abandoned about half of the country
to the Italians for reasons of expediency, and this served
the purpose. In peace time it was also a very useful
buffer for Kenya, because the Abyssinians were allowed to
carry rifles, and consequently it was thought very
inconvenient to have the Abyssinian frontier adjoining the
Native Reserves of Kenya. More important still in the
eyes of the British administrators was the presence of the
N.P.D. under the administration of Kenya as safeguard and
buffer against the westward movement of the Somalia
■»
towards the White Highlands. Indeed the Somalis themselves
had always argued that if not for the harassment of the
British, they would have spread as far as Tanganyika. The
concept of the N.P.D. as a buffer was also conceived of
from the ideological sense, since the British were already
worried about a possible spread of Communist influence from
Somalia and felt that the N.P.D. ought rather to be in
British hands.
Also, British policy in the area was seen as of
economic significance. The Somali Republic's view in the
matter was that Britain was primarily interested in the
economic potentialities of the area; because the N.P.D.
was considered a supplier of livestock to Britain and the
Commonwealth. Moreover, the N.P.D. was a unique area
for ranching, for animal husbandry and mineral deposits."*"
1. See p. 302 for the remark by Khalif on the oil prospects
of the N.P.D. and the British decision on the N.P.D.
issue.
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For this reason, it was asserted "that the returning of
this area to its original national territory, the Somali
Republic, is naturally a loss to Britain's exploitation
of this part of Africa."1 Hence Britain's decision.
Besides these factors, the British decision was said
to be motivated by strategic factors. Kenya was useful to
Britain as a military base. And finally it was possible
that Britain did not want to offend the feeling of
Jomo Kenyatta and his African colleagues who did their best
to see that the N.F.D. remained in Kenya. But still the
real reasons behind the British decision remained puzzling,
at least to the Somalia, who were not sure whether it was
mainly to safeguard British interest in Kenya or whether
it was the usua l British policy of 'divide and mile" in
order to create permanent friction between the Somali
Government and the Independent state of Kenya. However, one
thing they were sure about was that the past and present
policies of successive British Governments towards the
Somali people and their territories had brought the Horn of
Africa into a state of political tension and conflict,
seriously impairing relations between the Somali Republic
and neighbouring states. Also, according to the Somali
view, the instability of the Horn of Africa, "is the creation
of the British Government which will be held responsible
O
for many consequencies that may follow."
1. N.F.D.: Frontier Problem Planted by Britain between
Kenya and Somali Republic. (Ministry of Information,
Mogadishu), pp. 10-11.
2. The Issue of the N.F.D.. p. 7k»
311
It is not within the soope of this thesis to discuss
the events which followed but it was obvious that since
the time when Kenya had attained her independence, a lot
of changes had occurred in the area. With the adoption by
the Somali Government of the policy of peaceful co-existence
with its neighbours, the complete absence of armed
resistance at the present time and the increasing orientation
of the territory as a part of Kenya, the attitude*of the
N.P.D. Somalia was gradually changing and prospects of the
emergence of violent nationalism are not predictable.
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CONCLUSION
It is obvious from the preceding chapters that the
problem of administration of the Soma lis was two-fold:
in the first place, there were the difficulties facing the
British officials due to the geography of the area, the
constant movement of the Somalia into Kenya, and their
attitude to any attempts at foreign rule. Secondly, from
the Somali point of vi-ew there was obviously neglect under
►
British rule: no successful policy with regard to their
social, economic and political improvement was implemented.
The N.P.D. was often dismissed by the British as "a worthless
desert" and a burden on the economy of the Colony. The
result was that British rule in Kenya had very little
effect on the Somalia.
The first chapter of the thesis illustrated_how,
during the period 18^5-1916 the British administration of
Jubaland Province was never welcomed by the Somalia; the
authorities had to despatch three major expeditions against
the Herti, the Ogaden, and the Marehan, Somali opposition in
Jubaland was increased by the influence of Muhammad Abdille
Hasan's religious movement in Northern Somaliland. This
had involved the administration in Jubaland in frbquent
clashes with the Somalia. It was only the continual inter¬
tribal clashes between the different Somali sections and
sub-sections that prevented a general rising against the
British.
Prom the second chapter it is evident that although it
was realised that something had to be done to bring about
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the pacification of the Somalia both in Jubaland and the
N.F.D., the administration was at a loss to implement the
various suggestions made in this respect. The possibility
of the pacification of the Somali through social and
economic advancement failed, as a result of the conflicting
views between Nairobi, the officials on the spot, and the
various government departments. Although temporary
pacification was achieved by forceful measures, such as the
re-occupation of Serenli and Afmadu, and the disarmament of
the Somalia, permanent pacification proved impossible as
long as the Somalia were not put into distinct administrative
%■
units. The problem was aggravated by the cession of
Jubaland to Italy in 1925 and the consequent division of the
Somalia once again. This planted an artificial boundary
between the British and the Italian Somalia and by no means
eased the task of their administration.
The third chapter discussed the international aspect
of the administration of the Somalia in Kenya's Northern
Frontier Province. The absence of any official British
control over the frontier up to 1910 resulted in a continued
state of lawlessness in the frontier area. The incidence of
raids and counter-raids between the tribes on the Abyssinian
and, to a lesser extent, on the Italian side, naturally
brought about a series of conflicts between the administration
in Kenya and those in Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. The
situation was further complicated by the influence of the
Italo-Ethiopian conflict of 1935 and the Second World War.
The result was that considerable difficulty was experienced
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in protecting an already burdened Province against the
influx of refugees across the border, and the temporary
evacuation of Government stations which led to considerable
hardships to the Somalis.
The position of the urban or 'Alien' Somalis in Kenya -
%
as revealed in Chapter IV - was no better than that of their
kin in the N.F.D. In the period between the two World Wars
they were moved from pillar to post on the assumption that
they had no right of settlement in the Colony. This was
greatly responsible for the well organized and sophisticated
political campaign launched by this group of Somalis against
the British colonial administration. Their position was
further complicated by the fact that they were far more
politically conscious than the local N.F.D. Somalis and
that they continually raised a number of difficult and
complicated issues with regard to their status in the Colony.
It was this that made them very unpopular with the colonial
administration throughout the period under consideration.
The fifth chapter shows that in the post-wah period
both Somali sections were no happier at the proposed Post
War Development Plan for their economic and social
improvement. Once again although proposals were mooted,
no definite results came out and the Somali remained one
of the least satisfied with the results of British rule on
the eve of independence.
The last two chapters discussed the growth of national
feeling among the Kenya Somalia and showed that the tendency
of the British authorities to rule the Somalis in the N.F.D.
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differently from the rest of the country and the continued
efforts to restrict movement inside and outside the Province,
had alienated them. This had definitely accounted for the
degree of adhesion that the N.P.D. Somalia had for the
concept of a Greater Somalia which flourished in Mogadishu
in the post-war period and which was propagated by the
S.Y.L. The argument by the N.P.D. Somali political leaders
that they were never meant to develop as a part of Kenya was
accepted by all the Somalia. This was seen by them as the
most legitimate justification for their secession from Kenya
and their joining the Somali Republic after it had.attained
its independence in I960. So strong was the Somali appeal
for secession that they eventually managed to win the
support of the 'Alien* Somalia in the 60's - although the
latter had been less inclined to support them earlier on.
The Somali struggle for secession did not, however, end
in success. The British Government's verdict against
secession had far-reaching repercussions in relations
between the Governments of independent Kenya and Somalia
and no doubt in the general African arena. Although it is
outside the scope of this thesis to discuss the position of
the Somali in post-independent Kenya, it is worthwhile
stating an opinion on the future of the area.
It is obvious that the Kenya Somalia - as is the case
with their kin still under Ethiopian domination - had
suffered from the aftermath of colonialism and Imperial
expansion which left them divided despite their unity of
culture, language and heritage. But, on the other hand,
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modem Africa - as was stated in the last chapter of the
thesis - is not prepared for further territorial sub¬
divisions in the continent. It is for the leaders of
these African States to negotiate means of peaceful co¬
existence of the different races within one territory rather
than prepare for fresh troubles which none of them can
afford.
In the case of the N.P.D. Somalia, I am convinced -
after visiting the area in 1970 - that with the improvement
of the facilities ibr education and health, the opening of
»
the North Eastern Region, the degree of spread of the
Swahili language, the enthusiasm with which Somali
youngsters sing the Kenya National Songs and take a certain
tw,
pride in being called Kenyans ,^/jcert a inly shows that the
future of the Region and its inhabitants is within Kenya.
Moreover, the tendency by the Somali Government to maintain
friendly relations with its neighbours, and the fact that
the so-called 'Shifts' or freedom fighters had actually
settled down to some sort of agriculture on the other side
of the Somali border, indicates that armed resistance is
not to be expected - at least in the near future.
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Kablalla Sadeh Gerrbh Aissa
(1) From I.M.Lewis, Peoples Of The Horn Of Africg. p.15. andT y
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3*Rer Tulla Rer Amir Rer Wegieda
1
Iss Rer Eili Dera
, 1 r
Rer Ahmed Rer Khalif Hussein Rer Gerard




Rer Abdallah Rer Isaak
■ " I .
Mahak Rob " Rer Aden Kheir
I
Yussuf " Rer1 '/Si A'anag
Rer khalaf Rer Figgis KerT&mir Ren bifTera R^Aii Nasr R&r
1 Ali
R*r Guled Rer Samanter Hajssan
KhaEaF" "Ref 'Ugas Nur
t


























I t 1 1 ' n





Habr Toljaala Habr Gerhajis
i 1
Saad Muda Awal Issa Muga
Awal
Ay lib r 1Habr Yunis Aidagalla Arab
T T
Mohammed Abokr(Ibran) Ibrahim(Sambur) Musa Abokr(Jaalo) Anmed
(Toljaalo)
(1) Another division of the Hawiya given by S.Tduval, Somali
Nationalism , p. 17#
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Appendix II
A short history of the main Somali towns
in the N.F.D.1
(a) Garlssa
Game into existence as a District in 1925* with its
headquarters at Bura and later at Garissa in 1931. Prior
to 1920 the district was part of the Tanaland Province.
In 1920, it came under the control of Senior Commissioner,
Jubaland, and in 1921 transferred to the N.P.D., then
under military administration. In 1925 it became a
district of the N.F.D.
(b) Isiolo:-
Isiolo District was established in 1929 by the
amalgamation of the Samburu and Garba Tulla Districts.
Garba Tulla, originally called Bulesa, was formed in
1917A®. When Bulesa ceased to be a sub-district of
Wajir between 1925 and 1929, it was then merged with
Samburu. Samburu had been administered from Archer^
post until 1921 when a separate station was established
at Barsalo. The latter was closed in 1929, the Samburu
becoming part of the Isiolo District.
(c) Mandera:-
Became a District headquarters in 1910, and remained
Capital of the N.F.D. until 1919 when it was moved to Meru.
For a short period in 1914-0 the Italians invaded the District.




Prom 1912 to 1923 Gurreta was administered from Moyale until
1923 when it became a Sub-District. In 192,6-29 Gurreh was
an independent district, but between 1929 and 1914-1 it was
amalgamated with Moyale as a Sub-District.
(d) Wajir:-
•>
Wajir was first occupied by the British in 1912 to
prevent the Boran being driven by the Somalia from the
wells. Wajir District remained quiet at the outbreak of
the 19114.-18 War, especially after Mr. Deck, the Officer-in
Charge of the N.P.D. had removed the Aulihan, Rer Afgab,
from the wells in 1911+. and sent them to Serenli. In 1916
the sack of Serenli by Abd ar-Rahraan Mursal with the Aulihan
had necessitated the evacuation of the station for a short
while as no troops were available to defend it. Prom 1921
to 1926 the Military took over the administration of Wajir
District, as with the rest of the N.P.D. The Italo-
Ethiopian war of 1935 affected the district, as did the





Notes on some of the leading British Officials In charge of
Soma lis in the Protectorate and the Colony1
(a) Glenday, Vincent G.:-
Assistant D.C., E.A.P., from 27th December 1913J
Acting D.C., N.F.D., January 1911]. to June 1919; Officer-in-
Charge, Somali disarmament, N.P.D., from March 1919;
Seconded as D.C. Berbers, British Soraaliland, from the period
March to September 1920; Assistant D.C., Nandi and trans-
Ngora, from October 1922; D.C. 1926; On the Abyssinian
Mission, 1927-28; Acting P.C., N.P.D. 1930-31* and again
from March 1933; Senior D.C., 1931].; P.O. in 1935; Governor
and Commander-in-Charge, Somaliland from 1939.
(b) Hope, John Owen Webley. C.M.G. (1918).
3rd Treasury Assistant, E.A.P., from 17th May 1899;
Officer-in-Charge, N.P.D., in 1909; Acting P.C., Kenya 1915*
(c) Klttermaster» H.B., O.B.E. (1918).
Assistant D.C., E.A.P., from 18th December 1908; D.C.
in 1915; Officer-in-Charge, N.P.D., from 1916; Secretary
to administration, Somaliland, from August 1921.
(d) Reece. Sir Gerald K.C.M.G. 1950; C.B.E. 1943; O.B.E. 1937-
Administrative Cadet, Kenya, from 1925; District
Officer, from 1927; Acting Consul for Southern Abyssinia,
from 1932 and Consul from June 1934; D.C. (on abolition of
Consulate) from 1937; On military service 1915-19 and 194i»
1. Prom Colonial Office List, British Museum.
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Senior Political Officer, Borana Province of Ethiopia I9I4.I;
Officer-in-charge of the N.P.D. 1939-14-5J P.O., N.P.D. from
19I4.5; Military Governor of Somalia between 1914-8-53.
(e) Turnbull, Sir Richard Gordon G.C.M.G. 1962; K.C.M.G.
1958; C.M.G. 1953.
District Officer, Kenya, from 1931; Civil Liaison
Officer, Headquarters of East African Command, in 1914-7;
P.C., N.P.D., from 1914-8; Defence Secretary from 1955*
Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Tanganyika, from 1958;







This agreement is between the Gonali eMefs Stambul Abcli, Hassan
Asaan, 3huria Hassan Hurgcn and Kafundi of the Orrnar Tagalla.
They agree that if a Conali woi&n goes to the Galia or a Gal la
woman goes to the 3o;aalis the dowri to be paid, will be Rs. gCC.
As to released 7/agalla slaves now with—the Co.iali, the chiefs
on both sides agree that if the • wish to leave the Sonalis they
are at liberty to go with all their women and children but gOf
their live stock is to remain with the jonalis and to beeone
Is ail property.
Pi'ociuct'.'.l Co . iissioner,
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SPURGES
I - In the United Kingdom
(1) Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, London
(P.R.O./F.O.)
(a) F.O. 107 Zanzibar Series 1893-1898.
(b) F.O. 1 Abyssinia Diplomatic and Consular
1897-1901;.
(c) F.O. 2 Africa series 1899-1905.
(d) F.O. I4.5 Italy Diplomatic and Consular.
(e) F.O. 78 Egypt.
(f) F.O. 369 Abyssinia Consular: Mega Records.
(g) F.O. 371 Diplomatic General, I92O-I4.O:-
371/5502 Occupation of Gaddaduma.
/5510 Tactical value of the Cession of
Jubaland in relation to settlement
of the Dodecause.
/5510 Movement of the Marehan in Jubaland.
/I3IO8 White Paper on Abyssinian raids on
British territory.
/19123 Italo-Ethiopian dispute: Draft
Memornadum.
/19172 Parliamentary Questions: Political -
Egyptian Ethiopian.
/20168 Report by Consul Reece - Mega - on
events in his district.
/20168 Kenya-Ethiopian frontier. Treatment
of Belligerents crossing the
frontier.
/20169 Kenya-Ethiopia frontier incident.
/20931 Kenya-Ethiopia Frontier Adjustments.
/22023 Kenya-Ethiopia Frontier: watering
rights.
/23378 Kenya-Ethiopia Frontier: Evacuation
of Moyale.
(h) F.O. I4.O3 Confidential Prints 1896-1912.
i;03/225 Mr. Craufurd's expedition to Afmadu;
East Africa Company's treaties on
Italian side of the Juba.
/226 Craufurd's visit to Afmadu;
Establishment of relations with Boran;
Craufurd's report on general conditions




I4O3/227 Craufurd's report on the geography
of Jubaland Province.
/228 Farrant's report of journey to
Gosha country; Ogaden Sultan sends
treaty; Payment of subsidy to the
sultan.
/2I4I Jenner's journey to Afmadu.
/2l\2 Abyssinian raids near Boran; Reports
on Afmadu; Proposed expedition
against Afmadu.
/2J43 Reports on Ogaden Somalia; Raids by
Somalia on Gosha.
/2I4J4 Raids by Ogaden on Gosha; proposed
new post at the junction of the Daua
and Juba; Raids on Galla by
Abdallah Somalia.
/260 Ogaden Somalia and payment*of fine;
State of negotiations with.
/261 Ogaden raid near Gobwen; Hardinge
urges necessity of occupation of
Afmadu; Ogaden raids on Yonte.
/263 Ogaden Sultan and chiefs; Expedition
against Somalia; Intended Abyssinian
advance into Afmadu.
/280 Report on Ogaden country; Report on
operations against the Ogaden.
/28l Jenner's journey to Serenli.
/282 Jenner's visit to Serenli; Expedition
into Boran country.
/283 Expulsion of two Somalia from Kismayu.
/295 Affairs at Serenli; Quarrel between
Abdallah Somalia and Afmadu Ogaden.
/296 Advance of money to Farah Ibrahim;
Death of Herti Sultan; Murder of
Jenner; Ogaden revolt; Ogaden
Expedition.
/3O8 Jubaland rising; Ogfiden Expedition;
Expenditure on Jubaland; Difficulties
connected with dealing with the
Ogaden; Overtures from Ogaden Sultan;
Occupation of Afmadu; Surrender of
Ogaden Sultan.
/309 Ogaden Punitive Expedition; Future
Policy in Jubaland.
/310 Recent events in Jubaland.
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P.O. 14.03 Contd.
^03/311 Ogaden Sultan how did he escape?;
Payment of cattle fine to Government
by Biscaya Somalia.
/318 Civil administration of Jubaland;
Ogaden fine; Future administration of
Jubaland; Expedition to Afmadu by
Harrison and Macdougall
/319 Report by Major Harrison on'1 Jubaland;
Inclusion of Biscaya territory in
Jubaland.
/321 Administration of Biscaya country;
Visit of Major Harrison to Biscaya.
/330 Ogaden Somalia invited by Mullah to
collect arms and make ready for him
in Jubaland; Scheme for carrying on
campaign against Ogaden Somalia.
/331 State of Jubaland; Little danger of
revolt.
/3I42 Capture of emissary of Mullah in
Jubaland.
/357 Report on Jubaland; Abyssinian raids
on Boran.
/366 Disturbance at Kismayu.
Colonial Office Archives. Public Record Office, London
(P.R.O./CTOTT
(a) C.O. 533 Original Correspondence 1905-19JL|.3»
533/11-15 Correspondence regarding Ashgar's
movement.
/16 Herti Somalis.
/I33 Operations against the Marehan.
/135 Trade with Abyssinia.
/137 Situation in Marehan country.
/II42 Loyal address from Soma lis in
Jubaland.
/153 Deportation of Ali Abdi principal
chief of the Gurreh.
/15k N.P.D. water supply.
/I56 Report on water supply of Jubaland:
Special warrant.
/167 Attack on Serenli.





/173 Native disturbances in the N.P.D.
/175 Roads in the N.P.D.
/177 Jubaland and the N.P.D.
/179 Roads in Jubaland
/182 Affairs in the N.P.D.
/I85 Kismayu-Serenli road.
/189 Situation in Jubaland
/192 Ibid.
/193 Operations against the Aulihan.
/196 Memorandum by J. Ainsworth, re.
Muhammedanism in relation to the
first administration of the
Protectorate in East Africa.
/210 Report of the Economic Commission.
/211 Administration of the N.P.D.
/213 Cession of Jubaland.
/215 Water supply in the wells at Afmadu.
/216 Kismayu-Serenli Motor Road; Anglo-
Italian Boundary: Jubaland.
/233 Patrolling of Abyssinian frontier.
/23I Abyssinia-East Africa Boundary.
/2I4.I Situation in Abyssinian frontier;
Disarmament of Marehan and Aulihan.
/256 Ibid.
/261 Cession of Jubaland.
/262 Ibid.
/263 Aulihan raid.
/28I4. Cession of Jubaland.
/296 Ibid.
/299 N.P.D. administration.
/309 Boundaries - administrative; Provinces
and Districts.
/3II Cession of Jubaland.
/312 Ibid.
/3I5 The Native Hut and Poll Tax Amendment.
/328 Recommendations of frontier Conference.





/333 Repatriation of the Degodia.
/3*4-5 Ibid.
/3I46 Ibid.
/3*4-7 Jubaland Boundary Commission.
/3*4-8 Immigration of Abyssinian tribes.
/3&*4- Work of Anglo-Italian Boundary
Commission.
/370 Conflict with Somalis in Nyeri
District.
/371 Report of E.B. Denham on his tour
to N.P.P.
/373 Delimitation of the British and
Abyssinian frontier.
/37*4- Abyssinian raids into Kenya.
/38O Taxation in the N.P.P.
/385 Administration of the N.P.P.
/386 Abyssinian raids into Kenya; An
Article by E.H.M. Clifford, "A
Recent Boundary Commission".
/391 Abd ar-Rahraan Mursal.
/391+ Southern Abyssinian Boundary.
/396 Taxation in the N.P.P.
/I4.OI Disarmament of frontier tribes.
/I4.O2 Status of the Nairobi Somalis.
/I4.O5 Development of stock trade in the
N.P.P.
/I|.09 Memorandum on the meeting with
Fituarari Ayella at Moyale on
18th January 1931*
/I4.I6 Migration of Somalia from Italian
Somaliland.
/I4.I9 Slave raids on the Kenya-Abyssinian
Boundary.
/I4.25 Petition by Ishak Shariff Community.
/I4.3O The Abyssinian-Kenyan and Abyssinian-
Sudan Frontier; Trans-frontier trade.
/I4.39 N.P.P. Poll Tax Ordinance.
/kk.7 Petition: Status of Darod Somalis in
Kenya.
/k79 Maltreatment of British subjects by
Italian authorities.
/I4.8O Petition by Ishak Shariff Community.
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